Marcos the Revolutionary

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COMMENTS ON MARCOS THE REVOLUTIONARY

"*Marcos the Revolutionary* commends itself to readers who desire to acquire an understanding of the Marcos theory of revolution... In his characterization of President Marcos, Professor Crisostomo succeeds in depicting him in his true light as the nation's leader: a heroic figure who is always moved by feelings of humanity, who is firm but compassionate, warm but resolute, who is above all a genuine idealist with a pragmatic view of the world around him — a commanding yet humane personality."

— DR. GUILLERMO C. DE VEGA
In his Introduction

* * *

"...already on the local best-seller list, *Marcos the Revolutionary* by Isabelo T. Crisostomo may be the book of the year, as *Today's Revolution: Democracy* by Ferdinand E. Marcos was in 1972.

"...Crisostomo's book is unique in its way. It is a full-length summary of the events which led to the proclamation of martial law, their protagonists, and the challenges they posed to a leader who had his own ideas of how a revolution should be carried out.

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— E. AGUILAR CRUZ
Expressweek Magazine

* * *

"...a comprehensive and interesting piece of scholarship in contemporary affairs, it deserves wider readership..."

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HIS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS

Sixth President of the Republic of the Philippines.

MARCOS
THE
REVOLUTIONARY

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO

With an
Introduction by Dr. Guillermo C. de Vega

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MARCOS THE REVOLUTIONARY

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DEDICATION

To the revolutionaries
building the New Society

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INTRODUCTION

This book is the first serious attempt by a prominent Filipino writer to analyze with singular clarity and logic the phenomenal rise of President Ferdinand E. Marcos from politician to revolutionary. Rich in scholarship but deceptively simple in its style of exposition, this work of Professor Isabelo T. Crisostomo is remarkably instructive and enjoyable to read. It commends itself to readers who desire to acquire an understanding of the Marcos theory of revolution, as well as the background, rationale and prospects of his historic decision.

A great number of Filipinos, including members of the intelligentsia, were taken by surprise when President Marcos, a product of the old system of politics in this country, turned against that system and decided to change the course of the nation's history by waging a democratic revolution. Their astonishment stemmed from the fact that no President before him had had the genius to conceive such a comprehensive vision, and the courage and fortitude to implement it. Furthermore, past experience in the history of this and other nations, in Asia and other parts of the globe, could yield no precedent similar or parallel to the action President Marcos had taken. Finally, they realized that the Marcos revolution, unlike other great revolutions in history, is peaceful, legal, and constitutional.

Professor Crisostomo contends in *Marcos the Revolutionary* — incidentally his second book on the President — that those who were surprised by the apparent suddenness of the President's decision would not have been caught unaware if they had been perceptive enough to sense that actually revolution was a recurrent message in the President's speeches and official pronouncements. As early as 1965, when by an overwhelming majority he won the Republic's presidency, he was already mentioning it, and in his First Inaugural Address delivered on December 30, 1965 he adumbrated the course of the revolution as one principally directed at the oligarchy — "the privileged few."

Scrutinizing the President's published speeches, interviews with journalists and a wide spectrum of other sources, Crisostomo ob-

serves that since Mr. Marcos occupied the presidency, he had nothing but contempt for the *status quo*. He wanted to build a new social system because the old order, totally controlled by the elite, was too sterile and decadent to admit changes that could relieve the misery of the masses. Yet, paradoxically enough, although theoretically the most powerful man in the Republic, the President did not have sufficient powers to institute the reforms in the society awaited by the people. Congress was at best slow in considering the passage of revolutionary social legislation that would diffuse wealth and power since the elements comprising it were by and large oligarchs or their proud extensions. The judiciary, like Congress, was stuffed with a number of representatives of the oligarchy, and as a consequence the dispensation of justice was not beyond the commerce of the influential. The bureaucracy was bogged down in the mire of corruption and ineptitude, thus resulting in the loss of millions of public funds, and the sacrifice of the masses. Criminality and lawlessness were rampant not only because of the inequities engendered by the oligarchic control of the economy but also because of the prevailing distorted sense of values of the law-enforcers and the people themselves.

To a President obsessed with national greatness and a passion to improve the plight of his people the situation was intolerable. Thus, as early as May 29, 1966, President Marcos declared:

"You have elected me as your leader, but as your leader I find myself impotent to raise this cry [that public officials be beyond reproach] for all the people to hear. I have issued the directives, I have issued the orders. I commanded, and yet it does not go beyond the lower echelons of the hierarchy of government."

Imperative was, therefore, the need to change the system and recast the values of our people. But such an end could only be attained by radical action, a revolution. The President, observes the author, could sense that the mood of the people, as early as 1966, was portentous; the masses were rapidly developing a revolutionary temper that could explode any time. Thus he appealed to the oligarchy to be more socially responsive and responsible, to stop the ostentatious and brazen display of their affluence and

power, and to share, if possible, part of their privileges with the masses. But instead of heeding his advice the unscrupulous rich used their mass media in ridicule to destroy his credibility as they continued to mock the masses by extravagantly flaunting their pelf and privilege. When the masses began to rise, as Marcos had warned, the oligarchy, much to their dismay, discovered he was with them — the people — leading them in their revolt against the system.

As a critical study of the Marcos leadership, Crisostomo's book familiarizes the reader with the background and motivations of a number of great revolutionary leaders in history, vividly capturing the mood and temper of the period covered by his narrative — the irresponsibility and unresponsiveness of the rich, the inadequacy of the powers of the President of the Republic, the rebelliousness of the young, the color and clangor of protest rallies and demonstrations which were eventually infiltrated and manipulated by Communist ideologues. The author's account of the so-called "Revolt at Congress," the "Battle of Mendiola" and "Siege of Malacanang" prior to the launching of the Democratic Revolution on January 25, 1971 by President Marcos will doubtless enable the readers to re-live that chapter in our history which helped precipitate martial law.

However, it is in his characterization of President Marcos where Professor Crisostomo excels himself. Drawing from the President's own words and from those of his critics in the mass media, he succeeds in depicting the President in his true light as the nation's leader: a heroic figure who is always moved by feelings of humanity, who is firm but compassionate, warm but resolute, who is above all a genuine idealist with a pragmatic view of the world around him, indeed a commanding yet humane personality.

GUILLERMO C. DE VEGA, Ph. D.

PREFACE

To attempt a book encompassing the whole life of such a commanding figure as President Ferdinand E. Marcos is a monumental mission; but it is too prodigious a task to embark on for a writer who has too little time in his hands. What I have attempted, therefore, is not a biography but an essay on his evolution from an orthodox politician to an unorthodox revolutionary leader.

My thesis is that Ferdinand E. Marcos ascended the presidency as a revolutionary — a revolutionary in embryo, so to speak — whose dream of national greatness was an obsession that slanted across time. I have attempted to develop and substantiate this thesis, using as principal authority the President's own major speeches since 1965.

Chapter 1, "The Presidency in Retrospect," is partly taken from a chapter of my *The Challenge of Leadership.** I have used it as my opening statement and as a foreshadowing of the historic events described in the rest of the book.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Guillermo C. de Vega who painstakingly read the typescript and wrote the Introduction, and to my friend and colleague of long standing, Atty. Leopoldo L. Africa, who obliged with critical comments on the manuscript.

I am likewise grateful to Miss Azucena L. dela Rosa who typed and retyped the whole manuscript and helped read the proofs; to newsman-teacher Lamberto C. Castro, Miss Paz S. Caballero, Mr. Marcial I. Duba and Ricardo S. Galing, who helped in the research; and Jose M. Buhain, another teacher-journalist, and Prof. Pastor O. Cruz who helped read the copy and the proofs.

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* Published in 1969.

Mr. Vitaliano R. Martinez accepted the task of printing this book at a financial sacrifice; I am indebted to him and his family, including his son-in-law Narciso C. Cruz.

I am also thankful to Mr. Primitivo Mijares and Mr. Vicente M. Tanedo, chairman and executive director, respectively, of the Media Advisory Council, for granting me permission (Special Permit No. 0055, dated June 7, 1973) to publish this book.

But as in the past, I am particularly and especially grateful to my wife, Nory, guardian of my private workshop.

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO

Quezon City, Philippines
June 12, 1973

CHAPTER

THE PRESIDENCY IN RETROSPECT 1

HISTORY, it has been said, is like a magnetic needle that quivers, oscillates, responds to new impulses, and throbs at the slightest variation in current. The intensity of its response corresponds to the impact of a leader's decisions on the life of his following. A leader performing an ordinary task, such as carrying out a routine program his predecessor had initiated but left unfinished, is a common leader of the interregnum.

History looks with favor to the uncommon leader. Such a leader is innovative, energetic, visionary and daring. He does not merely drift with the current and the tide of events. Armed with the power of thought and the gift of courage he participates in the making of events rather than merely watches them. He does not just participate, he commands. He controls and directs the energy of the current and the tide to achieve his goals.

An uncommon leader, unlike a leader of the interregnum, strives to found things that will endure. History casts his name

and his deeds in marble and granite. On the other hand, history records the names of common leaders in quicksand.

A leader must reflect the hopes as well as the fears of the people. His choice by the people is decided largely by his unqualified promise to shoulder, endure and transcend what they assume as a passing storm in their slow and painful evolution. He must give his all. Because the people's fragile faith lies in his hands he must never accept defeat. Another writer says that in the leader's eyes should glow a dream crying for realization, and from his lips should issue the voices of the people praying for deliverance from their wretched condition.

> "Above his head is the sky that will rejoice at his finest hour or grieve over his worst. And underneath his feet is the earth that will swallow him up should he fail. From him—much is expected. Such is the meaning of the covenant between the leader and the follower. No failure is acceptable for every fact of failure is an act of betrayal."[1]

This is the inevitable agony of leadership. By his choice to lead, the leader sacrifices a large measure of selfhood and individuality; he must leave behind personal attachments that will hinder him from reaching the heights.

Leadership is an acceptance of the challenge hurled by the need to fulfill a dream, a response to an appeal coming from many for deliverance from a given plight. This is why a leader cannot and does not live for himself alone. He lives for others. His life is one of self-surrender, self-giving and self-sacrifice. This painful act of giving the self to others is the substance of leadership.

Definitely, to be a true leader is to be not an ordinary man. Leadership is an extraordinary human condition, and one who presumes to be a leader must transcend the limits of the common human being.

IN another book[2] the writer of these lines observed, with other writers, that the greatness of a leader is measured by the degree of his achievements, and that a leader arrives on the scene only

when the time is ripe for him. Like an actor in a drama, a leader has a role to play. If the role is great, as in a classic Greek or Shakespearean masterpiece, he must be armed with great qualities. For there must be direct and exact correspondence between the task that a leader must accomplish and the qualities that he possesses.

If a leader is ill-equipped for a great role or, to put it another way, too small for a job, he will not be called upstage to perform it. Great roles are for great actors. If, by accident, or by the work of other men, the great leader is unable to perform, and a little man is thrust upon the scene to assume the role, it will not be a command performance. He can only provide incidental continuity to the unfolding of events in the drama. His lacklustre performance will be brief and unmemorable.

The impact of a great leader's achievement upon a generation deepens with the passage of time. His name continues to be cherished and remembered by generations thereafter. Such a leader is a maker of history.

The makers of history are the darlings of historians.

TO be a great leader a man must be able to unite and move other men to fervent action. A great task cannot be accomplished by one man alone, or by a few men. A task like founding a nation, building a republic, or saving it, lifting the people from a crisis, or reforming, modernizing or revolutionizing society is too momentous for one leader or a few men, among millions of other men, to accomplish. A great social transformation such as the building of a *New Society* needs great leadership for it requires the dismantling, destruction and replacement of the weak and sterile parts of the old social structure; it demands a reconciliation between the productive and usable old with the parts and elements that are new.

Such a task is rendered infinitely more difficult by the fact that the materials the leader must strive to put together are not inert wood, steel and stone, but people, each one moved by unique impulses and instincts as complex and mysterious as those of the leader.

But men who make history, or who lead in the making of it, are equipped with peculiar qualities not common among other men. Eric Hoffer writes in his *The True Believer*[3] that such leaders possess audacity and a joy in defiance, an iron will, a fanatical conviction that they are in possession of the one and only truth, faith in their destiny and luck, a capacity for passionate hatred, contempt for the present, a cunning estimate of human nature, a delight in symbols, unbounded brazenness which finds expression in their disregard of consistency, a recognition that the innermost craving of a following is for communion, and a capacity for winning and holding the utmost loyalty of a group of able lieutenants. To Hoffer these qualities are not equal in importance; the most important are audacity, fanatical faith in a cause, awareness of the importance of a closely-knit collectivity, and, above all, the ability to evoke fervent devotion in a group of able lieutenants.

If this be true it would be interesting to review briefly what has been recorded about our past leaders.

JOSE Rizal, the authentic father of political thought in the country[4], did not possess a mass leader's qualities. He was an intellectual who possessed the courage to advocate unpopular views —the necessity for reforms from above, the urgent need for education of his people, the need to end the conspiracy between the Spanish Civil government and the Catholic church in brutalizing his people—but lacked the other qualities. He was an intellectual isolated in the summit of Olympus from which he issued exhortations to the people below.

Even after Andres Bonifacio, an outstanding mass leader, had organized the Katipunan and primed it for attack, Rizal in his exile in Dapitan, vacillated, then rejected the challenge, when asked to lead the revolution. This was not his fault, of course; the hero was simply not equipped with the audacity and joy in defiance of a mass movement leader. A revolutionary situation such as existed in the country then demanded the leadership of a revolutionary, and that revolutionary leader was Bonifacio.[5]

Unschooled, denied of material means, Bonifacio possessed great courage, and an iron will. Experience and reading had developed in him the fanatical conviction that he had found the one and only truth: revolution was the answer to the plight of his people. His contempt for the corrupt and abusive regime was deep and boundless; hatred for the present boiled in his blood. The evidence indicates that in the beginning Bonifacio enjoyed the loyalty and devotion of a corps of select men, among them Emilio Jacinto and Pio Valenzuela, which could have accounted for the success of the organization. But it soon became apparent that he had communion only with the lower class, the middle class, represented by the ilustrados, distrusted and envied him. In the end even the lower class was divided into several warring factions, and the Katipunan itself broke up into two major divisions in conflict with each other. Eventually Bonifacio was quietly liquidated.

He did not live long enough to see the triumph of the revolution he had led.

Emilio Aguinaldo, who took over the leadership of the entire movement after the death of Bonifacio, succeeded where his predecessor had failed. Practically the entire country, it has been written, rallied behind him. Consequently the mass-based movement recorded military successes to the extent that the Spanish government was forced to sue for peace. This covenant, signed at Biak-na-Bato, presaged a fatal destiny for the movement. Aguinaldo's advisers, who counseled him to enter the agreement, did not have the ability to see beyond. They were not aware that on the other side of the globe the United States of America had begun to flex its imperialist muscles — an event Jose Rizal had prophesied in his "The Philippines A Century Hence" — and that the Philippines was a vital part of its plan of conquest.

If Aguinaldo had not been ill-advised by his lieutenants the Revolution launched by Bonifacio could have been pursued to its glorious and historic end.

On the second phase of the Revolution, this time against the Americans to whom Spain had sold the Philippines pursuant to the

Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Aguinaldo was still the man for the season. But he was surrounded by envious, jealous advisers who were more educated than he and who belonged to the principalia. With the brilliant political thinker, Apolinario Mabini, by his side he was on the right course. This direction was clear. Writes Cesar A. Majul:

> "Here was [Mabini's] chance, as an intellectual, to come in close contact with those men who intimately represented the violent and coercive character of the Revolution. Through Aguinaldo, he would be given the enviable chance of giving the movement a more resolute direction, warn it of deviations from the original impulses, check its negative corollaries, and guide it along more constructive lines. The spirit justifying the Revolution would essentially be the same spirit justifying the establishment of a new order. The spirit consisted of the affirmation of human and individual rights. Although the criterion for military leadership was success in the military operations of a revolution, this was not the final end of the Revolution. The end of the Revolution was what military success might bring about. Mabini was to spell out what this end was, an end in relation to which all other ends now appeared ultimately as merely means. The fundamental aim was the establishment of a national community where social relations were to be defined in accordance with the liberal formulation of the great thinkers and reformers of the world; a community that would set itself as an example to other oppressed peoples that they may develop the will to establish their own particular national communities."[6]

But to the other lieutenants of Aguinaldo, Mabini was a Rasputin, a Black Cabinet, whom they feared, envied and hated. Through intrigues and machinations these advisers, who submitted to Aguinaldo without glorying in that submission, for it was their own interests that they wanted to protect, caused Mabini's downfall. In retirement, Mabini bitterly reflected on the failure of the Revolution.[7] He said the Revolution would have been successful if the people were more virtuous and more willing to undergo greater

sacrifices; if the leaders were more dedicated and less guided by personal or class interests and if the energies of all were directed to a definite social goal and signifying the construction of a new social order where patriotism reigned supreme.

But if Mabini was harsh on the abusive soldiers, he was more severe in his indictment of the leadership, principally Aguinaldo's. Essentially, said Mabini, in his *La Revolucion Filipina,* the movement failed because "it was poorly directed and because its chief acquired his position, not by meritorious acts, but by reprehensible ones, that is, instead of supporting those men useful to the country, he, on account of envy, reduced them to ineffectivity." Of the other leaders — Aguinaldo's lieutenants and advisers — Mabini said "they could not serve their country except on an elevated position — an error perilous to the common welfare."

AFTER the Revolution, with the Americans safely in control of the Philippines, another mass movement leader emerged, Manuel L. Quezon. He was not, by his own admission,[8] a true revolutionary. In fact, though he knew the Katipunan existed, and that one of its leaders, Emilio Jacinto, was in the same school with him, he did not immediately join it. Unlike Jacinto, who even then had already "sealed with his life his love of freedom for his people," Quezon was more inclined to make trouble than to avoid it.

It was only after the outbreak of the Filipino-American war, the second phase of the Revolution, that Quezon decided to join the revolutionary movement. "The news of the hostilities which began on February 4, 1899, reached Baler where I was staying overnight," wrote Quezon. "I decided at once that my duty lay in fighting for the freedom of my country." He was to add wishfully, later on, that he felt certain he would be one of the national military heroes of Philippine history.

Quezon's political leadership began after the capture of Aguinaldo in Palanan. He first engaged in law practice, then drifted into politics. According to William T. Sexton, in his book on the Filipino-American war, *Soldiers in the Philippines,*[9] Quezon remained a passionate, if peaceful, apostle of Philippine independence even

after the establishment of peace. Like Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, he had a fanatical conviction that it was the right of the Filipinos to revolt in order to win independence. "Possessed of a brilliant mind, a pleasing personality and public speaking ability," Sexton wrote of Quezon, "he saw his ideals materialized thirty-five years later in his own inauguration as first President of the Philippine Commonwealth."

The success of Quezon as a mass movement leader derived from a combination of the qualities noted earlier. Aside from audacity and daring, fanatical conviction in the rightness of his cause (independence and nationalism), personal charisma and love of dramatic symbols, he had a mastery of the psychology of his people. In his book, *Aide-de-Camp to Freedom,*[10] Teodoro M. Kalaw said Quezon had none of his contemporaries' scholarly gifts, but had the gift of intuitive insight into the hearts and minds of men. This was confirmed by Claro M. Recto who, in his *My Crusade,*[11] stated that Quezon had no organized political philosophy, unlike Rizal or Mabini, "and didn't seem to need one." For as a political leader he was an empiricist, dealing with situations as they arose, acting and deciding according to what his instinct dictated, always thinking of what was politically useful and convenient. Victory, said Recto, was Quezon's consuming and overpowering objective in all of his political struggles, which he always waged in the grand, spectacular manner.

Like other great leaders Quezon possessed the brazenness to be inconsistent. His inconsistency was notorious. Wrote Kalaw:

> "I felt I could not rely on his statements because a change in circumstance could eventually make him contradict them . . . he had a good word for every side of every question . . . he could be quoted as being for independence, *against* independence, for a dominion status, *against* a commonwealth, for free trade, *against* trade . . ."

As a rabble-rouser he was unequalled. In his controversy with then Governor General Leonard Wood, he brought up the issue of pro-Americanism before the electorate. He denounced Wood as

a tyrant and a usurper of power, thus inflaming the passions of Filipinos against the Americans. It was at the height of that controversy that Quezon made this immortal statement:

> "I would rather have the legislature abolished and allow the Governor General to govern alone. There has been no party in power since he took over his post. Because he is the Power, the only power, I would prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by Americans, because no matter how bad a Filipino government might be, it can still be improved."

His mastery of the psychology of his people is legendary. He knew what they wanted and gave it to them immediately. Quick to decide and act on the spot, he was impatient with details, in contrast to Osmena, to whom he once said:

> "The trouble with you is that you take this game of politics too seriously. You look too far behind you and too far ahead of you. Our people do not understand that. They do not want it. All they want is to have the present problem solved, and solved with the least pain. That is all."

But while Quezon had no patience with details, it was his men who studied details for him carefully, thoroughly. According to Kalaw he "always chose the right man for the job." This gift of winning the devotion and loyalty of the men around him, coupled with his unerring statesman's instinct, saved Quezon from costly blunders.

"The greatness of a statesman," writes Karl Jaspers, in *The Future of Mankind*,[12] "lies in his feeling for the methods of expertness, in his quick grasp of the essentials, in finding experts, listening to them, allowing them to work and to get results." Quezon evidently had this gift.

The combination of these gifts made Quezon a greater man than any of his contemporaries. He was the man for a great role, to lead the movement for the independence of his people. That movement was to reach its climax on July 4, 1946.

SERGIO Osmena, Sr. never really had a chance for a command performance. Even when the chance came, he did not seize it. In effect his role was that of a second-in-command. Retiring, suave and urbane compared to Quezon, he had none of the latter's brashness and passion for spectacle. From the inauguration of the Commonwealth in 1935 through the outbreak of World War II Quezon was the man on center-stage, continuing his performance. Even up to his death in Saranac Lake, New York, as head of the government-in-exile, he was still the President.

Osmena could have seized the stage from Quezon in 1943, when in November of that year Quezon's term of office would terminate in accordance with an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth which Quezon himself had inspired in 1940. Osmena would automatically succeed him. Both were in the United States then, Quezon a very sickly man. But Quezon still wanted to remain President, to die in the saddle, as it were. When he brought this up with Osmena, the latter, always the self-effacing gentleman that he was, granted Quezon's wish. Writes Teodoro A. Agoncillo in his *A Short History of the Philippines*:[13]

> "Largely through Osmena's efforts, the American Congress passed a resolution providing that the President and vice president of the Commonwealth should 'continue in their respective offices until the President of the United States proclaims that their successors have been duly elected and qualified in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Philippines.' It was thus that though defeated in law, the actor in Quezon won a decisive victory. He remained president up to the time of his death on August 1, 1944. Osmena then became president." But only for a while.

After the war Osmena awaited and sought his chance to lead his people during the first postwar election in 1945. The people were prostrate. The whole economy was in shambles. The urban centers of population and commerce were in ruins. Poverty brought death to thousands. The country was in total distress.

The national crisis demanded dynamic and tireless leadership. It was too great a job for Osmena whose finest years had already been spent. It had to be Manuel A. Roxas.

And Roxas it was. In the election of April 23, 1945, Roxas won with more than 200,000 votes over the aging Osmena, who did not campaign. Roxas thus became the last Commonwealth President and the first President of the Republic when the Philippines became independent on July 4, 1946.

Roxas was also gifted with great leadership qualities. His role was to rebuild a nation wantonly destroyed. He seemed big enough for his role. A human dynamo, a fabled speaker and orator, a tried political leader and soldier and, it has been written, an "intense and almost humorless executive hurrying to achieve his goal," Roxas was the man for the occasion. But he found himself caught between the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, he must lift his prostrate people on their feet, nurse, feed and shelter them until they had recovered. But the country was a vast wasteland, a Sahara of rubbles and craters. To achieve his goal, the only alternative was to seek American support. Yet, to do so, to make another country rehabilitate his own, he would be putting his country's future in hock.

It was a historical dilemma unique to his era.

Still a decision had to be made; the government had to go to the immediate source of aid, the United States.

The country had to pay a great price for this. Roxas himself had to go back to his people, after they had been nursed back to life and were strong enough to go to the polling booth, to persuade and coax them into voting affirmatively on a proposed amendment to the Constitution granting equal rights to Americans to exploit the wealth and resources of this country. This has become known as the Parity Rights Amendment to the 1935 Constitution that for years thereafter has been a bone of controversy.

At the same time massive government graft and corruption dimmed the lustre of Roxas's tenure. Himself impeccably clean, up-

right and patriotic, he had chosen some men to work with him who exploited the postwar situation for personal economic gain. One of the biggest sources of graft then was the Surplus Property Commission whose depots of surplus American war materials made millionaires of a number of Roxas men. It was also then that other Roxas men became millionaires by engaging in the now-infamous Chinese immigration quota racket.

Elpidio Quirino, his vice president, inherited the presidency and its mountainous problems after Roxas's death, of a heart attack, in Clark Field, on April 15, 1948. Like his predecessor, Quirino immediately promised to rebuild the economy and to restore the people's faith in the government. He launched a vaunted five-year economic mobilization program, ambitious both in its range and intention. But the momentum of corruption that had accelerated during the first two years of Roxas at the helm was not checked. Quirino became a much-maligned leader, the target of barbs and relentless criticism from the opposition Nacionalista and the press. Much of the attack was justified because he did not prove to be a great leader. A conservative and retiring gentleman like Osmena, he merely plodded along. For all his good intentions, Quirino also failed in his mission to improve not only the economy but morality in and outside the government as well. In no time, his popularity dropped, and this partly owing to the involvement of a brother in not a few transactions considered of doubtful propriety and legality.

Quirino's term, even from the viewpoint of this writer who was then a college student, was far from spectacular. Because of mismanagement of public affairs, immorality in government, corruption of the men around him, and uncurbed poverty, the people became more restive. It was during his regime that the Huks nearly succeeded in overthrowing the government. To stop them in their tracks, Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* in 1950, followed by the lightning arrest of Huk leaders, principally the members of the Politburo based in Manila.

BUT the hero of that hour was not Quirino; it was Ramon Magsaysay, a former guerillero, mechanic and politician. Magsay-

say was then secretary of national defense. Unabashedly non-ideological and nakedly pro-American, he was the least intellectually qualified of all Filipino leaders ever to become President. For a leader he lacked a leader's vision, but he possessed charisma and audacity which his press-agents, aided by an American propaganda expert, blew up to heroic proportions.[14] His achievement as defense secretary was his success in winning the Huk leaders and followers to the government side, not by force of arms but by a policy of rehabilitation. So dramatically was his image projected that the people, looking up to him as a saviour, overwhelmingly elected him President in 1953. Quirino, his former chief, was set aside.

But like other leaders before him Magsaysay did not measure up to the high expectations he had generated. He had no blueprint for progress. All his plans were mere improvisations and patchwork, a temporary expedient which required the continued alliance of the masses with him. The result was that after his death in a plane crash in March 1957 "the rural areas remained what they had been before he became president." However, his regime is remembered as having given the masses serious attention, for not only did Magsaysay fling the doors of Malacanang open to them but frequently went out of his way to be with them in their rural dwellings. If he did not die too soon Magsaysay could have been the leader of the revolt of the masses against the elite, a role that destiny or Providence did not assign to him but to another man who would emerge later.

Upon Magsaysay's death his second-in-command, Carlos P. Garcia, succeeded to the presidency. In November of that year, however, Garcia was elected on his own. But the role he had to play — destroying the Communist and maintaining peace and order — had already been preempted by Magsaysay.

Garcia must be credited, however, with the nationalistic Filipino First policy of his administration. As he himself explained it, the policy meant "the concerted effort of a sovereign nation to rise to the level of supremacy in its own economic household."[15] In his view it was a natural and legitimate aspiration of a free and independent people. While economic freedom came only after political

emancipation, political independence would be meaningless without economic liberation. This was the reason Garcia fought parity after the war; he believed it was a shame for the country to "blackmarket its patrimony." It was because of his Filipino First policy that Congress enacted several nationalization measures.

Consequently, alien interests in the country became hostile to Garcia. The American magazine *Time*, for instance, began publishing derogatory items about his administration. Garcia would take none of this; in retaliation he banned one of its correspondents, James Bell, from the country.

Even in retirement Garcia still could not understand why many Filipinos mistook his healthy nationalism for Communism. "Read the history of Hungary, Iraq, Egypt, India, Tibet, Africa and South America," he said. "Only nationlism can free the Filipinos from foreign economic domination. It is a regenerative force that gives respect and dignity to the country and people."

In the off-year election of 1959 Garcia made his Filipino First policy his principal campaign issue. The defeat of the Nacionalista party candidates then, running under that battlecry, presaged his downfall in 1961.

The man who beat him was Diosdado Macapagal. To Macapagal the role assigned by events was a great one. The economy, which had continuously deteriorated since the postwar years, was in shambles. The situation was desperate. Unemployment, graft and corruption, the tenancy problem and the restiveness of the discontented masses threatened the stability of the Republic. Radical changes were needed; the situation demanded great leadership.

Macapagal correctly saw one answer to the problem: agrarian reform. Against spirited opposition by the landlords, he succeeded in having the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844), enacted which he signed into law on August 8, 1963. But the finished product had already been mangled beyond recognition in Congress, most of whose members were landlords themselves or their extensions. Macapagal himself revealed that he launched land reform to "bring about prosperity for the greatest number."[16] But as finally

signed the land reform code was no longer an instrument for radical change.

Macapagal's task was a great one; it called for a great leader. He was given the chance to perform it. But evidently he was not big enough for the job. When he walked out of the stage because his period of performance had ended, the task was still there. Not only was the task unfinished; it had grown bigger and more formidable because of the accretion of graft and nameless venalities committed partly by his own men during his regime.

This epic role would be assigned by destiny to Ferdinand E. Marcos, a kind of leader the country had never known before. #

CHAPTER

THE PATIENT REVOLUTIONARY 2

UNLIKE most of his predecessors, Ferdinand E. Marcos ascended the presidency armed with a correct analysis of the national condition. He knew that the feudal character of Philippine society was the central cause of the people's problems. The undiluted concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few rendered it impossible for the great majority of the people to improve the quality of their lives and ensure a better future for their children, for the monopolists of wealth, power and privilege were unexcelled in the use of cunning, persuasion and coercion. They possessed not only the expertise but the readiness to use violence if necessary.

As he would later admit, Marcos knew even before he became President that this oligarchic character of Philippine society was largely responsible for the failure of past Presidents. For in reality it was not the President but the privileged few who held real power. The President himself and the entire government machinery were indirectly under the control of the elite, for it was the elite's eco-

nomic power that invested the politicians with political power. No one could be elected President without the support of these vested-interest groups that controlled the country's wealth and the country's largest, most respected and therefore influential mass media.

It was therefore wishful and quixotic for anyone regardless of his credentials — intellect, charisma, experience and integrity — to seek the presidency and hope to win it without bending to the will of the economic monopolists. For the monopolists also controlled the two major political parties. A person could be nominated as official candidate of any of these parties only if he was acceptable to the party bosses. And to be acceptable to them a candidate must not only be a good bet, in other words a potential winner, but above all, a "good boy," that is, he would not turn against his makers.

Two recent Philippine Presidents who dared defy the bosses tasted the bitter venom of their wrath: President Carlos P. Garcia, who had boldly adopted a Filipino First Policy, as noted in the first chapter, which the native economic elite and their American and other foreign allies considered repugnant to *their* interests; and President Diosdado Macapagal, who had had the courage to go against the feudal landlords by initiating a bold land reform program. Both paid dearly for their individual acts of "betrayal" of the economic overlords.

A brilliant politician Ferdinand E. Marcos knew this sordid fact of Philippine political life. That throughout his political career he had never tasted defeat was proof that he was not naive enough, nor unreasonably stubborn, to go against it. It was a reality he knew how to live with, and use to his political advantage. Politics is the art of compromise, and Marcos would not hesitate to compromise if it would advance and accelerate the attainment of his goal.

Now that goal was no longer to win elections but to bring the Philippines to the heights of greatness. 'This nation can be great again!" was in fact his slogan, his battlecry, when he campaigned for the presidency in 1965.

All leaders dream of greatness. For greatness means immortality. But to Marcos greatness, as events proved later, was not mere-

ly a dream. It was an obsession that transcended time and space and seemed to motivate all his actions as President. In his statements and written speeches he never failed to invoke it; he always spoke of greatness and of history. It was obvious that he was determined to rendezvous with history and immortality. And he could attain that end only if he succeeded in leading his country to greatness.

Unlike his predecessors, Marcos spoke and planned in the grand manner. Even his language matched the grandeur of his dream and his vision. Where other leaders spoke of little things, often of trifles, and initiated short-term programs, Marcos spoke of whole concepts, of history, as though he were the leader of a great and powerful nation, not an underdeveloped country. He passionately exhorted his people to think big without however ignoring their little immediate needs.

Greatness, to Marcos, was not just an idea but a living goal. In his first inaugural speech, delivered at the historic Luneta on December 30, 1965, he boldly described his election victory as a "Mandate for Greatness." Calling attention to the historic significance of the Luneta, where Jose Rizal was shot to death by the Spaniards on December 30, 1896, he recounted how Rizal fell from a tyrant's bullets and how a new nation sprang from the martyr's blood. "That nation," said Marcos, "became the first modern republic in Asia and Africa. It is our nation." He then proudly proclaimed that the Philippines was one stable country in an area of instability, where ballots, not bullets, decided the fate of leaders and parties.

> "Thus, Kawit and Malolos are celebrated in our history as acts of national greatness. Why national greatness? Because, armed with nothing but raw courage and a passionate intelligence and patriotism, our predecessors built the noble edifice of the first Asian Republic."[1]

By saying that the Philippines was the first modern republic in Asia, Marcos was no doubt trying to instill in his people a sense of pride in their history, in their national identity. He was telling

them they had a past they could well be proud of and that a people with a sense of pride in their history would not remain insignificant nor passive. This was in fact to be the beginning of a relentless series of challenges to his people to break away from their inertia and strive to make their country a leader-nation in Asia.

But Marcos used that opportunity — his maiden speech as the sixth President of the Republic — not only to call his people's attention to a glorious chapter in their history but to tell them what was wrong with their society. In the context of the immediate past, his words were too daring. He had just defeated the incumbent President, Diosdado Macapagal, in what had been considered widely as an uphill campaign for the presidency, with one of the nation's biggest economic bosses, Fernando Lopez, as his Vice President. And now, on his inauguration, he was already turning against the President-makers. Marcos in fact, attacked them in these words:

> "We have come upon a phase of our history when ideals are only a veneer for greed and power in public and private affairs, when devotion to duty and dedication to a public trust are to be weighed at all times against private advantages and personal gain, and when loyalties can be traded in the open market."[2]

To the perceptive it was evident that the President uttering these words was not a conventional politician.

Marcos then described the terrible despair the people had begun to feel, the cries of thousands, the face of hunger and hopelessness he had seen in the barrios, in huts and hovels all over the land. He attacked the insincerity of private and public men who excelled in devising slogans for the sake of recorders of history but not for those who would live by them in honor and dignity. He deplored the lack of peace and order, the failure of the government to guarantee life and limb in the growing cities. Then he zeroed in on what he believed to be the central cause of the nation's plight.

> "Prosperity for all, we promise. But only a privileged few achieve it, and, to make the pain obvious, parade their com-

> forts and advantages before the eyes of an impoverished many. Justice and security are as myths rendered into elaborate fictions to dramatize our so-called well-being and our happy march to progress."[3]

In his first speech, then, as President of the Republic, Ferdinand E. Marcos broke tradition when he directly identified the "privileged few," the elite, as the fundamental source of the social and economic inequities in the country. He not only identified them as a group but castigated them for their ostentatious and brazen display of comfort and advantage before the impoverished majority, and for bending the ends of justice to their will. Conventional Presidents and leaders, among them Marcos's predecessors, would simply have taken that opportunity to thank the people and the direct sources of political power in the country for giving them their confidence; they would have refrained from unleashing tirades against them. But that Marcos did, in utter disregard of politesse and diplomacy; that he seized that opportunity to deliver his attack against the elite and the miscarriage of justice in the country, marked him off as an uncommon leader.

Marcos then interpreted the meaning of his victory. It meant, he emphasized, the people's rejection of the prevailing social, economic and political inequities. His election was not merely a political victory; it was "a new mandate of leadership, a mandate not merely for change but for greatness." In essence he was telling the people that they had elected him President because they wanted him to lead them to greatness, to a state worthy of their forebears whose heroism and achievements were boldly etched in the nation's history.

He vowed to restore the meaning and majesty of the democratic rule of law. In the next breath he issued a stern warning to the lawless and to the enemies of the Republic:

> "To those who flaunt the law, I say: this is my constitutional duty and I am resolved to perform it . . . I am pledged to execute the law and preserve the Constitution of our Republic. This I shall do. And if need be I shall direct the forcible if legal elimination of all lawless elements."[4]

Ending his speech the new President stressed that every generation writes its own history, then challenged his own generation to write their own, since "our forebears had written theirs — with nobility."[5]

THE following month, on January 24, 1966, President Marcos delivered his first State-of-the-Nation address during the first session of the Sixth Congress. He admitted that the nation was in crisis, a crisis he had inherited. The government had been spending more than its income, and incurring a daily deficit of ₱2 million. As of December 31, 1965, the day after he delivered his inaugural address, the cash position of the government was at a negative level by ₱228 million, and the total budgetary loans amounted to ₱1,081.1 million.

Marcos seized that occasion to resume his attack on the privileged few whom he accused of reducing elections into a contest of the rich and the unscrupulous. Observing that deserving but poor and penurious candidates never won in an election except by a miracle, he vowed to end that shame and degradation of democracy by legislation that would limit campaign spending. Simultaneously, he called for an amendment of the Constitution. He wanted it amended to provide for synchronized elections and a single term of six years for the President. Both proposals were to be implemented later.

He then identified the national problems: low level of agricultural productivity, stunted growth of industries, inadequate communications, inadequate public utilities such as transportation, communication, water and electricity, the annual schools crisis and the deteriorating quality of education, criminality, sluggish investigation and disposition of cases in the courts, and smuggling — "that cancerous evil that has wreaked havoc on our economy and weakened the moral fiber of our people."

Marcos deplored the unpreparedness of the military and police establishments, saying such unpreparedness unnecessarily exposed the security of the Republic to grave danger, the danger posed by Communists. As he put it:

> "We face a pervasive threat from a military power that has flagrantly resorted to open aggression to attain its ends and has never accepted that general war would be disastrous. Limited but protracted warfare is very much in evidence in areas immediately adjoining our territory. The conflicts in South Vietnam and Malaysia present security problems of the gravest concern."[6]

As early as that speech, then, Marcos was already warning of the Communist threat. At the same time he noted that the "temper of the people has changed, it has turned from complacency into an aggressive demand for greatness."[7]

The whole point is that in the view of Marcos the Philippines was sick and the principal cause of the sickness was the concentration of wealth and power in a few. The government was not doing what it was expected to do, lifting the people from poverty, for instance, and keeping the military in a state of preparedness. Unprepared, the military would be too impotent to meet the threat of Communism. And since the temper of the people had changed from complacency to aggressiveness, the Republic was faced with a real and grave danger.

After making a diagnosis of the national condition President Marcos issued specific prescriptions. First, strengthening of the agricultural sector to attain self-sufficiency in the production of food, especially rice, and the improvement and diversification of the production of export crops. Corollary to this would be the implementation of land reform. Next, he would reinvigorate industries, adopt a policy of attraction for investors, domestic or foreign, and provide government assistance to infant industries. Then he proposed that the government provide a solid physical base — infrastructure — which would adequately support planned and sustained economic growth: improved and new major thoroughfares, irrigation facilities, power and water supply facilities, flood control, and physical plants for regular government social services.

Next he proposed to redirect the educational system. He would define the responsibility over the financing of the different levels

of the schools system, encourage science and research, strengthen vocational and technical courses, and liberate the educational system from political influence, particularly in the recruitment, promotion and assignment of personnel.

Marcos prescribed maximum protection to the working men. He would increase their productivity through training and placement services. He also called for the elevation of the standards of administration of justice, and pledged to complement crime prevention and law enforcement with the speedy and fair adjudication of cases.

His policy against Communism was firm and unbending. Thus, while saying that "we shall be friends to all nations that share our values and wish us no evil," he maintained a hard line against Communism which in his view posed "an ever-present danger to the security of this region." "We shall stand ever alert to this menace and are determined to resist its expansion through our own strength and in cooperation with other nations," Marcos said.

Marcos then called on the people and the other leaders to respond to the national problem with complete dedication and total heroism. "For this political body is ill," he declared, "perhaps paralyzed by this great disease, and we must meet this ailment vigorously."[8]

Without directly saying it, the new President of the Republic, just freshly installed in office, was advocating surgery to solve the problems of the country. Mere palliatives would not do; the affliction was such that it demanded "vigorous" action.

Explaining that the democratic faith to which he was committed was premised on the concern of the people for their life, liberty, security and health, Marcos admitted that the country still had a long way to go to do justice to this faith. "But with the help of the Almighty," Marcos stressed, "the bounty of our resources and the energy of our people, I am confident that we will meet the demands of our faith."[9]

From there he issued another stern and ominous warning. There was special urgency in meeting the demands of the democratic

faith and the nation could not continue to procrastinate. The leaders must no longer vacillate but act, for

> "our people now cannot wait and they ask us to act and I hear them say, there is no time to waste, there is no surplusage for pettiness. There are no reserves for partisan strifes. It may even be too late."[10]

Here, then, was a new President challenging other leaders to change their ways, urging the rich to be responsive, for the people were impatient for change, and had had too much of political strifes and partisanship. Here was Marcos, barely one month in the presidency, warning monopolists of the nation's wealth that if they did not change soon enough, the people might reach the limits of their patience.

Evidently, based on both his inaugural speech and state-of-the-nation address, Marcos was not a captive of the privileged few. His message was that he was the President of *all* the people and the spokesman of the oppressed and deprived majority. It was their plight that he wanted to improve, their grievances that he wanted redressed, and he wanted the powerful and the rich to respond swiftly and vigorously to the demands of the people, as their failure to do so would inevitably result in disaster.

In his style as well as in his tone, President Ferdinand E. Marcos appeared and sounded more like a revolutionary leader than a conventional democratic President.

He did not immediately spell out the details of his prescription to improve the national condition. He knew there would be time for it, and he had the patience to wait.

"You have patience," his revolutionary grandfather, Fructuoso Edralin, had counseled him when he was still a wide-eyed, hero-worshipping child, "it will give you the chance to control the initiative. Never make an important move until you can choose your own battleground."[11]

And his own father, Mariano Marcos, advised the young Ferdinand with profound wisdom: "Don't start a fight until you know you can win it."[12]

These were lessons Ferdinand E. Marcos had mastered to perfection. His triumphs in the battles he had fought, in the bitter political struggles he had waged, not the least of which was his capturing the presidency of the Republic against overpowering odds, proved this. Now that he was the President, he would still heed that counsel. For the biggest fight in his life had just begun. He had vowed to lead his people to his vision of greatness, and he knew the monopolists of the nation's wealth and power would not let him do so. They would do everything to stop him. They would allow no one, not even the President of the Republic, to dilute their power and reduce their privilege.

Marcos knew this. He knew his dream of greatness was too radical, too revolutionary, for the privileged few to accept. But he was determined to pursue it, to translate his vision into reality. If necessary, he would bide his time, he must have the patience to wait for the hour to strike. #

CHAPTER

VISION OF GREATNESS 3

FERDINAND E. Marcos wanted to get things done fast. He wanted to lift his people immediately from their crisis, to clean the government of institutionalized graft and corruption, improve the national economy, and eradicate lawlessness and criminality. He wanted to set the country on the road to greatness. For that vision of greatness for his country was to Marcos an obsession and a passion that slanted across time.

To foreign journalists he would often reply, when asked about the future of his country:

> "Give us time. Give us several years and the Filipino people will rise up as one man. All they need is guidance and direction, and selfless devotion of a leader in order that ultimately they will show the world that here in Asia, this race — the Filipino race — is a race that can be a leader race!"[1]

But while in a democracy the greatest leadership and the most sublime form of power is the presidency, it is in reality an office with limited power.[2] Presidential power is not absolute because the President is at the top of a democratic or representative system of government, not a monarchy or a dictatorship. He shares government power with the legislative and judicial departments. In fact he is the head of only one of the three seats of power in a democratic government. He cannot get things done if either Congress or the judiciary is uncooperative. His power is in a real sense very limited.

Unlike a monarch or a dictator the President cannot simply issue commands, and expect to be obeyed. He must propose a program, explain, justify, and "sell" it. To get accepted he must coax, cajole, compromise, or horse-trade. He need sometimes resort to blackmail, coercion, direct intimidation, or manipulation of public opinion (which is why he needs sympathetic mass media) to get public policies through.

Richard E. Neustadt, in his *Presidential Power,*[3] observes that the President has extraordinary status, *ex-officio,* according to the customs of a democratic government. He has an extraordinary range of formal "powers" and authority granted by statutory laws and the Constitution. But his status cannot get action without argument or opposition for "presidential power is merely the power to persuade."

This is the reason why democratic Presidents are often frustrated. Abraham Lincoln, for instance, was said to be a sad man because "he couldn't get it done all at once. And nobody can." John F. Kennedy was quoted by Theodore C. Sorensen in his *Kennedy,*[4] a biography of the American President, as having written that every President "must endure a gap between what he would like and what is possible."

Presidential power, however, no matter how limited, can be potent if the President knows how to use it, and has the courage and audacity to do so. That expertise in the use of the power to persuade cannot be acquired from schools; there are no schools

for Presidents. Neither does it seem to belong to all politicians as a class but a very rare breed of politicians, the event-making ones, the movers of history. A business magnate, for example, who is a *summa cum laude* and holder of a Ph.D. does not necessarily possess it. Even men of politics who specialize in organization work and party office scarcely qualify at all; that expertise can come only from deep experience in political office.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes believed that it is "first-rate temperament" rather than intellect that gives a President expertise in the use of power. And Neustadt explains it thus:

> "The politics of well-established government has rarely been attractive to and rarely has dealt kindly with the men whom intellectuals regard as first-rate intellects. Temperament . . . is the great separator. Experience will leave its mark on expertise; so will a man's ambitions for himself and his constituents. But something like that 'first-rate' temperament is what turns know-how and desire to his personal account. The necessary confidence is nourished by that temperament. It is a human resource not discovered every day among . . . politicians."

A President possessing first-rate temperament is in love with power, knows how to win it, and finds joy and satisfaction in employing it. It enables him to regulate and contain opposing forces and thus channel them to his advantage. Franklin D. Roosevelt was one such President. John Gunther, in his book *Roosevelt*, writes:

> "All great men of action have to be empiricists: certainly Roosevelt was. What he wanted was something that would work; he did not care how; he moved by intuition and cared for little but results."[5]

However limited the real power of the President, he must have the determination to use it if he wants to accomplish anything. For, says Gunther, "A weak President has exactly the same constitutional powers as a strong President." But to be

able to use it to get results he must excel in politics, not politics in the sense of winning an election or a reelection but politics in the sense of exercising power framed by reason and leading other men, including the living instrument of government, to see reality as he alone perceives it.

The kind of information that reaches a President is crucial to his performance — and fate. For correct decisions are based on correct information. Great Presidents in history recognized this need. Roosevelt, for example, believed that his first task as President was to guarantee himself an effective flow of information and ideas. Thus his persistent effort was to check and balance information acquired through official channels by information acquired through a myriad of private, informal, and unorthodox channels and espionage networks. Sometimes he even pitted his personal sources against his public sources.

The President needs not just any information, not simply summaries, surveys or reports. More than generalizations, which could often be slanted by the source, he needs details to enable him to see the bottom of the issues brought to him. He must reach out as widely as he can for every scrap of fact, opinion, gossip or bit of information bearing on his interests and relationships as President. It is fatal for the President to assume that any person or system will give him the details he needs most. It is judicious to assume, instead, that his closest official advisers will volunteer but little of what he needs, especially if it would endanger their personal interests.

And it is wrong to advise the President to leave details to others, to his subordinates and sycophants. For it is details that provide the President the frame of reference necessary in the formulation of viable policies and the making of decisions. The President must not plead scarcity of time to examine details. To say he is too busy to attend to them is to admit he lacks the temperament of a good President. To the end of his life the folly of this indifference will hound him.

To assure himself an effective flow of correct information the President, says Neustadt, must be his own director of his own central intelligence. And to be effective as such he need be his own executive assistant. "He need be both, that is to say, *if he would help himself* . . . This is the help that starts a man along the road to power." And, it might be added, greatness.

A President must possess "convictions, a vision of where the nation should travel; he must summon the national mood and push it in the right direction. If he fails to give his people a sense of participation in crucial decisions, his politics may be doomed from the start."[6]

But it is not enough that the President is armed with vision, that uncanny ability to see tomorrow today. He must also be armed with the courage to implement. For the implementation of a vision calls for hard decisions. All great Presidents in history had this combination of vision and courage. It seems to be the great separator between minor and great Presidents. Dwight D. Eisenhower said it is necessary for a President to have the courage to implement his vision despite severe criticism and actual vilification. Otherwise, he would not accomplish anything of value.

That vision must be rooted in the ethos of the people. It must be related to their real needs and longings. This is why the President must not isolate himself from the masses of people. He must be close to them, commune with them. He must clearly state his aim and his goal and communicate his reasons for them. He must reply to questions raised by the people rather than evade them. His dialogue with them must be characterized by frankness and sincerity. He must tell them the realities of the situation, and in telling the truth he must use words that touch the inner motives of innumerable individuals, words that will enlighten and awaken them. This way the President will not be alone; rather the energies and fervor of the people he leads will converge with his own and facilitate the realization of his vision.

History is one overwhelming proof that it is folly for a President to believe that the masses will follow him simply because he is their leader. He must realize that they are waiting for him to tell them what he really wants for them, and how he proposes to get it for them. And he would know what they really want, and what he really wants for them, if he turns to them regularly. Keeping himself cloistered from them by a cordon of advisers would be fatal to his goal.

A President who no longer considers himself a politician in quest of power and grandeur but a statesman in quest of achievement for his people must call for a change in man. He must tell them that the envisioned change he is proposing cannot be realized without a change in them as individuals. But when he calls for such a change he must show them, believably, that he himself is undergoing it. If he calls for sacrifice he must show the people that he himself is submitting to it, willingly and honestly. Many a President of the country committed the blunder of telling their people one thing and doing another.[7]

AS the sixth President of the Republic, Ferdinand E. Marcos evidently possessed the qualities that make great Presidents. It was apparent from the start that he was armed with the vision and the intellectual energy to perceive and see beyond. He had a grand dream of greatness for the country. He had brought to the presidency a brilliant record as a student and student leader, unsurpassed record of heroism and leadership during World War II and the resistance movement, deep experience in politics, first in his native Ilocos, then Congress and finally the Senate. Moreover he had a wife, Imelda Romualdez, whom the famous *Life* magazine of Henry Luce would later describe, on a full-color cover story, as "fabulous," and indeed fabulous was the adjective that soon became most frequently used by writers and statesmen in calling her. The First Lady, it turned out, was not merely possessed of unrivalled beauty but equipped with a rare political sense as well.

Describing the leadership career of Marcos, Hartzell Spence[8] writes that destiny crowded Marcos without pause almost from his birth:

"While he was still in college, he was convicted on a charge of murder.

"Before he was licensed to practice law, he had argued a case before the Supreme Court.

"Before he was twenty-five he had won more medals for bravery than anyone else in Philippine history, had suffered the heroic Battle of Bataan and its aftermath, the infamous Death March, and the medieval tortures of the Japanese secret police.

"Before he was twenty-six he was officially dead — and carried a card to prove it.

"Before he was thirty-five, he was acknowledged to be the cleverest trial lawyer in the Philippine Republic.

"In rapid sequence he was the youngest man in his nation's history to be the minority leader of the House of Representatives, minority leader of the Senate, president of the Senate, and president of the political party . . .

"At forty-six, only the ultimate goal of his destiny was unfulfilled. He was not yet President of his country. But he had reason to believe that this destiny, too, was manifest."[9]

Marcos brought all this to the presidency, plus charisma, youth that throbbed in a wiry, coordinated and strong body, and the heritage of revolutionary ancestry. The last is significant.

Still, barely five months in the presidency, Marcos was already impatient. He was vexed by the realization that the presidency was invested with limited real power. He could not get everything that he wanted to do done at once. He was the President but could hardly do what had to be accomplished. Thus, on May 29, 1966, President Marcos expressed what other Presidents had voiced before him:

"You have elected me as your leader, but as your leader I find myself impotent to raise this cry [that public officials be

beyond reproach] for all the people to hear. I have issued the directives, I have issued the orders. I commanded, and yet it does not go beyond . . . the lower echelons of the hierarchy of government."[10]

Marcos certainly knew what was wrong — the system. It was a system that had evolved out of accommodation and compromise and was dominated by the elite, the oligarchs, whose common interests demanded that it be perpetuated. It was impossible to change it, suicidal to fight it. But it was there, it was where he was operating with too little elbow room, with practically no freedom of action. Unless the system was changed how could he lead the nation to his vision of greatness?

The system was tight, rigid and forbidding. At the control center were the handful of elite in whose hands were concentrated the wealth of the country. They owned and controlled industries. They had all the economic power. They could pick anyone from obscurity, equip him with unlimited money, provide him with a private army of professional goons and terrorists, and get him elected to office. Once installed in the seat of power the politician is their prisoner, without any real freedom to do what he pleases; he does what he is told. He introduces and champions measures subtly designed to further strengthen and expand the empire, the dynasty, of his benefactors. He cannot do otherwise. The least sign of hesitation or reluctance, the faintest manifestation of rebelliousness, would end his political career and deprive him of the glory and affluence that go with it. For the elite would unleash their wrath through the mass media which they also owned and controlled — radio and television networks, newspapers, magazines and other periodicals; his credibility would be lost, his strengths would be minimized and his weaknesses magnified to horrible proportions through open accusations or through innuendoes. At the very least he would be meted a less cruel punishment — news blackout, which is dreaded by politicians. Then, of course, there is that extreme punitive action: liquidation.

President Marcos knew all this. He himself was a creation

of the system. The elite knew he owed them a great debt, not the least of which were the grandeur, privilege, power and majesty of the presidency. Without their support Marcos could not have risen to the pinnacle of power.

Hence, they expected him to be on their side, to defend and protect the system, the *status quo,* to the fullest. They expected him to be their man, not the leader of the people, the teeming millions who were deprived but who had not the voice nor the access to the elite media to articulate their deepest yearnings. It was evident that they firmly held the belief that Marcos would never turn against them, nor do anything as drastic as rocking the boat.

But they had underestimated the man.

On July 7, 1966 he addressed the Manila Rotarians in a speech enriched, as had become characteristic of him, with choice historical passages and allusions. He played upon the ego of the Rotarians. He called them a "creative minority," then quoted Arnold Toynbee, the eminent British historian, who said that in all history it was this creative minority, not the great masses of the population, that determined the destinies of nations and civilizations. This was a unique approach Marcos had perfected which enabled him to establish immediate rapport with his audience. He then challenged them to prove it, to assert their leadership, to go against the old repressive system, to be revolutionaries:

> "Service above self," [Marcos thundered from the rostrum]. "This is a motto for the revolutionary. Let it be so and let the creative minority be the revolutionaries that shall build a *new system* for our country and for our people, a government which we can hand down to the next generation with pride and without anxiety."[11]

If the Rotarians, most of whom were extensions of the oligarchy that controlled the old system Marcos was condemning, were astonished by the radical tone of their guest, their reaction was

justified: the man hurling Jovian thunderbolts at them was the President of the Republic himself!

Yet the new system he had in mind could not be built at once, and he knew it. He knew he must bide his time. But the message was there; the seed had been sown and it needed time to germinate. In the interim, he must utilize his freedom, however limited, to do things that would help his people, no matter how temporarily. He would try to relieve their misery; he would give them palliatives — in the meantime.

At the same time he would not be remiss in his responsibility as President of all the Filipinos. He would tell them what was wrong with the country, then ask them to help solve it. He would appeal to their sense of civic duty and social consciousness. Then he would warn them that unless they all helped in solving the problem it would pose a serious danger to all of them; that if there should be a cataclysm it would not spare them. For among his gifts that separated him from other leaders was his keen sense of history, and his ability to absorb lessons from the past. He knew that in all societies, when the human condition had deteriorated, and the people had suffered long enough, destiny would interfere, a leader or a group of leaders would arise to liberate the masses from their plight. The Philippine Revolution of 1896 was one such stark lesson from history.

Thus, two weeks after he had challenged the Rotarians to be revolutionaries, he called the attention of officials and personnel of the Philippine National Bank to the great gap between the rich and the poor in the country, saying:

> "When you sit in these luxurious chairs and enjoy these surroundings, consider the PNB and crow in triumph over this success, just remember that the greater number of the Filipino people have never seen and perhaps will never see surroundings like this . . ." [The President paused briefly, surveyed with his eyes the faces before him.] "This poses a challenge to all of us. For we cannot live with 5 percent of the people enjoying the luxuries in this country of ours, and

75 to 80 percent living in the despondency and the misery that was the legacy of many generations before us!"[12]

For the first time, in precise figures, Marcos dramatically pictured the stark contrast between the oligarchy and the masses, a disparity that he had vowed to resolve.

Significantly, this sharp social and economic inequity in Philippine society as described by Marcos eventually found its way into the slogans and jargon of youth activists and revolutionaries. But history, in one of its inscrutable twists, denied the youthful radicals the privilege of solving that problem.

HAVING made his point that there existed a total concentration of the nation's affluence and power in the elite, to the deprivation of the masses, Ferdinand E. Marcos sensed it was time to issue dire warnings to the privileged few. In December 1966, at the combined induction ceremonies of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Philippine Chamber of Industries, Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Bankers Association of the Philippines, he told the nation's economic overlords that they would be in great peril unless they heeded the anguished cry of the masses. He challenged them to be just and responsive, and reminded them that those who thrived in a free society had an obligation to keep it free and progressive through the diligent exercise of their responsibilities.

No leadership, Marcos said, could protect the interests of the few without incurring the resentment of the many.

Marcos assured the leaders of business and industry that the government under his leadership would continue to support them, but that the resultant prosperity must be shared by them with the people for this was the spirit of the democratic faith. For unless the elite shared their bounty with the deprived majority, "we shall lose not only our economic freedom but those very freedoms we have abused in our ruthless pursuit of gains!"

Marcos had correctly read and interpreted the temper of his people.

In subsequent major speeches, some written and others extemporaneous, President Marcos continued to harp on his favorite theme: the great disparity between the elite and the masses, and the urgent need to correct it.

But no one would take him seriously then. They could not interpret his mind or accept the seriousness of his purpose.

The oligarchs had misread the signs. They had grossly underestimated the dashing warrior President from the North.

Thus, when Ferdinand E. Marcos, after years of warning them, took the side of the masses and led them in a revolution against the elite, the oligarchy was struck dumb with disbelief.

IN the meantime that he was waiting for the opportune moment to ripen, President Marcos continued to use the limited resources of the government for national development. In his first year as President, he launched an ambitious infrastructure program, using the military to build roads, bridges, irrigation and numerous thoroughfares to serve the needs of agriculture and industry.

Meanwhile, he relentlessly inspired his people with visions of national greatness. He reminded them constantly of the noble and heroic toils of their forebears, their selflessness and their sacrifices. He exhorted and challenged his people to write the history of their generation in fortitude and determination, just as their ancestors had written theirs with nobility and vision. The warrior President was also a teaching President, a builder-President. The elite, through their media extensions, mocked him for his "heroics," for his "Great Again" society, and even derided the epic quality of his language. His honeymoon with the media ended briskly. He could not do anything that was right. Columnists and editors read ulterior motives behind all his actions and policies.

Nationalists attacked his decision to send a civic action team to Vietnam as a sign of subservience to the United States. His use of the military in the building of infrastructure projects was attacked as militarization of the government. He received no compliment for his prosecution of land reform.

But Marcos was not daunted by media criticism; if he was hurt he tried hard not to show it. He had a job to do and had to do it because that was what the people's mandate meant. He would use that mandate to help them; to lift them from their poverty if he could. He was determined to do it; never mind the obstructionists.

1966, which he later called Year of Crisis, proved that though the government had meager resources it could help lighten the people's burden if it had a sincere and resolute leadership. Ferdinand E. Marcos provided that leadership. He approached the national problems on the basis of priority. In rapid succession he sought to put government finances in order, improved the climate of business, investment, and employment, introduced administrative reforms in the government, initiated infrastructure projects, maintained domestic security and, rather ambitiously, tried to play the role of mediator in peace-making activities among Asian countries. He proclaimed the second district of Pampanga a land reform area, and adopted a firm policy against subversives. Then, wading into dangerous waters, he ordered the prosecution of some smugglers and corrupt government officials.

To the charge of militarist tendencies as a result of his enlisting the services of the military establishment in the implementation of infrastructure projects, the reply of Marcos was that what he did was to transform the armed forces "into a large creative force for our social and economic development."

> "The AFP today is a strong catalyst in our drive to build and change our society. A brigade consisting of ten construction battalions has been formed. The soldier, too, has become a builder."[13]

He proved harsh on the grafters and the corrupt — in the Philippine Constabulary, the Bureau of Customs, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This involved the expulsion and prosecution of PC officers found conniving with smugglers. In the Bureau of Customs 107 officials and employees were charged criminally or administratively. In the Bureau of Internal Revenue 183 officials and employees were charged with various offenses. More than 80,000 casual employees were dismissed, and reemployment was denied to those who had been linked to cases of dishonesty or inefficiency.

But these achievements against corruption were not enough. "We have hardly begun," said Marcos.

He maintained throughout the year a policy of firmness against the Communists, whom he called internal subversives. For he was convinced that the PKP/HMB (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas/ Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*) had not abandoned their objective of organizing a Communist society in the Philippines. Warning against complacency about this threat which he claimed had led to strange alliances between Huks and military elements, Marcos said it would be reckless and dangerous to ignore the problem. Thus:

> "we have decisively confronted this threat both by programs of social reform and by military action. Through the Central Luzon Development Program, substantial gains in public works and social development projects as well as in the struggle to win the hearts and minds of men have been made. In fact, the situation in Central Luzon has significantly improved on the side of freedom."

But the subversives were not really licked. In just four years after Marcos had made this assessment they had succeeded in capturing the imagination of the masses in many parts of the Philippines, thus posing a grave threat to the government and the Republic itself.

As early as that moment of his tenure as President, Marcos had already set down his policy (which he is pursuing at the time

this book is being written, with martial law in full effect throughout the country) which was to characterize and distinguish his martial law regime. In his own words:

> "We shall continue the fight against subversion through our policy of compassion and firmness — compassion for the misguided and firmness against the subversive.
>
> "The Central Luzon Development Program shall be pressed with greater vigor to correct the conditions which breed unrest and discontent. At the same time, we shall not hesitate to use the sanction of law to suppress dissidence . . .
>
> "To those who seek to overthrow the government, we shall respond in the only language they know — the language of firmness. But to those who are merely misguided and are sincerely working to uplift the common man, we offer the loving embrace of our people in a common effort to build a just and affording society."[14]

Despite all odds, not the least of which was the sustained pressure of vested interest groups that reduced the presidency to impotence Marcos succeeded in weathering the crisis in which he had found the country. He had not done everything he had wanted to do; no one else could. After all not even Kennedy, when he became President of the richest and most powerful nation in the world, thought it would be possible for him to finish his task in a short while. In Kennedy's own words:

> "All this will not be finished in the first one thousand days. Nor will it be finished in the first one hundred days nor in the life of this administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin."[15]

Marcos seized that opportunity not only to report to the people what he had done during his first year but to describe to them the magnitude of his and the people's task, the "new epic of nation-building." The epical proportions of the task of developing

the nation, said Marcos, could be seen in the fact that from Malacanang to the last hamlet of the country's 26,000 barrios, there were a thousand difficult tasks to do each day, problems and decisions that called for much in courage and self-confidence, mental and moral blocks that stood between the vision and the reality. The government could not attend to all these tasks; it could only provide the climate in which a self-actualizing citizenry could have the opportunity to confront them.

The President then returned to his obsession — national greatness. His idea was that the nation could not be great except through labor and find salvation except through work. He said:

> "We used to pride ourselves in being a generation of fighters. Today, we are called upon to become a generation of builders. Our mission is to build those foundations that will replace the bamboo supports of our agricultural economy, in the phrase of Rizal, with bases of concrete and steel on which can rest a modern civilization and a fuller life for our people. This is central to the task of development."

Ferdinand E. Marcos completed his first year in office as President of the Philippines not with a bang, as the poet T.S. Eliot put it, but neither with a whimper. Rather, he completed it in a tone of resoluteness and dedication. That he had led the country out of poverty and into the road of development was no mean achievement. It was not by any measure spectacular; but it was promising. Like Kennedy, Marcos could well say: "But we have begun. Neither wind nor tide is always with us. Our course on a dark and stormy sea cannot always be clear. But we have set sail — and the horizon, however cloudy, is also full of hope."

But Marcos, the new leader of his country whose presence evoked visions of warrior-statesmen in the past, had a different way of saying it:

> "The year just past shows that our people have this capacity for making the harder choice — which in the end is syno-

nymous with the capacity for greatness. As for me, I choose to put my faith and trust in our people's genius to overcome. At the roots of this genius is the gift of courage. Victory seeks not the craven-hearted but the man of burning purpose and indomitable will; as with men, so with nations; as with war, so with the task of peace."

This was to be his fighting credo as he sauntered into the second year of his presidency. #

CHAPTER

A NEW IDEOLOGY 4

AS a revolutionary still in embryo, Ferdinand E. Marcos, the dashing warrior President from the North, is a class by himself. He is markedly different and removed from other revolutionaries. First of all he was the President of his country and was thus seated at the summit of governmental power. He came from a prominent family in his native Ilocos Norte whose influence had transcended the boundaries of the Ilocos region even before he became a national politician. His own family life was idyllic. Even as a child he never knew poverty, nor ever lacked parental love and affection. Furthermore his intellectual development was shaped and molded by an educational system generally accepted as colonial.

In brief he had not the stereotyped background and qualities of a revolutionary. Hence no one expected he would ever be one, for men of outstanding achievement and those who live full, happy lives usually set their faces against drastic innovation.

REVOLUTIONARIES and revolutionary leaders traditionally belong to set categories and types: the socially rejected, the

minority groups, the social misfits, the mentally unbalanced, the power-seeking (to compensate for feelings of inadequacy), the jealous, lower-middle class, and the self-centered who have lost faith in themselves. To these types a rising mass movement has attractions, not by reason of its doctrine, but because it can cure their frustrations by freeing them from their ineffectual selves and submerging them in a closely knit and confident corporate whole. It is a truism that many who join a rising revolutionary movement are attracted by the prospect of sudden spectacular change in their conditions of life.

In his *Psychopathology and Politics*[1] Harold D. Lasswell, using unnamed American politicians as prototypes, found that "Our conventional schemes of political motivation seem curiously aloof from the manifold reality of human life when we discover the private basis of public acts." What Lasswell wrote of politicians could be true of revolutionary leaders. The intensity of their drive for recognition and power as well as the nature of their public acts could be partly explained by the conditions of their private lives.

Napoleon, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin all suffered from poor physical health and belonged to moderately "fringe" families. All were little men. Napoleon, besides, had a partly atrophied sex organ. As a soldier he could not rise higher than corporal. Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar were alcoholics. Abraham Lincoln, the great American emancipator of Negro slaves, was a depressive. Mao Tse-Tung of China was a child of poverty who had a deep dislike and hatred for his father who maltreated and oppressed his mother. Sukarno, the great Indonesian revolutionary, came from a lowly peasant family. Andres Bonifacio, father of the first revolution in Asia which culminated in the founding of the first Asian republic on June 12, 1898, was an unschooled plebeian who was alien to wealth. Apolinario Mabini, the brains of the Philippine Revolution of 1898 (against the Americans), was a peasant's son and a paralytic from the waist down.

Hitler, an Austrian of peasant stock, was a failed artist, a school dropout. From the gutters of Vienna he soared to pro-

minence and power, succeeded to the mantle of Bismarck and the Hohenzollern emperors. In his monumental work, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*,[2] William L. Shirer grudgingly admits that whatever his crimes against humanity, Hitler had unleashed a dynamic force of incalculable proportions which had long been pent up in the German people. For he virtually picked up Germany from the mud and transformed it into a world power.

The discarded and the rejected are often the raw materials of a nation's future. "The stone the builders reject becomes the cornerstone of a new world. A nation without dregs and malcontents is orderly, decent, peaceful and pleasant, but perhaps without the seed of things to come. It was not the irony of history that the undesired in the countries of Europe should have crossed an ocean to build a new world on this continent. Only they could do it."[3] The reference here is to the Americans.

BUT not all great revolutionaries are misfits and rejects of their society. Lenin, the great Russian revolutionary, and the greatest single driving force behind the Soviet Revolution of 1917, came from a relatively fine family. His father was a schoolmaster who rose to the position of director of schools; his mother a doctor's daughter. Lenin himself was a lawyer. In 1887 Lenin's elder brother, another university student, was executed by the government for taking part in a plot to assassinate Czar Alexander III. Young Lenin's mind turned to revolution. The ideology that fired him was Marxism, of which he became the undisputed authority at an early age.

Fidel Castro was no misfit, either. His comfortable beginnings hardly intimated that he would become the eventual leader of the Marxist-oriented Cuban revolution. He was the son of a wealthy Galician immigrant sugar plantation owner in Oriente province, and attended a Jesuit high school before entering Havana University where he studied law. He began his law practice soon after graduation. A left-of-center reformist, Castro wanted to be a politician; and the *Ortodoxos*, a leftist reform party which he had joined, nominated him for a seat in the national congress in the

1952 election. But the election never took place: Fulgencio Batista, former President, prevented by Cuban law from seeking re-election, led a successful *coup d'etat* against the government of President Carlos Prio Socarras and installed himself as the absolute dictator of Cuba. This was the beginning of Castro's transformation into a revolutionary.

Marcelo H. del Pilar, the firebrand pamphleteer turned revolutionary, was the scion of a relatively wealthy family. He, too, was a lawyer although it was in the written word that he excelled. Jose Rizal, who died a martyr, not a revolutionary, came from a well-to-do family; he was condemned to death precisely because the Spaniards were convinced his incendiary writings were responsible for inciting the people to revolt.

Revolutionaries are driven by deep hatreds. Lenin had a vigorous contempt for the corrupt czarist government and an equally vigorous passion for Marxism. His burning ambition was to destroy the *status quo* and establish a Communist society. Hitler was a fanatical German nationalist. He deeply hated all foreigners, particularly the Jews whom he believed polluted the purity of the German race. Robespierre had a passionate hatred for the excesses of monarchy. Mao Tse-Tung abominated the Manchu imperial dynasty and the Japanese invaders who threatened to dominate his country. Sukarno hated the Dutch and had a boundless contempt for "white rulers." Fidel Castro vomitted at the sight of Batista's corrupt and unjust regime; he wanted to establish an egalitarian Cuban society. Andres Bonifacio seethed with contempt for the oppressive and exploitative Spanish regime; love for the independence of his people from the Spaniards raged in his blood.

ALL great revolutionaries in history are gifted with organizational and propaganda skills, apart from courage and resoluteness of purpose. Through his underground newspaper, *Iskra* (Spark), Lenin constantly pounded in the minds of his fellow workers in the movement and their followers the need for sustained efforts, conversion to their cause of other Russians, and their indoctrina-

tion into Marxism. Mao Tse-Tung likewise used the press extensively throughout his long revolutionary struggle. Bonifacio, aided by Emilio Jacinto and Pio Valenzuela, issued the *Kalayaan* and assorted manifestoes and letters to inflame the passion of his people against the Spaniards. Hitler who, like Lenin, was an unsurpassed orator, used the public platform, and later the radio, to galvanize his people and direct their energies toward the success of National Socialism, or Nazism. Fidel Castro resorted to skillful propaganda throughout his struggle for ascendancy; having won, he took to radio and television with gusto, bravado, and a degree of sophistication that has captured the admiration of media experts. In his *Understanding Media*: *The Extensions of Man* Marshall McLuhan admitted Castro is a highly successful TV performer, and quoted another writer as saying that Castro, in his seemingly improvised "as-I-go-along style," can evolve politics and govern his country — right on camera.

> "What the Cubans are getting by TV is the experience of being directly engaged in the making of political decisions. Castro presents himself as a teacher, and . . . 'manages to blend political guidance and education with propaganda so skillfully that it is often difficult to tell where one begins and the other ends.' "[4]

And great revolutionaries have the gift of patience. However fervid their desire for change they would rather lose a measure of time than press their siege prematurely. They seem to have a common gift of precise timing. And when the situation has reached the point of crisis they strike swiftly and ferociously. It is fatal for a revolutionary leader to hesitate at the moment of truth. When the revolutionary situation has arisen he must seize the opportunity to lead.

Such was, again, Lenin. Having waited for twelve years after the failure of the first revolt in Russia of 1905 he returned from

exile when the 1917 Revolution was in progress, then rode on the tide of events through victory. Such, also, was Castro whose first assault took place on July 26, 1952. It was only on January 1, 1959, after years of sustained guerrilla warfare against the government forces, that his revolution triumphed. This was signaled by Batista's escape from Cuba.

FERDINAND E. Marcos, like the great revolutionary leaders cited above, is no less endowed with patience. Patience was one of the virtues inborn with him and recognized even in his early boyhood by his father Mariano and grandfather Fructuoso. One of his former colleagues in Congress said, however, that he does not believe in the siege — he likes the swift lightning attack, carried out with subtlety. "It is never the instinctive, spontaneous drive of the gambler who plays a hunch, or of the emotionalist who leaps in with a prayer. His is the confident campaign of the veteran intelligence officer who, having patrolled the ground and assessed the opposition, *having coldly and analytically anticipated all possible consequences, chooses the time and place for his encounter, and thus through surprise controls the initiative.* Basically he is a scholar, not a politician, an introvert, not a handshaker. Appearing impetuous, he is actually cautious. As a boxer he learned the value of the counterpunch when the opponent's guard is uncovered, and from General [Mateo] Capinpin the counterattack when the enemy has spent his charge. He seems impulsive when best motivated by wary strategy. *He can be impatient with people but never with events;* he can be reached by logic but never by sycophants."[5] (Italics supplied).

The description is apt. Here, indeed, is a man who knows when to strike and who possesses the patience to wait for the time to deliver the *coup de grace.* Blas F. Ople, one of the closest men to Marcos, confirmed this. By nature, he said, Marcos brought to the presidency "the patience of a Job, the sagacity of a fox, and the courage of a lion."[6]

That he is cautious rather than impetuous is affirmed by his former right-hand man, Rafael M. Salas, in these words:

> "The President is a crisis-man; he seems, rather, to thrive in them. He doesn't get nervous during periods of extreme emergency. He doesn't panic. In a state of crisis the man who doesn't get rattled becomes the saviour. He leads the people from disaster."[7]

And so Marcos, in his second year as President, decided to work within the limits of the system. He would not be impatient with events. Confident that during the first year he had led his people from their crisis and had given them a new lease of hope and faith, he was able to tell them, after the second year:

> "Many grave problems remain and most of our people's needs remain acute. But today we face them with the confidence of self-made success; we have lost our fear of the future; problems have become challenges and goads to action."[8]

Again he stressed his faith in the Filipino people. They could do something meaningful for themselves, something that could even alter their destiny. He called some of the year's achievements "historic breakthroughs" for the people in their march to a fuller life, then admitted that his other achievements were much less spectacular.

True enough Marcos succeeded, in 1967, in attaining self-sufficiency in rice and corn, a problem the people had to face with for the past several generations. The government also succeeded in building up the "physical underpinnings" of economic development — roads, bridges, irrigation dams, airports, portworks, and other infrastructure projects — an output even his critics admitted exceeded by several hundred percent the total accomplishments of preceding administrations. In agriculture the rate of growth averaged 6 percent; in manufacturing, 8-7 percent. Per capita income increased by 5.4. In investments the Economic Development Foun-

dation, a private agency, reported that the increase was 23 percent over the past year. Production of schoolbuildings was unprecedented, exceeding in number, in less than two years, the combined total of three preceding administrations spanning a dozen years. Tax collection increased by 21 percent. In agrarian reform Marcos declared the entire second congressional district of Pampanga a land reform area and initiated several hundred leasehold agreements. He then turned to Communism and the Communist threat:

> "Confronted with the threat of a foreign-inspired mutiny in Central Luzon, we honestly seek to turn this grave danger into a great opportunity for the development of this pivotal region. We have spurned counsel to further fratricide; we welcome the reconciliation of brothers; we eschew civil strife unless forced upon us by lawless and unscrupulous elements."[9]

But to Marcos these achievements were no more important than "a new spirit and a new outlook discernible in the Filipino people — the will to confront the tasks of development and of nation-building purposively and energetically." And neither did he claim these for himself. Soaring to heights of eloquence (for like most great leaders Marcos is unequalled in oratory), Marcos said those accomplishments, realized with no increase in material resources, told a story about the Filipino people — a success story that exhilarated by its novelty and rarity in the national experience.

> "We are no longer what we always believed we were — a nation of incompetents and failures. We have become — perhaps imperceptibly — a nation of achievers. We have begun to undergo the experience of competence which forms the basis of genuine self-confidence for men or nations.
>
> "There is a new birth of confidence in ourselves as Filipinos. This is in itself a source of great creative power. It reminds us of our distinguished heritage as the nation that pioneered the libertarian movement in Asia and founded the first democratic republic in our part of the world."[10]

Marcos had reason to be happy. For over and above all these achievements he had realized that the people were not unappreciative of his performance. The year 1967 was, in fact, an off-year election, an election of eight senators and local officials (governors, mayors, councilors).

THAT off-year election would be crucial to the career of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and he knew it. For off-year elections in the country, from the time it became a Republic in 1946, had always served as a preview of the succeeding presidential election. Disaster in this contest could presage his defeat two years hence, when he would seek another mandate. Tradition pointed to the inevitability of that conclusion.

Marcos remembered that the defeat of President Elpidio Quirino in 1953, as a reelectionist President against Ramon Magsaysay, was preceded by the defeat of his senatorial and other candidates in an off-year election two years before. President Macapagal's loss to Marcos himself in 1965 came after the debacle of the Liberal Party senatorial candidates in 1963. Now that he was the President, and faced with an off-year election, Marcos would not take chances. He would make it his personal fight. He would not repeat the errors of his predecessors.

The deep and devastating political mastery that had helped catapult Marcos to the presidency of the land was to be put on trial again. That rare political skill had been tested more than once. In 1949 he was elected Congressman of Ilocos Norte with no less than 70 percent of the total vote. As the youngest — 32 — congressman then, he outwitted the old foxes in Congress and maneuvered himself into the chairmanship of the committee on commerce and industry, a seat in the committee on national defense, and eventually installed himself as minority floor leader of the House. In 1959, running for the Senate, Marcos emerged No. 1, leading the No. 2 senatorial winner by 200,000 votes. He was elected minority floor leader in the Senate, the first time that

position was given to a newcomer or neophyte Senator. In 1961, he was able to capture the presidency of the Liberal Party. In 1963 he succeeded in deposing a venerable politico, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., from the presidency of the Senate, by a vote of 13-11. Because Macapagal had reneged on his commitment that he would not seek another term after he had served the first, thus depriving Marcos of the opportunity to be the Liberal Party presidential candidate in 1965, Marcos broke off with him. On April 11, 1964 Marcos took his oath as a Nacionalista. From there he captured the Nacionalista nomination for President in 1965, against the party's old guards. In the ensuing election that year, Ferdinand E. Marcos, the challenger, defeated the incumbent Macapagal by more than 670,000 votes.

That consummate political skill would be put to a severe test in the 1967 off-year election, for so much was at stake. If his candidates lost, or won but not decisively, spectacularly, it would be a fearful omen for his reelection in 1969.

MARCOS made himself the central issue in the campaign. Performance was his platform, the performance of his two-year-old administration. This put the opposition on the defensive; they were made to disprove that Marcos had performed well. The Liberals found it difficult to dispute and deny the Marcos performance because his accomplishments were tangible: more than 300 kilometers of newly-paved roads; 7,000 new pre-fabricated schoolhouses (which greatly relieved the annual crisis of schoolrooms); the bumper crop of the miracle rice; the prosecution of smugglers and corrupt government bureaucrats.

But he was not merely interested in getting his senatorial candidates elected; he wanted to ensure that their victory would be so decisive he would have an easy time campaigning when he ran for reelection. At the same time he considered that election a brilliant opportunity to limit the chances of his future opponents. Then, the figures of Sergio Osmena, Jr., of Cebu, Senator Jovito Salonga of Rizal, and Nacionalista President Gil J. Puyat of Pampanga and

Manila loomed big and forbidding. Any one of them could be his rival in 1969.

It was time to nip the problem in the bud. He would discredit them by reducing their vaunted strengths into myths. Thus he secretly launched a sophisticated special operations plan in each of his prospective foe's bulwarks. In the Malacanang election master plan, writes a former staffmember of the *Philippines Free Press*, the provinces of Cebu, Rizal and Pampanga came under the subtitle "Special Projects." How Marcos did it is an interesting lesson in politics.

> "The plan called for all-out support, sky-is-the-limit funding of the local foes, NP or LP, of these presidential hopefuls in their political bastions. Under the plan, the President himself would keep close tab of the political situation in marked provinces. Special, bigger campaign outlays were provided. Strict party discipline among the NP locals was imposed. The main idea was not only to win, but to win by a whopping majority — the kind of majority that, if it didn't destroy the presidential hopefuls, would at least discredit them in the eyes of voters."[11]

The three potential seekers of the presidency were embarrassed after the election results were known. To Osmena, the acknowledged kingpin of Cebu, it was a humiliation. The Marcos candidates won 8-0 in his province, and 47 out of 49 towns fell into the Marcos bag. For the first time the vaunted strength of Osmena in his own home province was exploded. Cebu slipped out of his hands. It was a terrible disaster for a candidate for President with his hometown as his base.

Aside from money poured in the campaign, Marcos's sheer political sophistication accounted for Osmena's rout in his own bailiwick. First, Marcos fielded Francisco Remotigue, a popular Cebuano who was then Social Welfare Administrator, for the mayorship of Cebu City. This forced Osmena to run for city mayor;

none of his men was influential and charismatic enough to beat Remotigue, and if he did not run himself, Cebu City would fall into Nacionalista control. His candidacy for mayor was anticipated by Marcos. It was in fact part of the Marcos scheme. As Marcos had expected, Osmena was grounded in Cebu City. He could not campaign for the Liberal candidates outside of the city. He had to concentrate his resources, time and energy in the city, not in the province; otherwise he himself would be beaten by Remotigue. With Osmena immobilized, Marcos, through his well-oiled juggernaut of a political machine, had a field day manipulating the campaign in the 49 towns of the province.

Then, on the eve of elections, Marcos, the political tactician *par excellence,* delivered the *coup de grace* to wrap up the Cebu votes. He fielded his now legendary secret weapon, the shrewd, beauteous Imelda who was then campaigning actively in her native Leyte, in Cebu. As usual Imelda applied her fabled charm on the Cebuanos, captivating them with her lovely presence and subtle wit, enrapturing them with her repertory of popular songs. At the same time Marcos made sure the intense campaigning in Cebu never abated.

It was a lethal blow to Osmena's political future.

The same debacle befell Salonga in Rizal. With the special support of Malacanang, Governor Isidro Rodriguez thwarted the gubernatorial ambition of popular movie actor Pancho Magalona. Benigno Aquino and Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo survived the Marcos tidal wave in Rizal, a province which Marcos believed too important to be ignored: a hostile Rizal province would neutralize the Ilocano vote in 1969. To Salonga's credit and satisfaction, however, it was not a total rout by the Marcos Nacionalistas. Neptali Gonzales, the Liberal candidate for vice governor, won, and so did half of the Liberal mayors in his old congressional district, but over-all in this biggest province, the LP rout was complete.

Pampanga, Senator Puyat's home province, collapsed under the pressure of the Marcos blitz. Puyat's own candidates were

defeated, and the Puyat-backed candidate for governor only placed third.

When all votes had been turned in, six out of eight senatorial positions were captured by the Marcos candidates. Only one went to a Liberal, Benigno Aquino, while the other spot went to a woman, Magnolia Antonino, who substituted for her husband Gaudencio, a multi-millionaire independent reelectionist, who died on the eve of election day when his helicopter crashed.

THE spectacular triumph of the Marcos-led Nacionalistas in that crucial off-year election once more proved the unequalled political prowess of the warrior President. He was able to destroy a tradition of disaster that had hounded and bedevilled Presidents before him. It was of course his luck and advantage that he was an incumbent President; but so were his predecessors. While in power they had all the resources — presidential power, patronage, guts and funds — to ensure victory, from Quirino to Macapagal. But,

> "the similarity ends there. President Marcos knows how to use presidential power and how to farm out the funds. He knows the art of parlaying political power and funds into votes."[12]

For where previous Presidents were inclined to deal with the big leaders — the senators, congressmen, the provincial executives — Marcos went to the municipal and barrio officials and the grass-roots ward leaders. It was these people who, after all, had the votes. Other Presidents before him spent money lavishly on their campaigns, but because the money was in the main pocketed by the big leaders it did not get to those who really counted. Thus, even if Marcos did not spend more than they did, Marcos obtained more real votes.

Furthermore, Marcos was more daring than his predecessors. Where they would shirk from local fights and avoid getting enmeshed into struggles among their fellow partisans, Marcos cheer-

fully swung into them. He allowed no "free zones," where candidates belonging to his party fought one another. Whenever he thought it feasible, politically, he picked his own candidates. A strict and severe party leader, he allowed no factional groupings. In his hands the Nacionalista Party was one disciplined fighting machine, perfectly tuned up, allowing no waste of power or energy. Not since the time of Magsaysay had the NP machine been so powerful and so effective. Consequently the election of 1967 saw the resurgence of bloc-voting: people who voted Nacionalista voted straight — from the senators down to municipal or city councilor levels.

Beneficiaries of the Marcos power in the senate contest that year were: Jose J. Roy, Salvador Laurel, Emmanuel Pelaez, Leonardo Perez, Lorenzo Teves, and Helen Benitez.

> "Not since its golden years during the time of President Magsaysay has the Nacionalista Party scored a landslide victory in the senatorial elections.
>
> "It wasn't a clean sweep, true. Only six out of eight seats were captured. But alongside the rout the Liberals suffered, with only one LP winner out of eight, it was clearly a slam-bang victory for the Nacionalista."[13]

To say, however, that the Nacionalista Party owed the victory of their candidates only to Marcos would be grossly wrong. Alone, however skillfully he had engineered and masterminded the campaign, he could not have done it. A large part of the credit should go to his lovely wife, Imelda, who had been his most potent political weapon ever since their marriage when he was a mere congressman. Marcos himself was to attribute his meteoric rise to power largely to his wife.

Marcos naturally considered the victory of his candidates as a positive endorsement by the people of his performance as President. When he reported to the nation the following January he could not hide the deep pleasure and satisfaction that he felt because

"on the most important occasion so far given [to the people] to make their opinions felt, the great majority of our countrymen have shown that they agree with our estimate."[14]

ALMOST unbidden and therefore unnoticed by many except by perceptive oppositionists, the President had not been neglecting the military establishment. As in his first year he continued to assign to the military a "creative role" in economic and social development, in serving the nation's peaceful development goals which in the long run "constitute the true rampart of our security as a democratic society." He publicly exalted the armed forces for their effective assistance in implementing the road building and school house programs. He gave considerable space to the military in his report. His rationale was that when he assumed office in 1966, smuggling, criminality and general lawlessness were rampant, sapping the national will and capacity to progress. Thus,

"We have instituted vigorous measures to combat this threat. The PC strength has been augmented to intensify the campaign against criminality and against dissidents. This intensification is reflected in the increasing number of combat operations . . . The METROCOM [Metropolitan Police Command] was recently activated and is now effectively assisting the Manila Police Department in maintaining peace and order in Manila. In view of its success, METROCOM-type units are now being organized in other urban centers of the Philippines. Recently, I mobilized the entire Armed Forces to augment the still limited resources for the peace and order campaign."[15]

During that year Marcos also intensified the campaign against dissidents, resulting in the death or capture of 4 Huks in battle, including four ranking "commanders."

Marcos drew sharp attacks from his critics for the expanded role he had given to the military. Charges of militarism filled the air. That early, some of his critics were already insinuating that Marcos was planning to make himself a dictator.

But those charges did not bother Marcos. He had solid justifications for strengthening the armed forces. It was not civic action work alone where they were needed. He was firmly convinced, and openly said so, that the primary threat to the national security was internal subversion rather than external aggression. He would develop the military establishment along this premise. But since he believed that economic development would provide the permanent solution to the threat of subversion he would increasingly utilize the resources of the military in nation-building. Again, to refute his critics, Marcos said:

> "It is not correct to say that the military is usurping or taking over civilian functions. There is neither usurpation nor duplication of efforts. The military merely supplements civilians, in and out of the government service, who are either unwilling or unable to operate effectively. For instance, we are sending a naval medical corps to practice in Lanao and Sulu, in order to augment the extremely inadequate civilian medical service available in those remote areas.
>
> "What we have done is to refashion the role of the military towards civic action — the reassignment of soldiers from housekeeping in the barracks to active participation in the epic of development."[16]

This was as legitimate and valid a justification as any.

The year 1967 therefore ended with signal accomplishments. He himself stated that measured against the achievements of previous administrations, his performance for the last two years was impressive but measured against the people's needs, "they remain modest." It could not have been otherwise for, as noted earlier, the President was hampered not only by limited government resources but, moreover, by an old socio-political system that permitted too little freedom for progressive leadership and too many freedoms for grafting and corrupt public officials conniving with the oligarchs.

To Marcos the year 1967 was infinitely significant because when he submitted to the people the issue of his performance as well as the criticisms against him, they gave his candidates a resounding victory. To him this popular mandate indicated a mandate for the vigorous pursuit of a policy of performance directed at the improvement of the lives of the people, especially in terms of their basic needs— food, clothing, shelter and education; but he did not admit that it was simply an endorsement of his performance as President. Rather it was a verdict against excessive political activity for the coming Presidential election, 1969. Thus he called on the opposition to unite with the ruling party in a concerted effort to promote development efforts and appealed for a respite from politics and partisanship for

> "Those who persist in politicking at so late or so early an hour deserve the reproach and censure of the whole nation."[17]

Again Marcos appealed to the people to break away from the crippling habits of the past, urging them to cultivate only those ways and customs that would make Filipinos an effective and progressive people. The ghost of history once more entered his vision.

> "History may not record what we say. But it will record what we do. Let us now discard the pernicious habits of the past . . . To change their lives, men must first change themselves. The challenge of nation building is first of all a call to character building."[18]

Marcos then dangled before the eyes of the people his vision of an awakened Filipino nation, reminiscent of what great revolutionary leaders do to move their people into fervent action.

> "From a race, despondent, weak, vacillating, resigned and helpless — groping for salvation — to a nation confident, bold and resolute, seeking not survival alone but progress.

"From a nation of the *ningas-cogon* to a nation of achievers.

"Let this be our epic of nation-building."[19]

To transform the country into a nation of achievers, to make Filipinos a leader race in Asia — this was the grand dream and obsessive vision of Ferdinand E. Marcos. And now that he had won the confidence of his people and realized that they appreciated what he had been doing for them, he became even more convinced that he could lead and guide them toward his ultimate goal.

But first he must introduce them to a new ideology. #

CHAPTER

TO CROSS THE FRONTIER 5

MARCOS temporarily set aside in 1967 the revolutionary rhetoric he had used in his maiden speeches. He had to: 1967 was an election year and he knew his people well enough to harangue them with the fiery jargon of the radicals. Sagacity as well as political necessity dictated that instead of talking to them in terms of a drastic overhaul of the system he should bedazzle them with tangible achievements such as new roads, school houses, bridges and irrigation systems. The overwhelming victory of his candidates in that election proved the soundness of his strategy.

Steeled by a fresh endorsement of his leadership he pursued his building program with greater zeal in 1968. It was his third year in office; the following year would put his leadership to a test again: he would then ask the people for a second mandate.

The national problems were as usual innumerable. Nothing really significant and far-reaching had been accomplished to close or even narrow the gap between the elite and the improverished masses. Peace and order, as well as subversive activities, were

continuing problems the mass media played up prominently. Mayon Volcano had erupted; Filipino laborers were being subjected to harassment in Malaysia; court martial proceedings were being conducted on the "Corregidor Massacre." Columnists had a grand time speculating on supposed intrigues in Malacanang, insurrection in the Senate, and Marcos's impending rift with his Vice President, Fernando Lopez. Opposition leaders lambasted him in the Senate for loss of credibility, and some of his co-partisans were turning against him, particularly those nursing presidential ambitions. Meanwhile student activism was escalating, spreading like wildfire in the campuses, scorching even the premises of sectarian schools which were bastions of traditionalism and orthodoxy.

But in spite of all this Marcos could still maintain his calm, his "cool," in the slang of young moderns. He could not be ruffled. The criticisms rained thick and fast, but his armor could not be pierced or even dented. His beauteous wife, Imelda, who understood her husband more than anyone else and who was the most quoted First Lady in the nation's history, had an interesting political explanation for Marcos's calm.

> "As long as the charges are not graft and corruption, they won't have him worried. It's the issue of graft and corruption that the people understand, that gets them mad."[1]

In other words Imelda felt that the criticisms against her husband, hurled by the opposition and fanned and amplified by the media, were too vague and too remote from the people: the Corregidor incident, for example, which was then the most explosive issue of the hour, would not diminish his political stock and reelection chances.

If the attacks against Marcos then were often bipartisan, with his co-partymen singing the same tune with the Liberals, the reason was that he was up for reelection. No one was as large and alive as he in the country at that moment of history, either in the Nacionalista Party that he led or in the opposition

Liberal Party. It was natural that the cannonade of his enemies should be concentrated on him — and his equally political wife.

A critic of Ferdinand E. Marcos could not help noting the President's imperturbability. In the swirling political weather, he wrote, Marcos moved around with serene calmness like the eye of a hurricane. At least that was the picture he presented. What was striking was his ability to put up this front even knowing that he would soon come face-to-face with a jinx that had been the curse of all postwar reelectionist Presidents — not one of them had been reelected. He wrote:

> "If the political fate that mocked all his predecessors has a hounding, haunting effect on him, he hasn't shown it yet. He has so far displayed nothing but reassuring confidence, if you will, a scornful confidence in the face of historical odds and political superstition."[2]

A superstition it was, an historical myth that Marcos the year after scornfully and decisively destroyed.

But Marcos had another explanation for his calmness and composure. He was a fast learner and had learned plenty since he became President; he had learned what he could handle and control and what he could not. He had learned the extent and the limitations of the powers of the presidency. In his own words:

> "In my third year in office I'm surer of what I'm doing. I know where the ship of state is going. In the first [two] years, we were only guessing."[3]

By September of that year Marcos's figure had loomed much larger than life. In the eyes of the people he had undergone a complete transfiguration, one of the most rewarding privileges of power. While he was condemned, reviled and mocked by his opponents in politics and by columnists and editorial writers in the oligarchic mass media, even their most abrasive attacks could not obscure the glitter of his achievements.

A *Graphic* columnist and contributing editor, for instance, wrote that in spite of the crises that stalked the first year of the Marcos regime — nationwide apathy and indolence, the accumulated frustrations of the government, lack of public funds, excessive partisanship — Marcos was able to realize solid accomplishments.

> "In ways that were remarkable and revealing even to his most consistent political foes, the President began to establish gains and to make possible what had been the impossible all these years. He sought the participation of the private sector, including the various religious sects, rural organizations in the provinces, and the businessmen and the capitalists in the cities to be able to attain initial gains where others before him had been total failures."[4]

Marcos, added the writer, was well on the way to disappointing those who had underestimated him when he assumed the presidency in 1966 as well as those who had overrated him and had expected nothing less than miracles in less than three years. Because of his performance

> "the Opposition finds it difficult to deny that the man who can stop his reelection in 1969 has yet to come to focus. Marcos seems to be making headway in every direction . . ."[5]

A controversial leader with an equally controversial wife, Marcos had become a phenomenon. He was the uncontested idol, the "superstar," among the Ilocanos who numbered millions spread throughout the country. His popularity in the rural areas, as shown by the spectacular triumph of his senatorial and local candidates the year before, had not waned. But to the surprise and astonishment of his rivals and critics he was also popular, at that time, among the children of the elite.

Another *Graphic* writer[6] documented this in a lengthy article. She conducted a survey of her collegiate senior class in a convent-run school. The respondents were well-read; the majority were either literature or communication arts majors; they were children of the moneyed elite, and their average age was 20 years. They

were asked what they knew of Marcos, what they considered to be his successes, what they thought were his failures, how he conformed to their idea of what a Philippine Chief Executive should be — and what they thought of Imelda, the First Lady.

The responses were interesting, and revealing.

"Among the glittering diamonds of his achievements his failures must be mere pebbles," said one. "Ferdinand Marcos's shortcomings are much less than his good marks. It is only Quezon perhaps who can be his equal . . ."

"President Marcos," said another, "strikes me as a very brave person. I imagine him to be a man of fantastic determination, as tempered and as tough as steel . . . His face, his body, the way he uses them, even the way he talks, have also contributed to this almost frightening image I have of him."

"The President's image is one of action, of brilliant performance . . .," chimed in another.

Still another entertained a romanticized figure of the President. "I do hold a great amount of admiration for him. Anyone who'd dare try and straighten up the rotten mess this country is in surely has a lot of spunk! . . . Trusting his actions as being a part of his natural personality, I sometimes refer to him as another Napoleon. So small a man to take on so enormous a responsibility! . . . a go-getter who might yet stop in the middle of things but who hopefully has not."

Another student shared this Napoleonic vision of Marcos, but she went further. "Mr. Marcos clearly shows his 'dictatorial' hand in every aspect of society — and I agree that the Filipino people do need a dictator. We have sunk into such a level of permissiveness and indifference. We have stopped thinking of the far future, the future of the next generations. The Philippines does need a firm hand that will guide us into real democracy and out of the shame that it is now. But we need a dictator who thinks first, second, third, and last of the Filipino people as a nation."

"The Philippines, through Marcos's temerity, did gain some prestige and stature," said still another student. "The President and his First Lady cut an impressive picture for themselves as well as for the Philippines during state visits abroad . . ." And, "Not since Quezon have I heard of a President so beautifully built up," said one respondent.

Of his failures the young female students had tempered remarks. One said, "Try as hard as he can, the President can never be a complete success. He is only human, subject like all of us to ups and downs, to successes and failures . . ."

"But who can really understand the pressures exerted on the President?" asked another rhetorically. "Who can understand the changes in a man, perhaps the deepest changes, when he is plunged into the vortex of power? Who can say in the end what wields [sic!] a man in power?"

BUT if Ferdinand E. Marcos rated high then among the young *colegialas* in an exclusive school for girls, the First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, won their collective praise without reservation. Said the *Graphic* writer:

> "The unqualified, resounding success — as far as this group of college girls is concerned — is the First Lady. She is tops, she is a success, she can do no wrong: their accolade is generous and sincere and in this they do Mrs. Marcos a rare honor — of complimenting a fellow woman without stint or reservation.
>
> "She is considered a success first for being so gorgeously presentable — a primary matter, it seems, which is distilled in one girl's comment: 'She makes me proud of myself as a Filipina.' One or two compare her to Jacqueline Kennedy, but another vehemently calls the comparison a sign of colonial mentality.' "[7]

Imelda was praised, too, for the impetus she had given Philippine culture, particularly the construction of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. "In this, she knows how to use her power and

influence as First Lady of the land," said one respondent. Indeed, construction of the Center was financed largely through contributions solicited by the First Lady from the private sector, including foreign business firms in the country.

Finally the young girls, to whom the First Lady epitomized the finest in Filipino womanhood, a paragon of virtue, praised her for being a politician's ideal wife, "the consummate politician's wife. She knows to give her all toward her husband's endeavors and in this manner, we may truly call her a successful wife as well."

The most succinct paean for Imelda R. Marcos came from a coed who exuberantly cooed:

"The First Lady? She's A-OK!"

Ferdinand and Imelda even then loomed as the most invincible political combination the Philippines had ever known.

BY the end of the year 1968 Marcos could announce triumphantly that in only three years his administration had built more concrete roads than were ever built from the turn of the century to 1965. From the start of the American regime to the end of the Macapagal administration the government had built only 995 kilometers of concrete roads, 7,285 kilometers of asphalt road, 39,075 kilometers of feeder road and 76,693 lineal meters of permanent national bridges. In contrast,

> "In the three years of the present administration, we increased the total length of concrete roads by 105 per cent, that of asphalt by 20 percent; that of feeder roads by 15 percent; and that of permanent national bridges by 17 percent."[8]

For the first time, too, the shortage of classrooms — the recurrent annual schools crisis — was drastically minimized. With the fabrication of Marcos-type and army-type schoolhouses the administration made available more than 42,000 new schoolrooms in three years, in contrast to only 400 schoolhouses built by the Macapagal regime in four years.

Even his critics could not deny that Marcos had indeed succeeded in destroying a historic anomaly and irony: a rice-producing country habitually importing rice in great quantities. During the last year of Macapagal's term the government spent ₱264 million to purchase 570,000 metric tons of rice from abroad. But in 1968 the country stopped importing the cereal. Moreover the government *exported* rice for the first time in history, earning $5.9 million, and sold certified rice seeds to various countries amounting to $1.17 million.

In land reform Marcos easily surpassed the record of his predecessor. At the end of 1965 President Macapagal had proclaimed only 12 municipalities land reform areas. From January 1966 to October 1968 Marcos had declared 50 municipalities land reform areas, then hopefully expected that all of Central Luzon would be a land reform area by the end of 1969.

The total picture of the national situation in 1968 was rosy and promising, as depicted by the President: growth in private industry, increase in investments, a significant growth in the gross national product, exploration of new relations with other countries, including socialist nations, increase in foreign trade, expansion of community development projects, acquisition of benefits for Filipino workers in local American bases and in offshore American military installations, a new and ambitious manpower development program, reduction of the rate of criminality and lawlessness, and expanded social services.

Marcos then turned to the problem of agrarian unrest and rebellion in Central Luzon. He said that in the past the approach to this problem had been erratic, swinging from one extreme to the other: a policy of extreme restriction or a policy of extreme leniency and accommodation. The Marcos approach was different, more akin to Magsaysay's.

> "We recognized the socio-economic character of the problem and have embarked on a massive, long-range social justice program unprecedented in the history of the region. Coupled with this approach, however, is a firm military effort against

those who would subvert the Republic. In recent days, military operations for this purpose have crushed the backbone of armed dissidence in the area."[9]

Marcos never relaxed that policy of firmness against the subversives.

TO Ferdinand E. Marcos, then, his third year in the presidency, which he called "A Year of Expansion," was deeply rewarding and significant. It proved, in his view, that the Filipino people possessed competence for progress. In the barrios he could sense a growing impatience for progress and a deeper appreciation of the need for self-reliance in meeting day-to-day problems of development. He saw in 1968 "the end of frustration, resignation, cynicism and indolence, of complacency, and of indifference, the chief obstacles to Philippine progress." For in that year

> "... we began to shed the habits of the past and to install in their stead new attitudes, new frames of reference, and new values. The result has been a widening of our vision, an expansion of our horizons, a rising national strength."[10]

Marcos was gratified by this transformation of the people. He saw it as the realization of Jose Rizal's prophecy that the rise of a new Philippines, of new Filipinos, was inevitable — a people fired with a new spirit for work and a new Filipino consciousness, rejecting indolence, resignation and complacency. That they had undergone that essentially spiritual transformation was proof, in the view of Marcos, that they had followed Rizal's prescription to hasten the dawning of a new Philippines: a positive break with the past. He quoted the national hero:

> "In order that [the Filipino] may make progress it is necessary that a revolutionary spirit, so to speak, should boil in his veins since progress necessarily requires change; it implies the overthrow of the sanctified past by the present, the victory of new ideas over the old accepted ones ..."[11]

In his vision Rizal saw the rise of new men and a new social order within a century. This was in the 1890's. To Marcos the

translation of that vision into reality did not quite take a century. For

> "In 1968, the New Filipino and the New Filipinism came into being."[12]

BUT the stark reality was that Rizal's vision had not materialized. The people had not overthrown the "sanctified past." New ideas had not triumphed over the old accepted ones. Furthermore, the idea of a *new system* which Marcos had intimated during his first year in the presidency was still consigned to the region of the unknown.

Meanwhile the outspoken youth had begun to show their impatience. Better informed than the generation of their elders because they were reared in a technological age that saw a revolution in mass communications, they were evidently aware that their elders were not doing them right. They longed fondly for Claro M. Recto whose nationalist ideas, considered subversive when he was still alive, were beginning to prove their relevance and validity. But Recto had died in 1960, and no national figure had taken his place; he had produced no successor with equal prominence. In the campuses of colleges and universities Recto's uncompromising position on the dismantling of American military bases in the Philippines, termination of parity rights for the Americans and adoption of an independent foreign policy began to win primacy. Students, as well as faculty members, invoked his statements and made his name a battlecry. By 1966, during the first year of Marcos as President, the youth had become bold enough to take to the streets. On October 28 that year, during the Seven-Nation Summit Conference in Manila on the issue of the Vietnam war, students demonstrated and rioted in front of the Manila Hotel, the conference site, clashing with helmeted policemen armed with long sticks. The incident startled foreign correspondents covering the conference; they had thought the Philippines was a nation of sheep.

For student activism had already been convulsing other parts of the world for years before it erupted in the Philippines.

The campus rebels, led by student leaders from the University of the Philippines, Marcos's own alma mater, protested the escalation of the war in Vietnam, a policy supported by American allies in the Pacific. They brandished little streamers and placards crying "Down with imperialism!", "Yankee Go Home!", "Mister [Lyndon] Johnson, how many boys have you killed today?", and some placards calling Marcos an American puppet. That demonstration, which the students christened the "October 24th Movement," sparked the beginning of a series of youth rallies and marches. Their targets were the U.S. Embassy, Congress and, later, Malacanang itself.

In reality student power was already shaking Asia as early as 1960. South Korea was the first to fall. Unable to stand the regime of Syngman Rhee, Korean students demonstrated in massive numbers for his overthrow, to get rid of "the choking effects of suppression and the disintegration of political morality.[13] The next to fall was Sukarno, the charismatic Indonesian leader, a great revolutionary who had liberated his country from foreign domination. Activism next erupted in Japan where the militant *Zengakuren* rebels frequently snake-danced their way along Japan's thoroughfares, confronting the authorities, sometimes hurling themselves "again and again through clouds of tear gas and heavy streams of water from fire hoses, throwing themselves in *banzai* charges against the police barricades; but they always lost in the end."

From Asia the winds of student power swept across the European continent, and student revolutions grew from a regional to an international phenomenon. In West Germany they revolted against the country's almost medieval university system, advocating university reforms by attacking the power structure behind the universities. In Italy they demanded radical reforms on the archaic system of education, better facilities, a voice in university administration, and subsidies for needy students. In Great Britain they shook the staid British society with their demands for increased government grants and a greater voice in university decision-making.

Generalissimo Francisco Franco's Spain was shaken up, too, by students condemning government control of campus organizations. In Poland the young ones revolted when the government banned a

nineteenth-century anti-Russian play. Students in Czechoslovakia challenged the government when it failed to provide adequate light and heat in their dormitories, a revolution that culminated in the fall of President Antonin Novotny and the rise of Alexander Dubcek.[14] In Mexico, students, in ever-growing numbers, also tried to overthrow the government.

But it was in France where the student revolution of the 1960s was most tumultuous. Inheritors of a proud and revolutionary past, the French students rebelled against overcrowding in their universities and sexual segregation in the campuses. Their uprising, later joined by workers and intellectuals, constitutes what is now known as the "French Revolution of 1968."[15]

FERDINAND E. Marcos was not unaware of this tide of events. After all he himself had been a rebellious student, cutting classes at the university to make fiery speeches criticizing the Commonwealth leadership of then President Manuel L. Quezon, disputing political policy and haranguing the university administration for its trivialities: requiring all male students to study folk-dancing, and to wear distinctive uniforms.[16]

It was thus not surprising that Marcos should view student activism and rebelliousness with tolerance and accommodation. He understood their motivations; he knew why they were dissatisfied. In a speech in July 1968, before the Summit Conference in Manila, he said:

> "The youth revolution means, first of all, that governments [must] seek the counsel of young people, and second, that young people [must] be engaged in the nation's political life more profoundly and more broadly than ever before."[17]

Marcos knew the youth could no longer be ignored. He knew that the young generation, because better informed, were aware of the problems of their society as well as their own. They knew that in their society the majority who were unprivileged were separated by a formidable wall from the few who were privileged; that their public officials were extensions of the privileged few; that their education was colonial and that their teachers were ossified; that

the privileged elite were safely ensconced at the top of the hierarchical structure of society because they had control over the power centers — the church and other established institutions, the government, the media, the industries. They knew theirs was a cancered society but that those in power were reluctant to cure it. They were hurt by the betrayal of their elected representatives who, after election, became spokesmen and defenders of vested-interest groups with whom they forged unholy covenants to ensure their continuance in power. They had become disenchanted with the mass media because they had discovered that many of the writers and commentators they had idolized and listened to were in reality paid hacks and mouthpieces of one institution or another. They were disenchanted with their mentors who could not teach them enough because they had to conform to school regulations since conformity was the best way to retain their academic positions. It was a period when the youth were in quest of the courage to inquire, to know more, to innovate, but could not find this in their leaders and teachers.

Because they were aware of all this they were convinced their own future was dark and insecure. They would have none of that future to inherit.

In one of his speeches former President Macapagal aptly described the youth of the '60s in these words:

> "Our youth . . . manifest a perspective that does not coincide with some of the things that present leaders have upheld. The coming generation of Filipinos have not known our colonial status and are not accordingly prey to the prejudices created by the propaganda of the colonial power. Among such prejudices has been the blanket non-acceptance of ideologies opposed to that which we espouse, including a refusal even to hear about such alien ideologies. The youth tend to discard this prejudice. They want to know all that they are capable of knowing about all things . . . They uphold the unassailable proposition that in order to wisely judge, one must know about what he is called upon to judge."[18]

By his own admission, Marcos recognized the need to tolerate rather than suppress and alienate the restless young. He did not curtail their freedom to take to the streets and convert the thoroughfares into parliaments where they could air and ventilate their views, yearnings and pent-up passions. He knew that they, more than anyone else, were telling the truth and he allowed them to voice it. For what they were articulating at the top of their youthful voices was the very cancer of Philippine society that he had spoken of the moment he ascended to the presidency. Since their views coincided with his, why shouldn't he tolerate them? Their style may be crude and amateurish, they may be too emotional in their oratory, brutal in their language, subversive and radical in their rhetoric and slogans. Still they were telling the truth: the country was sick, there was no hope for change, the system must be overhauled and revolutionized, and this could only be achieved if the "ruling class" or what Marcos called the "oligarchy" were stopped from holding dominion over the entire country.

Obviously, Ferdinand E. Marcos did not consider the rebellious youth his enemy. As a revolutionary himself he knew they were his allies. Thus he shunned a policy of suppression. They were accomplishing tremendous propaganda work for him — in the streets, in campuses, in the media which gladly offered their pages and time to their grievances. The protests and yearning of the youth were reaching the very ears of the people to whom they were intended: the rich and the powerful. His attitude was correct, for:

> "As far as the President is concerned he must consider the youth not as an enemy that must be suppressed and avoided but as an ally with whom he must forge an *entente*. For apart from assuring him the flow of accurate information, which he sorely needs, the youth can give him the moral courage that he needs to confront the existing established institutions in our society and compel them to accept vital, social and economic changes which would lift the masses from their wretched misery and propel the country towards progress.
>
> "With the Filipino youth on his side, if he succeeds in winning them over, the President could still do wonders for

the country, not for the few privileged elite but for the great masses of Filipinos dwelling in the squalor of slums and in the poverty of their ancestral villages."[19]

Marcos was, after all, a man of deep political experience, and the experienced politician, like Von Papen of Germany and Mabini of the Philippines, comes in only when a movement is already a going concern. This was true even of Russia's Lenin who, like Robespierre of France, seized control of the revolution after it had already begun.[20]

AT the end of 1968, as we have seen, President Marcos had correctly understood the national temper. He was too shrewd and experienced to go against it. He knew that although he had accomplished much, compared to the accomplishments of the preceding administration, his performance had not measured to the full needs of the people. He was aware that the revolutionary fervor of the students had infected large areas of the body politic. The contagion of nationalism and discontent had widened and intensified. It would be unwise to fight it.

Thus, in his year-end State-of-the-Nation message to Congress Marcos himself began to use the language of the young revolutionaries more and more. He attacked the government attempts in economic development from the turn of the century until 1965 as long on grandiose schemes but short on real accomplishments. Then he identified a basic problem the revolutionary youth had called "feudalism."

> "The ancient character of our economic life persisted even beyond the grant of Philippine independence in 1946 . . . Excessive land holdings concentrated in a few families, on the one hand, and conditions of want and tenancy approaching slavery, on the other, comprised an economic structure that had to be, but never was, altered. This, together with the colonial status of our economy from 1900, consigned the Filipino people to a remarkably long experience of economic backwardness."[21]

Marcos then proceeded to the second fundamental problem: "colonialism" or what the youth called "imperialism." The two —

feudalism and imperialism — were pinpointed as root causes of economic stagnation. But instead of using his own words, Marcos shrewdly quoted an unnamed American observer as saying:

> "...as it gained political independence, the Philippine Republic was still far from possessing economic sovereignty. The United States, on the other hand, retained some of the economic and military advantages of a colonial power, while it was relieved of the burden of administration and of direct responsibility for Philippine welfare.'[22]

Neither did Marcos stop there. Deploring the nation's inertia of dependence on another country, he said that in the post-independence years industrial growth was at first limited to the advantage of alien interests determined to keep the Philippines within the bounds of a limited agricultural economy; and then subsequently set on an erratic course by half-hearted efforts.

Next he blamed the existence of a defective political system for the grave social cancer that had been gnawing at the vitals of the nation. The government machinery, said Marcos, still using the rhetorical symbols youthful radicals had popularized, had been incapable of producing satisfactory conditions of living. Evolved during the first half of the century this system had not been changed significantly since then. He poured scorn and contempt on the political system.

> "The inefficiency and the immorality in government are partly due to this defective political system. What is more, this political system has obstructed the democratic process. The system also has ironically been the chief obstacle to our progress. The sad truth is that we have kept our faith in democracy despite the inadequacies of our democratic institutions."[23]

He blamed excessive partisan politics for the abuse of democratic principles in the country and the consequent inability of certain sectors of society to apply themselves with dedication and vigor to the advancement of the nation. He zeroed in, once more, on his original target: the elite.

"There is an urgent need to curb the selfish and callous tendency of some of our leading citizens to engage in political activity at the expense of the public good."[24]

It was in answer to this need, said Marcos, that he signed into law a bill limiting the campaign period of national candidates to a maximum of 150 days, and other elective public officials to 90 days before the election.[25] Furthermore he announced that in two years there would be a Constitutional Convention.

"I leave it to the delegates of that convention to evolve a truly democratic system, one which will not merely bend, as our system does today, to the wishes of a traditional elite and perpetuate the *status quo*. Democratic institutions must be instruments of national advancement. Democracy must symbolize change . . .

"In short, our goal is nothing less than the complete transformation of our social, economic, and political milieu, the reorientation of our people's idea of themselves and of their capability, and the complete change of the assumptions that govern our relations with other nations."[26]

THE goal that Ferdinand E. Marcos had set was entirely revolutionary, not reformist. *Complete transformation* of society, any society, demanded major surgery, not palliatives. For palliatives merely provide temporary relief, a transitory easing of pain, and Marcos would have nothing of that. The nation was a patient afflicted with cancer; the roots of the cancer had been known (he himself had pinpointed them), and no less than the roots had to be destroyed. But how would he go about it?

A specialist in the art of the blitzkrieg Marcos did not immediately announce his strategy. The time was not ripe for the drastic, decisive blow that he had in mind. Thus, he merely paid tribute to the New Filipino "who has now risen full-blown from the loam of history . . . has taken command of our nation's destiny in various spheres of life . . . ," a new Filipino brimming over with "creative and purposeful spirit" who views the future as a challenge of greatness. Such a Filipino, to Marcos, eclipsed the pre-

Spanish Filipinos the historian Antonio de Morga praised for their courage, industry and independence before colonialism corrupted and enfeebled their spirit; he matched the vision and the independence with which his ancestors, in 1898, founded the first republic in the history of Asia, as well as the courage of the heroes of Bataan, Corregidor and the resistance movement.

He re-emphasized his faith in the Filipino as the central factor in the nation's progress. The achievements of his administration in rice production, education and industrialization had an undeniable material basis, but they represented, above all, a transformation of the Filipino spirit "from defeatism, sloth and self-depreciation to a new level of energy, self-esteem and the will to achieve our goals."

Marcos called this spiritual and intellectual transformation the "New Filipinism."

But the New Filipinism of Marcos was not an ideology. To him it represented the discipline and the ethic of independence, seeking the substance rather than the shadow of freedom, developing independence beyond formality to reality.

Under the influence of this spirit, said Marcos, the Filipinos had begun to reexamine their own narrow outlook on themselves and the world, they had ceased to think of themselves as a small and insignificant nation. They had started to reexamine the time-honored years (since the Spanish regime) and lifted up their eyes to wider horizons and more ambitious and peremptory goals.

Then he broadly outlined what was to come. If any of his listeners had closely listened then, they would not have been stunned by what he did two years later. For Marcos said:

> "In the foreseeable future, this new spirit will prompt us to reexamine our own basic institutions and perhaps recast them to make them more responsive to the needs of our people. We must not hesitate, from a sense of racial timidity, to change what should be changed. For here on we should be guided only by our sense of what will advance, protect and fulfill our national interest."[27]

This was a clear declaration of his intention to institute a complete transformation of Philippine society.

> "We must aim at the reality rather than at the formality of democracy. Political and social institutions that merely perpetuate entrenched privileges based on the accident of birth must be remolded or replaced with new ones that promote genuine democracy. I am sure the need for such profound change may well give the forthcoming Constitutional Convention its greatest challenge."[28]

If his listeners then still thought Ferdinand E. Marcos was speaking like the traditional politician they had always felt he was, they were wrong. The man had undergone a process of transformation himself. He was no longer Marcos the politician but Marcos the revolutionary. They had not read the signs, they had not grasped the meaning of the restiveness about them, in rural areas as well as in the urban centers. They still thought that Marcos, being a creation of the old system they controlled, was still playing at rhetoric, making heroics. After all that year, 1969, was a presidential election year, and Marcos would surely be a reelectionist candidate.

They would not take him seriously therefore even after he had said:

> "We must not be afraid of innovation in our social, economic, political and cultural life. The New Filipinism is a call for innovation — a revolution directed against the sterile and self-defeating traditions and habits of the race but without bloodshed and without fratricide. The New Filipinism is the courage to open up new worlds of opportunity and fulfillment for this and future generations.
>
> "The New Filipinism is, ultimately, a call to greatness. But any form of greatness must begin with an act of will."[29]

Marcos had said it: a *revolution*: He had described that revolution: "Without bloodshed" and "without fratricide," a revolution which would be an act of greatness that must begin with an "act of will."

The Filipino people who would wage that revolution, demonstrate that act of will, were the "New Filipinos" who, transformed, would no longer return to the sterility, mediocrity and timidity of the past. They were infused with a new spirit of achievement that was indestructible and would fashion, in time, a great nation in Asia.

Having made this manifesto of intention, Marcos civilly, courteously said his ideas "may be bold and unorthodox." But they were ideas that would guide him and the people through an unexplored terrain. They were not mere verbalizations but distilled from the facts and realities that impinged on the nation's life. He admitted there would be those who would oppose — "probably violently" — his ideas. But let their ideas be heard; the democratic dialogue must be preserved: the clash of ideas was and is the glory and safeguard of democracy. Then:

> "My countrymen: we have reached a turning point in our history. The choice is yours. Shall we venture into this brave new world, bright with possibilities, or retreat to the safety of our familiar but sterile past?"[30]

Ferdinand E. Marcos paused. It was a few seconds pregnant with ominous meaning. He had given his people — and the oligarchs — two options: change or *status quo?* Then he announced his own commitment:

> "I am for crossing the frontier."[31]

And as subsequent events proved later, Ferdinand E. Marcos crossed the frontier. And the people crossed it with him. #

CHAPTER

THE SECOND MANDATE 6

FROM the look of things revolution seemed inevitable before the end of the decade of the '60s. The government could not do enough to relieve the misery and despondency of the masses. President Ferdinand E. Marcos had succeeded in generating enthusiasm for work, it was true: the government was in relentless pursuit of construction projects. But these were only the underpinnings of national development. The immediate needs of the great majority of the people were not being answered or satisfied.

Implementation of high priority projects like road-building taxed his patience and ability. For even in the high circles of officialdom the struggle for patronage to satisfy voracious constituencies never abated. Marcos had to resort to perpetual compromises with various factions in Congress and the local governments to carry through his programs. Even after succeeding in making them accept

the priorities he had set in accordance with policy he could hardly proceed smoothly. For

> "On high-priority projects, like his highly successful road-building program, he sometimes personally has to follow up decisions as far down the sluggish bureaucracy as the man in charge of cementing a stretch of highway."[1]

Meanwhile general poverty continued to hold dominion over the masses, with only 2.5 percent of all Filipino families having annual incomes of ₱10,000 and above. The so-called middle-income group represented an almost negligible fraction of the population, officially estimated at 37 million. The most optimistic figures, however, placed the total middle-income group at 28 percent of the total population.

Amidst the poverty and squalor in which the Filipino masses hopelessly wallowed, the privileged elite mindlessly flaunted their excessive wealth. A birthday party, for instance, of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., elder brother of Vice President Fernando Lopez, who controlled the Meralco, a network of sugar centrals and other industries, and the Philippines' largest radio and television network — ABS-CBN — shocked the sensibility even of affluent foreigners for its bacchanalian lavishness and sybaritic extravagance.

Ferdinand E. Marcos did not attend that party.

In Central Luzon, hotbed of dissidence, the left-over Huk guerrillas who had largely shed off their ideological coating shifted to warlord-style banditry.

> "Much of their depredation is plain warlord-style banditry, and the protection rackets they run, in the Central Luzon towns and even in Angeles City, the civilian center closest to Clark Airbase, are less Yenan- than Chicago-style."[2]

In spite of the international attention focused on the Huks and the liberal, sometimes radical noise made by intellectuals in the press and universities, however, it seemed that the real danger confronting the country then came not from the threat of a radical revolution but from "a descending spiral of social anarchy whose

symptoms were a high crime rate, the corruption of the bureaucracy, the irresponsibility of the rich, the cynicism of the electorate, and the listlessness of national leaders."

Still, even before the decade entered its last dying year, 1969, cries of an impending cataclysm were heard. And among the loudest voices were those from the pillars of the old order. Bishop Mariano Gaviola, secretary-general of the Catholic Welfare Organization, had warned in 1967 that unless something was done there would be a revolution within 10 years. Francisco Araneta, a Jesuit scholar who was president of Ateneo de Manila University, had likewise suggested that major changes in the nation's socio-political-economic structure were imperative and

> "that a revolution must and will take place, and that the only question is — will this revolution be bloody or unbloody?"

But there were things going for Filipinos. The mood of Manila and other urban centers might be portentous. Many young marrieds were migrating to the West, leaving the country for fear of an upheaval. The young were writing ominous graffiti on the walls of public and private buildings, on street islands, and plastering the walls of schools and other public places with crudely painted posters denouncing the Americans, feudalism and fascism, and calling the President unprintable names. But the more perceptive segment of the population knew that revolution was not yet; it would take some time to come. At the end of 1969, in fact, the writer Nick Joaquin poked fun at the revolutionary situation in the country.[3] The presidential election that year, he said, would have been an event only if the much-ballyhooed boycott of the polls had taken place. But the boycott had not materialized and

> "The total flop of the boycott movement again proved that insurgency among us — whether youth, campus, class or nationalist — is only a noisy playing to the galleries. Like the Dante-for-President movement, protest is just a cute joke of a placard to be rewarded with laughter and applause, the highly flattering (if sometimes flattening) attention of the police, and space on the front pages. One activist says that,

as far as she can see, all that the young rebs among, for instance, the Tagalog writers are fighting for is the freedom to say *coitus interruptus* in Tagalog."[4]

In the Philippines the interplay of political parties has long been a safety valve for social discontent. No matter how portentous the mood of the people may be, that mood changes with the advent of an election campaign. The danger and the fanfare, the gilded promises spilling from gilded throats of candidates and their orators, the festival atmosphere and the flow of patronage and cash, the herding by the contending parties of partisans into large noisy public rallies and meetings, all serve to douse the hatred and fervor of the discontented. Filipinos, inheritors of a revolutionary past, for the Philippines is a republic born of a revolution, may look back with pride and awe at that tradition. But they could wait. After all the country has been strikingly conservative, though adaptable and resilient like the bamboo. It had taken them centuries before they had had the resolve to overthrow their foreign masters — the Spaniards. By 1969 they had been independent only for 23 years. Their leaders were Filipinos, not foreigners but people from their own ranks, their own race, speaking their own language. They could wait. There might be corruption galore in the government, smuggling, criminality, general disorder. Their society was one big hell swollen with immorality and corruption. But was not that preferable to a society dominated by a foreign country? They remembered that one of the fathers of their independence whom they still longed for wishfully and idolized, Manuel L. Quezon, had said: "I prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to a government run like heaven by Americans!" Hell it was, but it was Filipino hell.

They would much rather enjoy the election that year than resort to uprising. Who knows? No President had been reelected since 1946. It would be an interesting experience to see a President destroy that myth and get himself reelected. What would a reelected President do? It was worth trying.

TO Ferdinand E. Marcos the 1969 election was most crucial. It would be the constitutional way of attaining the transformation

of Philippine society which he had vowed to do. If he did not run for reelection his four-year regime as President would not be a milestone in his country's history. For he could not accomplish as much as he expected. Given a similar time, no President could.

But he had done many tangible things with tremendous political impact because they could be seen, and he knew that if he used this again as an issue, as he had done two years before when his senatorial candidates, except two, received a favorable popular endorsement, he could win again. The no-reelection myth did not bother him; he was determined to disprove and destroy it if it existed. He believed too much in his destiny, in his performance, in the formidable vote-getting appeal and ability of his wife, and on his own personal charisma.

His renomination as official presidential candidate of the Nacionalista Party was uncontested by the party leaders. It was, in fact, Senate and NP President Gil J. Puyat who volunteered to nominate him at the convention at the historic Fiesta Pavilion of the Manila Hotel, with Vice President Fernando Lopez as his team-mate the second time around. The opposition Liberals who had thought the Nacionalistas would be sundered because of a revolt by the party leaders were wrong. The Marcos party was as solid as it had never been before.

Even before his renomination Marcos had already been revisiting the provinces. He would not admit it was campaigning but rather a renewal of old contacts.

> "Terrific non-campaigning, one should say" [writes Nick Joaquin, alias Quijano de Manila,] "were those famed trips of the ₱2,000 checks, for the checks were handed out to barrio captains, whether NP or LP, by the President himself, usually accompanied by Mrs. Marcos and a photographer. A barrio captain who hangs up in his sala a picture of himself with the President and the First Lady has hung up a daily reminder for himself, the best campaign poster for his barrio. Mr. Marcos explains that the pictures were meant to identify the persons receiving the check — 'when we are in a hurry we cannot

ask for the receipt' — and to sort of commit them to using it as intended: for community development and self-help projects."[5]

The Liberals attacked him for those checks-giving trips to barrio captains as his way of advancing the campaign period. But his excuse was the climate. He told the *Free Press*:

"I have what is known as my summer trips, my summer inspection trips, because you cannot go around in some areas — like Batanes, northern Luzon, the eastern part of the Visayas and Mindanao — except in summer. We started in late March, I think, and continued up to May. We visited all the provinces, yes, and met with all the barrio captains. Incidentally, this strengthened my contact with the lower-level leaders, the real leaders in an election."[6]

That was part of his preparation for the convention. Moreover he reactivated the old organization around him, which helped him win the nomination in 1964. He also contacted student, veteran, peasant and political organizations. They assured him that there would be no problem at the convention if there was going to be a fight.

But there was no fight. The convention proved to be ceremonial. The ruling junta of the Nacionalista party in an earlier meeting (Saturday, June 14) decided to field him again, together with Lopez. When he did go to the convention at the Manila Hotel he knew he would be unchallenged.

"It was a new kind of experience for me, receiving a mandate by unanimous acclamation, the nomination coming from one considered my rival for it [Puyat]."[7]

The convention, which merely confirmed his renomination by acclamation, also served another purpose: that of demonstrating to the Liberals — and the people — that the Nacionalistas were solidly united behind Marcos. Furthermore it gained added impact because it also marked the sudden shift of forces from the Liberals: the Ramon Magsaysay forces, the Cornelio Villareal forces, and some peo-

ple of Diosdado Macapagal headed by Pampanga Governor Francisco Nepomuceno. The babel of voices that rocked the convention hall that Saturday was the sound of victory.

Looking back at the convention, Marcos said it was not really superfluous. Rather

> "It was an occasion for all the leaders to get together and reconcile so they can work together again. Undoubtedly, a ruling party tends to become too big and demarcation lines on jurisdiction are not well marked out and you have to set the limits of action for each and every one. There's the planning of the campaign and then the work on the details, like how we are to handle disputes between factions, the appointment of inspectors, who's to receive patronage, who's to handle the media in this province or that district, and why is the junta getting into the dispute between this and that aspirant."[8]

THE bigger fight was the presidential contest itself. But as early as July Marcos was confident and cocksure of victory. Sergio Osmena, Jr., whom the Liberals had chosen as their candidate, bothered him little. To his thinking Osmena as challenger would make the election a no-contest.

> "I have always said that, whoever was my opponent, Magsaysay or Osmena, I would be disappointed if I won by only one million votes — and I repeat that. I don't say this with arrogance; I say it merely because I know the situation in the barrios better than the Liberals. I don't think the Liberals have been too close to the people. They have been staying here in Manila and quarreling among themselves."[9]

Marcos felt that the combined Osmena-Magsaysay force would be a push-over since both talked too much in terms of a clan or a region. Marcos himself never adopted this strategy. He would not talk of clans or regions. The people were, after all, divided into innumerable ethnic groups and to talk in terms of one or two would be divisive and politically disastrous. Instead he talked to people

in terms of *all* Filipinos. His repeated speeches on Bataan — that he did not risk his own life for the Ilocanos or Tagalogs or Cebuanos alone but for all Filipinos — came again and again. As President he was the President of all Filipinos, not of any particular clan or region. Furthermore, experience had told him there was no substitute for an efficient, well-funded organization.

The Liberals, he was sure, had no organization. They had no true party machine that would enable their candidate to cover enough ground. They were not organized in most of the provinces; all they had were the personal machines each candidate had set up for the convention.

> "Organization is still the basic factor in a political fight. With the time left to campaign, Osmena will not be able to visit many parts of the country. For 1961, Macapagal campaigned for more than a year and still could not visit all the municipalities. I still lacked time, though I was working day and night."[10]

He minimized Osmena's chances against him and ridiculed his political mathematics. Osmena, said Marcos, always had astronomical figures to support him every time he ran for office. When he ran for Speaker he had all the names of the congressmen down, their signatures, and he was certain he would beat Daniel Romualdez. But he lost. In 1967 Osmena put up as an issue his supremacy in Cebu, pleading for support because it would enhance his bid for the presidency. He put up his own candidates in 52 municipalities against Marcos's.

> "I chose to meet him on his battleground and I won in almost every district. My candidate for governor won in 49 of the 52 municipalities. Out of four cities, Serging won only in Cebu City. And on the provincial board he got not a single seat. The results indicated that the Cebuano vote is not under the control of a single man."[11]

But there were issues against him which the Liberals thought potent enough to prevent his reelection. Among these was graft and corruption involving some people close to him, including his so-

called "cronies." Such charges, however, could not be proved. On the charge of the Liberals that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office was issuing fake tickets, the senators investigating it, including Eva Estrada Kalaw, found the charge completely false.

He was accused of violating the Constitution by organizing special defense forces. Marcos replied he was authorized to organize special forces. "Now, how they are employed is a different matter." He was blamed for inaction on the Jabidah or Corregidor Case. His answer was that he was the one who ordered an investigation of the case; it was he, not the Liberals, who ordered the trainees brought from Camp Capinpin; he who confronted their commanding officers, who counted the trainees and found out who actually was missing and how many were missing.

> "Then I ordered a court-martial. And the court-martial was stopped by whom? By *them*. They appealed to the Supreme Court. They didn't want the court-martial continued. Why? And yet I am charged with not punishing the guilty. The appeal to the Supreme Court was filed by someone who came to me with his governor son repeatedly asking that I put up no candidate against him. That was ridiculous."[12]

He identified the "someone" as Justiniano Montano, minority floor leader of the House, who started the impeachment move against him. According to Marcos, Montano wanted him to assure him that he would not put up a candidate against him, that he would run unopposed in his province, Cavite.

> "He promised he would support me; Cavite would be handed to me on a silver platter. But I laughed in his face because I have never received such an immoral proposal in my life. And there were many things [Montano] asked for."[13]

In that interview, published in an election year, Marcos did not hesitate to take a swipe at Philippine democracy. One difficulty under the system, he said, was that when a President had learned to do his work as efficiently as he could, his term ended, he had to run again — which he was then about to do — and spend a lot

of time engaging in politics and "answering stupid criticism." After three years in office a reasonably intelligent President would know all the problems of the country, what he could and what he could not do, how much resources he had, and how they should be employed. He did not want to let that experience go to waste, nor the chance to use it, for the first time in the nation's history, in a second term unhedged by political anxieties. In Marcos's own words

> "As a reelected President, I would be freer to make certain decisions because, I say this frankly, I would be free of the pressures of politics. I would be able to view our problems on a long-range basis. This country cannot slide along on four-year programs. It must have long-range programs, initiated now, that can continue to be implemented even 20 years from now."[14]

On the matter of foreign policy, for instance, Marcos said that when he took over as President in 1966 he found no documents indicating the reasons why the country was staying aloof to the socialist countries. He asked the foreign affairs department for the basis of the policy but was not given any. Yet, he said, Philippine ambassadors and ministers were prevented from meeting with Communist diplomats. He recalled that when he was a representative to the United Nations he received an invitation from a Russian delegate, and was notified that one of the rules and regulations was not to fraternize or meet with socialist diplomats. He challenged the regulation, but nothing came of it. When he asked the foreign affairs department if there had been a study of markers for the nation's products in countries other than those in "the supposed Free World," they said no. The reason was that there was no contact with them. Thus he ordered that a study be made. Of course the Liberals would call him a leftist for what he did, said Marcos.

> "This is one of the basic differences between me and Serging Osmena. I am for a dignified and free foreign policy. He openly says he is pro-American. What does he mean? That if the interests of the country clash with the interests of the United States, he will opt for the Americans? These are the

things he has to answer . . . I don't think that any country can run its foreign policy except on the basis of national interest."[15]

Marcos then outlined what he would do if reelected. He would continue with the programs he already had initiated; but he would also lay out long-term plans oriented to such a definite pace and direction that "no mistakes, no accidents, no change of authority nor weakness in a leader could reverse the movement forward." He would strive to bring together, in order to build the nation, all the forces clashing with each other — even political parties. He could ask the two major political parties to joint together to implement a basic national policy.

"It's an idea — and again, of course, they will say I am a visionary, a naive character. They laugh at me when I speak of greatness. But what can I do? I believe in greatness. I believe that if one is to have vision, it should be a big vision, a great vision. Otherwise, forget all about vision, go crawl like an insect on the earth, and don't look for a vision in the skies."[16]

His four years as President had taught him that even a great vision had to move on practical ground. It was a sobering experience. When a person went into the presidency, he did so feeling he could do almost everything in the world — lift up his country and build it up into something generations present and future would be proud of. But as the days went by he realized that presidential powers were much more limited than he thought, that the President's resources were scanty, that there were obstacles in the way, both God-given and man-made.

The presidency, admitted Ferdinand E. Marcos, "has made me a very patient man — a patient and a wiser man."

Marcos explained that during the first year a President begins establishing priorities. Learning the priorities is a slow process. In the second year the President learns the lesson of what he called the "concentration of forces." Since the resources are limited he

could not solve them within the short period given him. "That's why you learn to become a patient man," he said. "And you pray to God that whoever succeeds you will learn the same thing."

This is the irony of the presidency, as we have seen earlier. On the surface the office seems to have unlimited powers and that the occupant could do everything. In reality the powers of the presidency are very limited.

To a man who desired fervently to get things done, this was a critical problem. He must acquire more power.

IF he failed to win a second term it would mean the death of his vision of greatness. For he would lose the power and the authority to define and pursue *the* national interest and to reconcile all the clashing, conflicting forces in society to establish a new system and a new order. His defeat would mean a continuance of the tradition that no President of the Republic had ever been reelected. And what would history say of him? He would end up as a mere leader of the interregnum. He must have saved the country from the crisis in which he had found it when he first rose to power in 1965. That was, in itself, an accomplishment. Still it lacked the substance and the measure of greatness that had always been his dream. Lifted from a crisis the nation could be plunged not long after into a new one. And where would that place him? He must lead it on to the promised land.

And he could only do so if he remained in power.

For a man so obsessed, like General Charles de Gaulle of France, with a dream of grandeur for his country, fame and immortality must equally be obsessive. Love of fame is not, in modern culture, considered a virtue: people are likely to confuse it with personal vanity and with publicity, and therefore not a worthy motive of a national leader. But it is a trait connected with people who excel, whether in the arts, arms, or politics. A soldier, a writer, or a politician entertains what Lionel Trilling has called "the phantasy of his immortal renown," though he may not overtly desire or

seek it. The great poet Dante desired above all earthly things to be famous as a poet, and Shakespeare believed implicitly in the permanence of his fame. John Milton called love of fame "the last infirmity of noble mind," but also called it an ally in the realization of immortality:

> *"Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise*
> *"To scorn delights and live laborious days."*[17]

In the pursuit of his vision Marcos was in deadly earnest; he would not be stopped. To stop now would be to deprive himself of that golden chance to lead his people in the writing of their own history. His critics attacked him ceaselessly for his near-demonic dynamism (Carl Jung's phrase[18]) in the struggle for power; they called him power-mad; he was reviled for his alleged ruthlessness in the use of power. But they all seemed to fail to understand his central motivation. It was definitely not the sheer joy of enjoying the grandeur and the privileges of the presidency that he was after, not power for power's sake; rather, it was evident, he desired to hold on to power because it was the only way he could transform his society and make it scale the heights of greatness that he had envisaged.

Marcos himself had repeatedly emphasized what he wanted to do. He would continue with the programs he had started but was unable to finish in four years. He would, moreover,

> "lay out plans, long-term plans, oriented to such a definite pace and direction that no mistakes, no accidents, no change of authority nor weakness in a leader could reverse the movement forward."

Reelected for another four-year term, and perhaps to remain at the helm of leadership for much longer, he hoped to "bring together, in order to build the nation, all the forces now clashing with each other. Even political parties, perhaps." This would no doubt be difficult to achieve; still, it was necessary because it was the only way he could give his people a better life. The conciliation of such

contending forces in a society, writes Prof. Michael Curtis, is a prime requirement of political success.[19]

This dream of homogenizing the diverse sectors of the Philippine milieu was to find expression two years later in Marcos's book on revolution:

> "The problem, therefore, is the modification of the political culture, so that the revolutionizing elements can be absorbed within the democratic system, thus achieving not only what is good in itself but also preventing the kind of revolution that is destructive of human freedom."[20]

In the achievement of his vision Ferdinand E. Marcos was willing to transcend himself.

EVENTS favored Marcos in that campaign. With a solidified Nacionalista Party behind him, a sophisticated personal organization, an infinitely effective campaigner in the person of his wife Imelda who could send thousands of voters racing madly to glimpse her in public meetings and rallies, and a rising fever of nationalism whose contagion had been spreading down to the countryside, he loomed even at the outset as the sure winner. The opposition Liberals not only had no nationwide organization, suffered from inadequate funds and logistics, and had just been demoralized and unnerved by their debacle in the senatorial election two years ago. They also erred in choosing Senator Sergio Osmena, Jr. as their presidential candidate. For Osmena had just been discredited; Marcos candidates had overpowered his own in his native bailiwick, as we have seen earlier, during the 1967 election.

Furthermore Marcos who, even as a neophyte congressman from Ilocos Norte was already said to possess charisma, had become even more charismatic the second time around. In four years in the highest position in the land, the fragments of his manifold experience in the use of authority and power seemed to have blended together and structured a new personality, a leader-personality, in Marcos. The years had widened the range of his vision and added depth to the quality of his life and leadership, but had not, it seemed, robbed

his physical being of its reservoir of stubborn, volcanic energy and dynamism. Sprightly and agile, he conveyed the impression that he was much younger than his 52. There was still that bohemian, rakish tilt of the head, the effervescent smile, the naughty deep dimple on the left cheek, and above all, that stentorian voice with which he could thunder powerful commands or softly whisper words of endearment. This voice was in fact one of Marcos's greatest assets.

On stage, addressing large audiences, Marcos would begin speaking slowly, clearly enunciating every word, gravely intoning the sentences. The voice gathers resonance as he goes along, gathers strength and power — rich, full, masculine. It is a voice that, according to a magazine writer, "seems to come past the larynx from a built-in loudspeaker in his diaphragm."[21] More than anything else the masculine boom of his voice seemed to invest him with power and authority,, and set him apart from the rest of the speakers.

Crowds at rallies did not have to be told who among the dignitaries on the stage was the President. The deep-toned voice, solemnly and slowly articulating the words, where the others chose to be just loud or strident, no doubt belonged to Marcos.

It is this skill in throwing and manipulating his Jovian voice that enabled Marcos to flog the emotions and appeal effectively to the tribal and even nationalistic past of the voters.

In contrast, Osmena, Jr. looked passive and phlegmatic. His mien was always serious; he rarely smiled, and if he ever did his smile was not spontaneous but forced. He, too, had a charming lady campaigner, his daughter Minnie, but while she had vivacity and youth she lacked Imelda's polish and charisma, a kind of personal magnetism that inspires by the sheer force of its presence — a magnet that lies deep in her person, in the character and quality of her life.

The Marcos exuberance could not be found in Osmena. On stage he could not match Marcos's oratory — his ability to

keep the audience spellbound with his powerful voice, the precise moments when he would provide them with relief by cracking jokes, often earthy, then setting them up for punch lines. When Marcos began rendering his vision and dreams into words ("I dream of making this country a land of plenty where no one goes hungry; I dream of you living in comfort and your children going to school and growing up to be proud and self-reliant citizens; I dream of making this nation prosperous and great, a jewel among nations . . ."), his more enlightened listeners would instantly recall the famous "I dream" speech of Martin Luther King, Jr. who had mesmerized the largest human gathering in the history of the United States on the day of the Washington March.

A writer describes President Marcos on a platform thus:

> "When he is in the mood he is by and large one of the best performers among present-day politicos. He is completely relaxed and conveys the impression that his reelection formula is a very simple one. Only the veterans in the game would know that every stance he takes and every move he makes is dictated by a highly sophisticated election plan and timetable."[22]

Osmena, on the other hand, had what is called a brand of "low-key oratory" — a simple exposition of premises, spare sentences, meticulous marshalling of evidence, strong and lucid logic.[23] On television Osmena's style is more effective than that of Marcos. For the success of any TV performer depends on his achieving a low-pressure style of presentation although getting his act on the air may require much high-pressure organization.[24] But the country is not television country; the rural areas, for example, and the slums within and at the fringes of the urban communities do not constitute ideal TV audiences or markets. Besides the appeal of Osmena was to the mind. On the other hand Marcos appealed as much to the mind as to the emotion. In his speeches, as well as in advertising and propaganda, he combined emotional and rational appeal, exploiting to the maximum his war-time record of heroism. He would begin by recalling where he and Osmena were during the war: he was in the mountains of Bataan fighting for his country, while Osmena was in his office on the Escolta enjoying the good

life, selling scrap iron to the Japanese army. The true measure of a man, Marcos would boom, could be taken in times of crisis; and the war years called for loyalty to country. He gave more than loyalty, he would say; he offered and risked his life for the nation. On the other hand, Osmena just made money during the war and gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

Then he would harp on Osmena's clannishness. Again recalling his travails in Bataan, Marcos would say, his voice charged with emotion:

> "When I risked my life fighting the enemy in the hills of Bataan, when I lay wounded on the battlefield, not knowing whether I would live next day, when I made all these sacrifices, I was not thinking of the Ilocanos nor the Tagalogs. I was thinking of my country, of all the people in it, the Ilocanos, the Tagalogs, the Muslims, the Cebuanos, the Negrenses and the rest of the Filipinos.
>
> "It is for them that I fought and bled. I was wounded by the same common enemy. I was fighting for the Filipinos, not just the Ilocanos or the Ilongos. I was fighting for you, too, you who are Cebuanos.
>
> "That is why it dismays me to hear some people talk about their voting for a Cebuano candidate, because they are Cebuanos or of Cebuano extraction. We are voting for candidates who will be officials of the Republic of the Philippines, not just of the government of Cebu or of Negros or of Ilocandia. We must vote as Filipinos."[25]

Furthermore, Osmena did not have the common touch. For a presidential candidate he seemed too aloof, too aristocratic. It was hard for the voters to identify themselves with him. And he did not have grassroots contacts. Marcos was to say after the elections that if the Liberal had chosen former President Diosdado Macapagal, "he would have given me a fight."[26] For Macapagal could identify with the masses, being a peasant's son. Besides he would have been able to bring unity to the Liberal Party. And

he would have known what mistakes not to commit again after his defeat in 1965. According to Marcos he and Macapagal had similar habits, criticizing themselves after a victory or a debacle. Moreover, with Macapagal's proposed welfare state program, the Liberals would have provided a concrete, tempting alternative to Marcos's "performance" and "achievement" program.

One other decisive factor in the contest was the issue of nationalism. Osmena had openly proclaimed that he was "one hundred percent pro-American." He would adopt an open-door policy for foreign investors especially in areas which needed developing and which were not yet overcrowded by Filipino industrialists. Marcos, on the other hand, would want Filipinos to retain control of the development of the country. While he also would encourage foreign investment, he would want Filipino entrepreneurs to retain corporate control of new industries.[27] The nationalism issue wrought havoc on Osmena's campaign because his pro-American stand was tied up by the Marcos camp with his war-time record. Osmena's policy of strengthening "special relations" with the United States and closing the door to non-democratic countries seemed totally parochial. Osmena seemed to have failed to read the signs of the times. Like Macapagal, who would not even allow athletes, journalists and cultural groups from Socialist countries to set foot on Philippine soil because of an imagined fear of subversion, Osmena would not attempt to open the windows however slightly to allow some fresh air in. Marcos knew what the people wanted, as voiced by intellectuals and nationalists in the media. They wanted a more liberal foreign policy. It was because of this that Marcos not only allowed non-American groups in the Philippines but also authorized Filipinos to visit Socialist countries. At the same time he opened the avenue towards eventual trade and even diplomatic relations with non-Free World countries.

Marcos made great capital of Osmena's pro-Americanism. In his famous *Nakakahiya* speech at Plaza Miranda on the eve of the election, he attacked Osmena not only for his war record and anti-labor stand, but exposed his anti-nationalist position which he said was dangerous. He said Osmena's anti-nationalism surfaced after

Marcos prodded him to state his plan of government since a presidential candidate should have a plan "contra-distinguishable from that of the present administration." Said Marcos:

> "And I watched as his plan of government developed more and more into a pro-American plan. Openly we were not saying anything — until the last minute. Then we hit out. He may not have realized it — I don't know if he ever did — but when he revealed his plan of government he revealed that at heart he was not a nationalist."[28]

THE range of Marcos's vision was matched only by his political sophistication. He was a modern politician in the fullest sense. This was evident not only in his firm belief in the effectiveness of an efficient, well-funded organization but also in his insistence on using modern technological inventions including the computer. He also made full use of public opinion surveys, and overcame the limitation of the campaign period by intensive use of the helicopter in his barnstorming campaigns. Furthermore, unlike his predecessors in the presidency, who all lost in their reelection bids, he knew how to maximize the effect of money and translate the fervor of the voters into real votes.

Marcos believed that the helicopter had revolutionized political campaigning. When he first ran for President he went around the country twice, and each round took him one whole year. But in the 1969 campaign, using the helicopter, he was able to round the country three times in only one year, and the experience had been less tiring. For the helicopter enabled him to deplane from one airport and fan out to areas inaccessible by plane, get into towns within range in 20 or 30 minutes, places that would take hours to reach by car, as in the Mountain Province, Cotabato, or Isabela. The First Lady, who had a separate schedule, was also able to cover the country three times before the election.

In pre-helicopter days, said Marcos, he could only visit an average of four to five towns a day. But with the helicopter he and Imelda could visit anywhere from 10 to 16 towns every day.

He also cut down his speeches to 20 or 30 minutes so he had an allowance of one hour per town. He slept five minutes on the helicopter between stops, and thus felt rested all day.

His campaign plan was sophisticated. The first phase was an intense campaign to bring about awareness on the part of the voters and raise their enthusiasm. The second phase was a slowing down of the initial efforts — an organizational period. The third and last phase was the last campaign effort, the escalation of the entire campaign into a peak or climax.

During the first phase the Marcos organization bombarded the people with a heavy barrage of mass-media advertising. Much of this advertising was withdrawn during the second phase, in accordance with the master plan. According to Marcos the campaign did not really stop; there was merely a stop in the handout of materials for radio, TV, and the press.

> "This was practically unnoticed because we spaced out what advertising we had. No new billboards . . . pure organization. We were just moving around in the provinces and asking: Are there any changes, any reaffiliations? Expenditures were also kept to the barest minimum."

During the lull surveys were conducted by American experts. Marcos said he could not believe the results; he was increasing his lead. He ordered another survey after 15 days, and the results were the same. He concluded that it was either that Osmena was not being accepted or that he was doing the right thing. As expected by the Marcos people the momentum of the first phase was carrying him through. Still, just to be doubly sure, Marcos secretly ordered straw polls in Manila colleges and universities at the end of the second phase. The results showed Marcos and his team were ahead by at least a 2-1 margin. In one state college, for instance, which at the time was a rising center of youth activism, the mock elections showed Marcos leading Osmena, 653-246; Vice President Lopez ahead of Genaro Magsaysay, 668-225. The same trend was evident in the largest universities in Manila: Far Eastern University, University of the East, Lyceum of the Philippines, and

the "exclusive" schools like Ateneo de Manila, De La Salle College, Maryknoll College, San Beda College, St. Theresa's College, and College of the Holy Spirit.[29]

The Marcos campaign plan was prepared by several groups but the master schedule was prepared by Marcos himself. He had to go over the arrangements and make changes because "it affected me, because it is I who know what I can do." In reality the campaign was planned way back in 1967, said Marcos; the senatorial election that year was the trial run. It was more sophisticated than the 1965 plan; he had dropped the techniques of campaigning that did not prove effective in 1965. For instance, in 1967 Marcos dropped the method of spending as much campaign time in small areas as in large ones. It proved effective, as the results of that year's senatorial elections showed. Marcos admitted, nevertheless, that during the 1967 election their system of funding was defective — "scattered gunshots," it had "none of the delicate accuracy of aim required." They remedied that defect in 1969. He limited and controlled their budget because, said Marcos, unlimited funding is one of the fables of political history. It simply was not true that an incumbent reelectionist had unlimited resources. As he puts it:

> "it is apocryphal, legendary, a myth. It is not true that a President has unlimited funds. There is never any limit unless you set a limit. Even President Magsaysay, President Garcia and President Macapagal, they themselves told me, this I got from them, because I wanted to know, and they said that the money is never enough, no matter how much you think you have . . . Unless you set a budget and stick to it. Because [the voters and leaders] will assume the sky's the limit and if you don't come across you're dead . . ."

But it did not mean they did not have the funds. Marcos admitted that if the opposition showed signs of fiscal power, he would spend more or at least keep up with them. He made sure they had more than enough in reserve, just in case. He was to say after the election, as a lesson to politicians, that a candidate had to project expenditure so that by the last three weeks of the campaign he

would still have 50% of his funds to enable him to keep his organization intact during the last month.[30] With the money the candidate could hire poll watchers, pay leaders who would herd voters into the precincts, and take care of last-minute expenses. This last lap was crucial: it was the period of conversion, the conversion of popularity and sympathy into votes.

According to Marcos, Osmena and the Liberals did not provide funds for the last lap. They spent their money too soon and poured too much on propaganda. When Marcos heard that Osmena was refusing to spend on his organization he knew the challenger was in trouble.

> "I don't know whether he ran out of money. One thing is sure: he did not finance the organization during the last two weeks of the campaign."

The result was that the Liberals could not even afford the cost of identification cards (IDs) for poll watchers, let alone pay those watchers four pesos a day. Marcos said that if the Osmena watchers were not allowed inside the precincts for lack of IDs, the Nacionalista leaders helped them out and offered them IDs and funds. In that way the Osmena leaders were converted into Marcos partisans.

He appreciated the value of the computer to get the proportions right between effort and geography, and to keep and check records. He would not rely on memory. He took notes of what happened in every election: the issues raised, his points of weakness, the deficiencies of his organization, as distinguished from the party organization. (Marcos is a great believer in alternatives, which in the armed forces are called "lines of communication." In politics, he said, there must be an alternate organization to take over in the event of a crisis.)[31] He took notes of the activities of his leaders. And he would not reveal all campaign secrets; in his view many secrets should be kept from the lower-level leadership of the campaign. He kept them to himself. Thus, if a leader promised him something he would note it on paper, have it indexed, then check it if the promised time came.

"That's the difference between [traditional] and modern politicians. The gentlemen of the old school relied on the personal word of honor. They didn't have to keep records. That's not always an advantage. They had memory, but we have records, and the records are precise and computerized."

The surveys helped him immeasurably in the campaign. If the surveys, for example, showed him losing in one place he would immediately campaign there again as often as necessary, using his resources carefully.

Scientifically conducted, said Marcos, public opinion surveys yielded accurate political signs. But they must be conducted every month to be effective. In his case he ordered a survey as early as January 1969, with a hypothetical opponent. Then the next survey was made after Osmena had been chosen by the Liberals in a consenus voting. It showed him leading Osmena 2-1, even 3-1. He continued with the surveys every month thereafter, from June to November. The findings of these surveys enabled him to decide where to aim.

If the surveys showed Marcos weak in an area all he did was drop everything and personally campaign there. His presence, he said, reversed the trend, as subsequent surveys indicated. There was no substitute for personal campaigning, for person-to-person contact with the voters.

"The personal appearance is important even if you just stand there repeating the same old platitudes. Your popularity rises with a single round of hand-shaking. I have talked with President Kennedy and Bob Kennedy and Johnson and Reagan about this question of the personal appearance and they all said there's no substitute for it. Even in the United States, where the TV network is nationwide and you can stand before a camera and get the whole nation — even there they say: there's no substitute for it."[32]

But in spite of Marcos's personal charisma, personal campaign machinery, the helicopter, the computer, and foreign public opinion pollsters, Osmena could have given him a good fight if the latter

had someone to match Imelda. For it was Imelda who, as in 1965, would give Marcos countless votes. One week before the election a magazine writer, analyzing the chances of Marcos and Osmena, wrote:

> "Imelda Marcos is still the most effective compaigner for the President. She has not lost her bewitching popular appeal. While she merely sang or delivered five-minute messages in 1965, now she goes campaigning on her own, accompanied only by some Blue Ladies, distributing goodies and making hour-long political speeches. Her enchanting style is said to have softened many Liberal leaders in the provinces."[33]

Marcos confirmed this repeatedly. In the 1965 election Imelda was his "secret weapon" which tilted the balance in his favor against Macapagal, the incumbent. And in the 1969 election Marcos admitted that Imelda "is the outstanding performer in this election."[34] As it turned out Imelda's native province of Leyte gave Marcos a lead of more than 100,000 votes over Osmena.

Throughout the campaign period Ferdinand E. Marcos was convinced he was going to win. Every survey indicated victory. Still he sustained and intensified his efforts up to election day. The election was too important for him to be lukewarm about and disinterested in. He wanted to be sure that he would win, and not only win but win by a wide margin. He wanted the people's mandate to be clear; he wanted to show the world, through that election, that the Filipino people were solidly behind him and their government.

His efforts were rewarded. Ferdinand E. Marcos defeated his rival, Sergio Osmena, Jr., by nearly 2,000,000 votes, with more than 8,000,000 voting. Officially, as decided on January 8, 1973 by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal which upheld the reelection of Marcos over the protest of Osmena, the final figures were:[35]

Marcos	5,017,343
Osmena	3,043,122
or a difference of	1,974,221

The decision of the tribunal which was made up of the entire membership of the Supreme Court was unanimous. The 41-page decision, penned by Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, was supported in a concurring opinion by Associate Justices Antonio P. Barredo, Querube C. Makalintal, Calixto O. Zaldivar, Fred Ruiz Castro, Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio, and Salvador V. Esguerra.

The night after election day President Marcos, assured of a second term, sat down at his massive desk, faced the TV cameras, and delivered a brief but meaningful statement:

"We have just received a new mandate at the polls. I am happy about this event and am profoundly grateful to the Filipino people.

"The satisfactory conduct of the elections is a tribute to our political maturity as a people and speaks well of the future of our political institutions.

"I perceive in the new mandate the clear voice of a resurgent people who demand the right to be heard and to participate. I perceive in it the voice of a new generation desirous of giving the nation the sovereign respect that is its due in the community of nations. I perceive in it an entirely new faith for the Filipino nation.

"For the renewal of mandate for this administration is a renewal of faith in an administration that has not hesitated to speak the truth about our own particular capacities and conditions. It is the acceptance of a leadership that will not hold out any promise of progress without requiring of the citizens compliance with their duties and fulfillment of their obligations.

"It is, in a historic sense, a bold decision for our people.

"It has been a hard and bitter campaign. But the conflict is over and the nation has spoken. We must now bind the wounds, resolve our differences and restore cooperation among our people.

"We must make this mandate a victory not of one party alone but a victory of the entire Filipino people. I thank God and the Filipino people for this unprecedented confidence in me."[36]

With the levers of political command safely in his hands again for another four years, Ferdinand E. Marcos could look forward to the continuous pursuit of his vision of greatness. He did not have to prepare for the presidency anymore. "I think I am prepared," he said. "I know *what* to do. I know *how* to do it. I do not have to compromise. I intend to carry the burden on my own shoulders."[37]

He would stop compromising, engaging in political expediency, making appointments and decisions to satisfy political adherents. He would explain this to all political partisans so they would cooperate. Cooperation was vital; he needed it to cope with the expectations of the people.

The reelection of Marcos, unprecedented and historic, had placed him on the crossroads of history. It had robbed him of the traditional alibi of past leaders of the country that four years was too brief a period for a President to do so much for his people. It had left him only two directions: one leading to an eminent place in history, the other to a subterranean darkness to which history has consigned mediocre leaders. On his new four-year term rested his fate: greatness or mediocrity, immortality or ignominy.

Now, more than ever before, he could move faster and with more confidence in pursuit of his dream. He could read what the people needed and desired most in the second mandate they had given him: change, a new system, justice. Was a revolution needed? Had the time struck?

"People in power," writes Michael Curtis, "can rarely create the current of events; their normal behavior is to float with it and to steer."[38]

It was not too long after his reelection that Marcos seized the opportunity to ride and steer the tide. #

His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sixth President of the Republic of the Philippines, took his oath of office at the historic Grandstand at the Luneta on December 30, 1965 before Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon.



President Ferdinand E. Marcos on his second inaugural on December 30, 1969 at the historic Luneta. He took his oath before Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. Witnessing the occasion are Doña Josefa Edralin Marcos (center), mother of the President; the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and the Marcos children: Ferdinand ("Bongbong"), Jr., Imee and Irene. Marcos is the only reelected President of the Republic of the Philippines.



The 1971-72 Constitutional Convention was formally opened by President Ferdinand E. Marcos (standing) on June 1, 1971 at the Fiesta Pavilion of the Manila Hotel. The Convention completed its task of writing a new Constitution after one and one half years of deliberation. The Charter provides a parliamentary system of government.

The historic document proclaiming the entire Philippines a land reform area (Presidential Decree No. 2) was signed by President Marcos in the presence of leaders of farmers organizations on September 26, 1972. The decree, which emancipated Filipino farmers from centuries of bondage to the soil, was done in the President's own handwriting.

President Marcos receives from former President Diosdado Macapagal on December 1, 1972 the draft of the 1971-1972 Constitution after it was signed by the delegates. The turnover ceremonies were held at the Maharlika Hall, Malacañang, in the presence of the delegates, members and leaders of Congress, and the judiciary.

President Marcos (center) signs Proclamation 1102 on January 17, 1973 proclaiming the overwhelming ratification of the new Constitution by the Filipino people. From left are former Senate President Gil J. Puyat, Former Vice President Fernando Lopez, former Chairman Jaime Ferrer of the Commission on Elections, former President Diosdado Macapagal, president of the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion.

President Marcos and the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, with their three children: Ferdinand (Bongbong) Jr., Imee and Irene.

CHAPTER

THE VOLCANO ERUPTS 7

WHEN Ferdinand E. Marcos stood at the historic Luneta on December 30, 1969 to accept his second mandate, the voice of revolution was beginning to echo all over the land. The New People's Army, the fighting arm of the revitalized Communist Party of the Philippines led by Amado Guerrero (*nom de guerre* of Jose Ma. Sison), was engaged in modern guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Student demonstrations in the cities were throbbing with revolutionary fervor. Numerous organizations had sprung up and continued to multiply among students, professionals, teachers, intellectuals, workers, peasants, fishermen, sectarians, media people, car owners, jeepney and bus drivers. In campuses the Tagalog version of the Communist *Internationale* was swiftly replacing the national anthem.

If that was not revolution it was only because of the absence of the classic sign of conventional revolution: the dramatic, bloody confrontation between the organized rebels and the government forces.

For aside from the proliferation of rebellious groups among practically all sectors of Philippine society the traditional instruments of revolution were in wide use: pickets, rallies, boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins, teach-ins, discussion groups and sporadic clashes with law authorities. The young rebels, unarmed, had learned to produce counterweapons: pillboxes, Molotov cocktails, and assorted explosives. Public gatherings featured fiery and abrasive oratories, chants and slogans, incendiary placards and streamers in flaming red: *"Ibagsak ang imperyalismo, piyudalismo, pasismo!"* (Down with imperialism, feudalism and fascism!), *"Ibagsak ang pamahalaang Estados Unidos-Marcos!"* (Down with the United States-Marcos government!). And the voice of revolution not only filled the streets in urban centers but resonated in the ancestral villages, for the rebels had already won access to the media of mass communication whose owners, pillars of the oligarchy, apparently thought the government had lost its power and its will to govern.

This was the national mood when Marcos accepted his second mandate. The "social volcano" he had talked about in 1966 seemed in a hurry to erupt.

The revolutionary temper of the people, who had just given him an unprecedented victory over his rival, Sergio Osmena, Jr., was not lost to Marcos. When he delivered on that day his second inaugural address, "To Transform the Nation — Transform Ourselves," he thanked the people for their trust and pledged to lead them into a new decade, the decade of the '70s, which he described as the most crucial in the nation's history as well as the history of Asia and the world. He noted that from city to countryside millions were waiting for the government to speak, moving in great anxiety as they crossed the frontier of the new decade, searching for a healing answer to their anxieties. Said Marcos:

> "We enter this decade burdened by heavy and complex problems.
>
> "For our achievements in the past four years are far from our dream of national fulfillment. That dream, that vision, is

still ahead of us. And deep within our hearts, we know the reason behind the national condition.

"In our own land, we have just begun building a nation. We have had to telescope in four years what other nations achieved in decades.

"There is a price for the achievements of these four years and that price we shall begin to pay now."[1]

He spelled out the price that had to be paid: dedication, discipline, self-abnegating leadership. Discipline, said Marcos, was the other face of achievement; discipline and self-sacrifice.

"But I hear the strident screams of protest against self-discipline from the gilded throats of the powerful, of the privilleged, of the opinion makers, of the wealthy and the cynically articulate — they who have yet to encounter the implacable face of poverty. I hear the well-meaning cries of the uninformed and the naive. To them I address this plea. Let them share the burden with the grace and the courage of the poor. Let them find common cause with the people. Too long have we blamed on one another the ills of this nation; too long have we wasted our opportunities by finding fault with each other; as if this would cure our ills and rectify our errors. Let us now banish recrimination."[2]

There were indeed errors that must be rectified — the fundamental problems of social, economic, and political inequality between the privileged few and the masses. Who should rectify those errors? The unprivileged, the revolutionaries milling and shouting in the streets, or the men in power and the men of privilege and wealth? And when should the errors be rectified?

"The time is now," President Marcos said for he knew that to postpone action would be unwise; the aggrieved had begun to wake up. He pledged the severest government leadership in integrity, morality, and discipline, then asked a response from the privileged. The next few years would see the laying of the founda-

tion for a "revolutionary reformation" of the nation's political, social, legal and economic systems. The decade of the seventies

> "cannot be for the faint of heart and men of little faith. It is not for the whiners, nor for the timid. It is not a decade for the time-wasters and the fault-finders. It demands men and women of purpose and dedication . . . Our society must chastise the profligate rich who waste the nation's substance — including its foreign exchange reserves — in personal comforts and luxuries."[3]

The government would not, whatever be the circumstance, abdicate, he said firmly. "We shall use our powers at home and our goodwill abroad . . ." so that the country would some day "become a power of its own, giving substance and glory not to alien nationalities."

The President then solemnly pledged to attain "our dreams no matter at what cost of personal pain and suffering."

> "The revolutionary temper of our times demands no less. The hardships have come, brought about by the heritage of a self-indulgent people; let us now bear these hardships; let us overcome them . . . In the solution of our problems, this government will lead."[4]

Marcos then said that since it was the destiny of the leaders to transform the nation they should begin by transforming themselves first, and that in that formidable task no one would be exempt, whatever his station in life. Neither wealth nor power would purchase privilege; wealth and power should not outrage the conscience of the people. He ended that brief second inaugural speech with what sounded like a prayer and a creed:

> "Trusting in God and ourselves, let us now pledge . . . that there shall be in this spot of the universe, a people strong and free . . . a people daring to match the iron of the world without losing their essential humanity, eradicating social inequity without anarchy, eliminating subversion without endangering their liberties, practicing self-discipline and self-

reliance without ostentation . . . embracing freedom and liberty even in deprivation.

"Thus we prove to our posterity that our dream was true that even in this land of impoverished legacy, the wave of the future is not totalitarianism but democracy."[5]

The Revolt of January 26

LESS than one month after his second inaugural, after delivering his traditional State-of-the-Nation message to Congress entitled "National Discipline: the Key to our Future," President Marcos was to witness what he had just called "revolutionary temper of the time" explode into a real revolution.

Before the President delivered his speech Fr. Pacifico Ortiz, S. J., president of the Ateneo de Manila, opened the session with an invocation that sounded like a revolutionary tract. He spoke of the growing fears, the dying hopes, the perished longings and expectations of a people who had lost their political innocence, a people who knew, as they walked through unsafe streets in their cities or through Huk-infested barrio lanes of Central Luzon, or stared at dwindling goods and rising prices in the market stall —

"who now know that salvation, political or economic, does not come from above, from any one man or party or foreign ally; that in the last analysis, salvation can only come from below — from the people themselves, firmly united under Your Divine Providence to stand on their rights whether at the polls, in the market place, or at the barricades; willing to pledge, against all goons or gold-rich bribers, what they have pledged mutually to one another at the birth of the nation — their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor."[6]

Continuing his invocation, the aging priest said that for a free people to lose their political innocence without despairing was also for them to know they were standing "on the trembling edge of revolution. It is a point of no return, it is a moment of truth that can either remake us as a people or unmake us into a mob." He

then asked God for courage of wisdom to forget the past with all its partisan bickerings and recriminations, but above all to pay the price whatever it may be for the rebirth of this nation: truthfulness, hard work, integrity, competence and compassion. When he was over, President Marcos quietly stood up, walked toward the rostrum and faced a battery of microphones, and amid a galaxy of light reflectors and hundreds of clicking cameras delivered his 93-page speech.

Outside, the entire area in front of Congress swarmed with students, teachers, priests, nuns, seminarians, workers, peasants, curious onlookers, and assorted sympathizers of activism. They had been coming since early that Monday morning, January 26, because they had been given a permit by the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally there up to 6 o'clock in the afternoon. The rally was organized by the National Union of Students of the Philippines, an organization of students of private schools, and their principal demand was to make the 1971 Constitutional Convention non-partisan. The NUSP, from the beginning, had been identified as a "moderate" group, believing in peaceful, constitutional reforms. The radical groups, on the other hand, believed drastic reform was not possible; a revolution was needed to change the national condition.

It was a huge convocation, estimated at from 20,000 to 50,000 people, and the collective mood was festive particularly in the morning and early afternoon, for with the boys were thousands of *colegialas* from Manila's exclusive schools for girls.

As in all gatherings of this type there was a wide assortment of placards and streamers identifying the organizations and proclaiming their slogans. Red armbands marked "The January 26 Movement" were sported by the NUSP officers and members. But if the students were numerous the security and law officers were also in full force, numbering about 3,000 including anti-riot contingents, to make sure the rally would not turn into a riot. According to one reporter, there were 40 different organizations in all represented in the rally, including labor organizations like the National Association of Trade Unions.

Before President and Mrs. Marcos arrived at 4:45 p.m. the rally speakers had taken turns denouncing imperialism, feudalism, fascism, government corruption and ineptitude, politicians in general, and all of the ills of the nation.

But the audience was not purely moderate, and the militants in the group were not content with merely denouncing the nation's sickness. They were chanting they wanted "Dante", commander of the New People's Army. To the militants Dante (in real life, Bernabe Buscayno) was the folk-hero *a la* Fidel Castro or Che Guevara.

Minutes before the President's arrival tension increased. A group bearing the revolutionary red banner of the *Kabataang Makabayan* arrived. For the KM had already established its reputation as a militant, fighting group. Their banner was held aloft two big wooden poles, and the members were chanting and shouting as they marched toward Congress, surging forward through the crowd in a diamond formation. Then they positioned themselves in the forefront of the demonstration site, their huge red banner dominating all the other streamers.

When the President arrived at 4:45, taking the south side of the Congress building, there was booing from the ranks of the demonstrators. The booing stopped the moment he disappeared into the building. But the rally speakers continued, even while the President was already delivering his speech, reporting to the people the "state of the nation" as they saw it, a nation kept in perpetual bondage and slavery by the "ruling class" represented by the rich, the politicians, and the aliens, notably the Americans — a country doomed by a socio-political system that permitted the majority of the people no opportunity for a better life.

Shortly before the NUSP permit would expire, NUSP president Edgar Jopson of the Ateneo de Manila announced that the next speaker would be Gary Olivar, a leader of the radical *Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan* (*SDK*). Like the *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM), the SDK had gained renown for militancy; its members seemed unfazed by threats or danger in the hands of authorities.

The SDK was, after all, a son of the KM, having been organized after a split in the KM leadership. And like the KM, whose founder was Jose Ma. Sison (or Amado Guerrero), it was a national democratic organization guided by the thoughts of Red China's Mao Tse-Tung. At the moment that Jopson was making the announcement, however, Olivar was not around, and the NUSP mikes passed instead to a radio commentator, Roger Arrienda, whose organization, *Ang Magigiting* (The Bold Ones), was the second group granted a rally permit for that day. His permit was valid up to 8 p.m. He began to harangue the audience. But so bombastic was his language and so expansive his gestures that he drew laughter from the audience who began to chant, "We want Gary! We want Gary!"[7]

Arrienda retreated from the mikes and Jopson announced again that Olivar would speak next. Olivar then reached out for the mikes, but Jopson, after some hesitation, announced that everyone should sing the national anthem, *Bayang Magiliw*. The militants resented the moderate Jopson's sudden change of mind.

After the singing Jopson declared the rally formally closed and urged NUSP members to return to their buses. He clutched the mikes to his breast.

Manifestoes which had earlier been passed from hand to hand now started flying, in crumpled balls or as paper planes, toward the demonstration leaders' perch. Then the militants grabbed the mikes from Jopson. The radicals had taken over the leadership of the NUSP-organized rally.

A youthful speaker, using the NUSP mikes, attacked the NUSP for being "counter-revolutionaries who want to end this demonstration," then trained his fire on fascists and imperialists in general. So effective was his oratory that by the time he was through, his audience had a new, a more insistent chant: *"Rebolusyon! Rebolusyon! Rebolusyon!"*

> "Passions were high, exacerbated by the quarrel over the mikes; and the President had the bad luck of coming out of Congress at this particular instant."[8]

Now the President and the First Lady emerged from the Congress building, surrounded by security agents, Metrocom troopers and other law enforcement units led by Colonel Fabian Ver, chief of the presidential security force, and Colonel James Barbers, deputy chief of the Manila police. The President waved at the large crowd, who waved back at him. But a moment later the crowd, an admixture of radicals, moderates, centrists, and mere spectators began to boo the President. To silence the crowd someone started to sing *Bayang Magiliw* over the microphones. He was joined in by many in the audience. But before the singing was through another group in the forefront began to sing the Tagalog version of the Communist *Internationale, "Bangon!"*

Then it happened. After the singing, while President Marcos and the First Lady were being escorted by security aides to their waiting limousine, stones, empty bottles, sticks, placards and other projectiles were thrown at their direction. Security men formed a human cover to protect them. Fearing an assassination, Colonel Fabian Ver pushed them into the car. His men covered the limousine. Then a black mock coffin and a *papier-mache* crocodile passed from hand to hand and were hurled at the presidential car, but fell short of the target.

The security men escorted the President and the First Lady out of the frenzied mob and into Malacanang.

THE President's personal version of the stoning incident is as follows:[9]

After delivering his address he was escorted by Senate President Gil Puyat and Speaker Jose Laurel, Jr. to the Congress driveway. He heard shouting below, on the street level, while he was on the stairs. He went down to the sidewalk of the driveway, looking at the placards to read them. The students raised their placards to enable him to read their messages.

The First Lady was behind him by two or three meters, shaking hands with people around, including the students. Marcos, too, shook hands with them, from the lobby to the sidewalk.

As he moved towards the car there was a scuffle, and he felt some heavy object falling around him. He did not know what it was all about, but later he was told it was a cardboard coffin with a stuffed alligator inside. But he did not see it. He was told it was pushed away by the police and thrown back to the street. The scuffle had become a pushing contest between groups, and people were shouting. Then there was a throwing of bottles and stones and sticks.

The President was not hit, but a security man beside him was hit in the face by a hard object. He suffered laceration and contusion and was given five to six stitches. Other security men suffered contusions, too; one was hit in the left eye and another on the nape.

> "During the commotion, somebody — I think it was Colonel [Fabian] Ver, my chief of security, pushed me into the car so fast I bumped my head on the door. But I remembered the First Lady was still back there. So I said: 'Wait, let us get the First Lady.' But nobody dared lay a hand on her to pull her to the car. So I had to go back and pull her myself. As a matter of fact, I hurt my ankle doing this: we were on the curb and I twisted my weak right ankle. That is the only thing I suffered, besides bumping my head on the car — but I had to pull the First Lady out of the crowd and push her into the car. I am afraid I pushed her too hard. It's good she didn't suffer any contusions on her lovely face. As we drove away, the scuffle had apparently died down on the driveway. In fact the students were waving their hands at us. I was therefore surprised when I learned later that there was a riot after we left."[10]

The First Lady did not show any fear, but felt sad about the whole thing. As for the Marcos children, they were not around for the family had decided against bringing them along.

Upon reaching the Palace the President heard that students and the police were battling on the streets. He checked with security; everybody had been caught by surprise. Intelligence had told him nobody had expected violence. It had apparently been provoked

on the spot by a few persons. He sent word to the PC, the riot squad, and the Metrocom to leave the area and "not to hurt any of the students except in self-defense." It was his first directive: to put out all those who were supposed to secure him from the riot area but to protect the people inside Congress.

Then the President received reports that some people near the flagpole had started throwing objects and that these were originally not intended against the First Lady or him but against the police. He could not believe it was the students who had started the riot because he had been continuously meeting with them the week before. He had met with them on Friday, January 23, when an intelligence man was mauled by the students in front of Malacanang for "infiltrating" the student ranks and using a fake student identification card. He had met with them, too, on the other days when they had serenaded the Palace with insults, and even on the eve of the riot: Sunday, January 25. And then this revolt took place.

WITH the First Couple out of the area, the law enforcers attended to the demonstrators. Helmeted anti-riot troopers armed with long truncheons gave chase to the retreating young rebels. The more defiant ones jeered and mocked the officers. Others linked arms and faced the law-enforcers, chanting *"Maki-Baka! H'wag matakot!"* (Fight! Fear not!)

As in all confrontations between trained men with arms and unarmed citizens, the latter were the losers. Before that night of January 26 ended, at least five persons were killed and scores wounded.

The behavior of the law enforcers, running after the demonstrators and beating them up with their truncheons, and worse, using firearms on them, outraged the population. Responsible citizens spoke against it, condemning police for their brutality. Salvador P. Lopez, president of the University of the Philippines, said:

> "The night of January 26 must be regarded as a night of grave portent for the future of the nation. It has brought

> us face to face with the fundamental question: Is it still possible to transform our society by peaceful means so that the many who are poor, oppressed, sick, and ignorant may be released from their misery, by the actual operation of law and government, rather than by waiting in vain for the empty promise of 'social justice' in our Constitution?"[11]

And even ranking government officials deplored and regretted the use of "unnecessary force" against the students.

President Marcos bewailed the excessive use of police power on the youth. On hindsight he would refer to that event as a "dramatic, shocking" expression of the revolutionary mood of the time. Still:

> "Students have a legitimate right to manifest their grievances in public and we shall support their just demands, but we do not consider violence a legitimate instrument of democratic dissent, and we expect the students to cooperate with the government in making sure that their demonstrations are not marred by violence."[12]

Marcos blamed the mass media for excessive dramatization and play-up of the incident. He attributed the violence to two factors: the inexperience in riot and mob control of the police and the military authorities, and the designs of certain Communists and nihilist radicals in the demonstration. The media did not even attempt to understand the issues and sentiments behind the militancy of the students and the ideologues in their midst, said the President, but merely dismissed it as a disenchantment with his administration "rather than as the inevitable outcome of the modernizing process, modernization being a disquieting, at times convulsive, undertaking because it is in fact revolutionary."

To Marcos, therefore, that tragic night was the expression of the people's desire to take up his challenge to think, not to accept with resignation the misery and illness that was their legacy from centuries of deprivation.

"I asked for their discontent, and it was clear that the more articulate, the more active among them had taken up the challenge."[13]

Ferdinand E. Marcos had asked for revolution at the start of his first administration, as we have seen earlier, and now, four years later, the people dramatically responded. A revolution had begun.

But the newspapers refused to call it a revolution; to them it was merely a "riot."

They were largely wrong. It was in fact a revolution.

The Siege of Malacanang

IF the January 26 convulsion still left doubt that a revolution was on, that doubt was completely erased by the siege of Malacanang that took place four days later, on January 30, 1970. A police officer said of the siege: "This is no longer a riot. This is an insurrection."[14] And no less than President Marcos himself called it a revolt — "a revolt by local Maoist Communists."[15]

The day after the 26th, about 120 student leaders, representing 36 schools and a dozen national youth organizations, assembled at the Far Eastern University and met for three hours. Presided by Edgar Jopson the representatives passed a resolution demanding the resignation of some officials of law enforcement agencies, and set Friday, January 30, as the starting date of a series of rallies. In the Palace, President Marcos was at about the same time conferring with law enforcement authorities, telling them to be "more tolerant to the future leaders of the country," and ordering them to drop the charges against the students arrested on the 26th.[16]

The following day, Wednesday, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila announced that the Manila police would stay away from future demonstrations to avoid trouble. They would, however, stand by to respond if violence erupted. That same day the leaders of the NUSP and the National Students League (NSL) rejected an invitation to meet with the President in Malacanang; they preferred to have the talks on the 30th. The Senate and the House

created a committee to investigate the root causes of demonstrations in general and Brigadier General Vicente Raval of the Philippine Constabulary proposed the immediate acquisition of non-lethal equipment for the police and urged their re-training in dealing with demonstrators, for:

> "The whole world is in ferment and youth is on the march. It is essential that, in our country, we take the greatest care in dealing with the problem."[17]

On the eve of the 30th four groups of demonstrators held simultaneous but separate rallies. One of the groups consisting of professors from the University of the Philippines was led by UP President Salvador P. Lopez. Other groups demonstrated in front of Congress, others at the Manila City Hall. The police brutality of January 26 had united all the activist groups; the first blood of the revolution had radicalized even the moderates, most of whom came from wealthy families. They had found common cause with militants.

On Friday, the 30th, the youth again demonstrated simultaneously. The militant members of the KM, SDK, MPKP and NSL proceeded to Malacanang where their leaders would meet with the President. At approximately 3 p.m. NUSP's Jopson and the NSL's Portia Ilagan, student council president of the Philippine Normal College (the NSL is an association of students from state colleges and universities) and other student leaders conferred with President Marcos. Before the conference was over, the Congress demonstration of the militants came to an end, and the demonstrators marched from Congress to Malacanang, arriving there at about 6 p.m.

The first sign of trouble occurred during that march when the youth revolutionaries, angered by the sight of a symbol of police authority — a police traffic stand — destroyed and burned it at the intersection of Ayala and Marquez de Comillas streets, at the southern foot of Ayala bridge. Getting unruly now they proceeded on foot, chanting and singing, their fists clenched, shouting their slogans and crying *Rebolusyon!* As they were approaching J. P. Laurel Street, toward Malacanang, they heard something that sounded

like exploding firecrackers, and their collective mood darkened further. Dusk had set in as they reached Malacanang; the lamps on the Palace gates had not been turned on. Someone shouted, *"Sindihan ang ilaw! Sindihan ang ilaw!"* (Turn the lights on! Turn the lights on!) and the lamps were lit.

Then someone hurled a rock at one of the vapor lamps, smashing it. Other rebels followed suit, blasting the Palace lamps one by one with rocks, stones, and pieces of wood with which they had carried their placards and banners. The front of the Palace was plunged in darkness.

At that moment another commotion was taking place at the Mendiola gate of Malacanang (Gate 4, at the corner of J. P. Laurel and Mendiola Streets). The young rebels were storming the gate. To stop them a firetruck inside the Palace grounds advanced and trained its hoses on the rebels, who retreated. Sometime later, at about 7 p.m., a Manila Fire Department truck came up from Sta. Mesa. It slowed down in front of St. Jude's Church, near the gate of the Palace, and trained its fire hoses at the students. But the water pressure was too weak. The students charged at the firetruck and commandeered it from the firemen whom they beat up.

> "The rebels now had a captured fire truck at their disposal. They drove it toward the Mendiola gate and used it as a battering ram of sorts until the lock gave way, the chains broke, and the gate clanked open. Into the breach surged the more daring demonstrators. They had apparently come prepared for the assault. They lobbed Molotovs and pillboxes into the Palace grounds; the flames spread down the road when the Molotovs crashed to the ground, the nails and broken pieces of glass scattered when the pillboxes exploded.
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> "Once inside the gate, the rebels stoned the buildings and set fire to the truck and to a government car that happened to be parked nearby. Before they could wreak more havoc, however, the Presidential Guard Battalion came out in force. They fired into the air and, when the rebs held their ground, fired tear gas bombs at them. The rebs retreated; the few who were

> slow on their feet, or were blinded by the tear gas, got caught in the Palace grounds and were beaten up with rifle butts and billy clubs and good old-fashioned fists and feet."[18]

Before they were forced to retreat the demonstrators had lobbed so many rocks, pillboxes and Molotov bombs at the buildings inside the Palace grounds that glasses and windows of the new Budget Commission building as well as the clinic building were smashed. The infirmary was set on fire, but the flames were quickly extinguished by the Palace security. At Gate 4 the rebels burned a waiting shed. A guardhouse was dragged up to adjoining Arlegui Street and burned there. And at the main Palace gate they destroyed the telephone booth beside the presidential guard battalion outpost with Molotov bombs.

To those outside of the center of action the situation seemed desperate. Radio and television announcers covering the scene were outracing one another in predicting the fall of the Palace. The panic and hysteria that seized the announcers and reporters themselves were evident in their voices. The way they described the siege it seemed Malacanang was burning.

Meanwhile, reinforcements from the PC arrived, then from the Army, Navy and the Metrocom. Then:

> "The pattern of the January 26 battle was repeated: the military would attack, the students would retreat; the students would counterattack, the military would draw back. At about nine, the soldiers had gained control of Mendiola and J. P. Laurel. The students were holding Tuberias, Legarda, and Claro M. Recto; some had retreated down Arlegui and into Quiapo, where looters took advantage of the situation in the Lacson Underpass, breaking display windows and grabbing jewelry and shoes."[19]

SHORTLY before the violence erupted President Marcos was conferring with a handful of student leaders. Among them were Edgar Jopson of the NUSP, Portia Ilagan of the NSL, and Crispin Aranda, president of the student council of the Philippine College

of Commerce. They had been invited that morning by a presidential aide. The atmosphere, according to Aranda, was tense. The student leaders were demanding that the President pledge not to run for a third term. The President assured them that he would not run again. They applauded him.

The students then pressed their next demand — that the Constitutional Convention be saved from politicians. The President assured them it would be non-partisan. Then they proceeded to press their other demands: the resignation of Colonels Gerardo Tamayo and James Barbers of the Manila police, the disbandment of the Special Forces and the anti-riot squad of the Metrocom. They were told that under the circumstances these were impossible demands.

The President exercised his usual tolerance in that conference. According to him the student leaders "practically threw a piece of paper" at him and said: "You sign that; you are not running for a third time."[20] When he told them he had been repeatedly stating in meetings with other students that he had no intention of running again, NUSP president Jopson shouted: "We don't believe you!" To which the President retorted: "I don't believe you either! Why are you so arrogant?" There was a short break and when the students came back and repeated their demand, the President asked them for whom they were seeking a written promise not to run again. They replied it was for no one in particular, but that they felt his promise should be in writing. The President refused. "As your President," he said, "I will do this voluntarily — but I won't do it under coercion!"

But that meeting, said the President, ended cordially, and he assured them he would grant the demands that could be granted. They had pictures taken together, then individual pictures of the President with each group. They did not know that a rebellion was already erupting outside.

PRESIDENT Marcos was on his way to supper in the family dining room when he heard explosions outside. He opened a window and had the guards called to find out what was happening.

The explosions were loud, and his first thought was of the First Lady and their three children. When he found them he told them to stay together in one room. He then called for Colonel Ver and the other security heads. By that time, there was a fire on J. P. Laurel and he could see some boys trying to destroy the lamp posts.

He went downstairs and walked around to find out what was actually happening. The rebels, he said, were throwing pillboxes, some of which the Palace security obtained: "empty eggshells filled with powder and nails and provided with a fuse."

> "My order to security was not to fire. What I was worried about was that the soldiers might fire and I did not want any firing from us, especially when I found out there was no shooting from outside, only the throwing of pillboxes. So, my order was: stay out of range of the pillboxes; stay under cover — but no shooting. I had to talk to the officers; I was worried that the officers might think this was a situation that required force when, in my assessment, it was not. I gave orders that if the students should break in they were to be pushed out or arrested. But better: just push them out."[21]

In his assessment the Presidential Palace was not in danger. A bomb hurled across the main gate caused a large crater, and stones, sticks, darts and pillboxes were aimed at Area I where the presidential living quarters were, but the bulk of the rebels was massed at Gate 4 and the bulk of security in Area I. Even when the students broke into the Palace grounds the President still saw no need to order the emergency evacuation plan executed, a plan for the transfer of the First Family from the Palace to a safer place. This was a plan, said the President,

> "that exists all the time, not only when Malacanang is under siege. Every day, security is supposed to be ready to carry out this evacuation plan and only security knows what it is. I don't know what the evacuation plan is — and maybe it's just as well. Security is supposed to implement it; I only say when to implement it; and I have authorized them to im-

plement it even without my consent in certain emergencies — for example, when I am out in the provinces and there's a fire in the Palace."[22]

Marcos saw that he was right in not ordering the implementation of the plan. For the invasion was quickly repulsed. Some of the Metrocom men were hurt but they did not fire a single shot. For he kept repeating to all unit commanders not to hurt anyone and not to allow the troops to use their guns. While he was giving instructions he was eating supper because he knew they would be staying up late.

When the Palace grounds had been finally cleared of demonstrators Metrocom troops rushed out in pursuit of the fleeing rebels. Other state troopers sealed off the Executive Building and deployed inside and outside the Presidential Palace, ready for any counter-attack. They also blockaded the areas around Malacanang to make the Palace secure. It was now past nine o'clock; the City Hall permit for the rally had expired. The authorities used this as reason for the students to leave the place and return to their homes.

The "Battle of Mendiola"

BUT the rebels would not leave. Instead they converged in the center of the cross formed by Recto, Mendiola and Legarda streets. Tense and turbulent, they flung rocks and insults at the men in uniform who were guarding the bridge leading to Mendiola. A jeep was burning nearby. On the left side of Legarda, other rebels were shouting and screaming. There were other demonstrators in that area and the soldiers had to guard the bridge against two armies of students, one attacking from the front, the other from the side.

> "It was at this point, with the students closing in from Recto and Legarda, that the troopers started firing . . . into the ground. Dust and tiny pebbles exploded from the cement . . ."[23]

The firing was preceded by the advance of two firetrucks from the Mendiola side, with the soldiers trotting behind. Upon reach-

ing the Holy Spirit College the fire hoses were turned on, trained at the vanguard of the demonstrators in front of Mapa High School. Some of them retreated, but they were egged on by their leaders. The youth were armed with stones and steel bars wrenched from the iron railings in the center of the island of Recto Avenue.

When the protagonists were less than a hundred yards of each other in front of Mapa High School the youths started pelting the advancing soldiers with stones. They hurled invectives and mocked their enemies. It was when the demonstrators refused to budge that the soldiers fired shots, apparently to scare them. But the demonstrators nervously held their ground. The soldiers fired again and the demonstrators dispersed and scampered toward the bridge. Some were clubbed by the anti-riot squad men.

Finally the demonstrators were pushed back to Mendiola Bridge. A number of students turned right on Legarda; others toward Recto. In front of the University of the East and at the corner of Lepanto and Recto where the Philippine College of Commerce stood, students set up bonfires in the middle of the street. Other groups filled bottles with gasoline at a gasoline station across the street from the University of the East to make Molotov cocktails. A few meters away from the station smouldered an army truck and a private car, which had been set on fire by the rebels.

The fighting ended by midnight, and the government forces took complete control of Mendiola Bridge. Thus ended the so-called "Battle of Mendiola," which occurred after the rebels had failed in their attack on Malacanang.[24]

The following night, President Marcos appeared on television to inform the nation of the "premeditated attack on the government, an act of rebellion and subversion." He said the mob that attempted to burn Malacanang was not a mob of students or of arsonists but men dedicated to an evil purpose: to destroy or take over Malacanang. This plan was, in his view, conceived by two groups, one Communist-inspired and the other not Communist-inspired. Both groups, said the President, were under surveillance.

Marcos assured the nation that the situation was under control, that peace and order would be maintained.

> "Malacanang Palace is well guarded, but more than this, the country and our government are well guarded. There is no takeover by any group of the military or of the civilian government. In the matter of preparation of the plans of reaction against any attempt to take over this government, the action that will be taken will be well-studied, deliberate, cautious, and legal, and there will be no attempt to curtail constitutional freedom."[25]

Then to the rebels he gave the warning that any attempt at the forcible overthrow of the government would be put down immediately. "I will not," Marcos emphasized, "tolerate nor will I allow Communists to take over."[26]

At the time he was announcing this hard line against the Communists, the entire armed forces of the Philippines had been put on red alert. #

CHAPTER

THE HOUR HAS COME 8

A NON-REVOLUTIONARY leader would have seized that moment in history — when Malacanang was under siege — to use the full powers of his office to quell the revolt. He would have ordered the military to train their guns at the young rebels who, waving crimson banners of revolt, shouting Maoist slogans, smashing and burning everything in sight, and proclaiming the downfall of government, had stormed the Palace. At such moment of crisis, an ordinary President would not have hesitated to order a counter-attack. And his use of superior force would have been justified.

But not Ferdinand E. Marcos who, when asked by his officers for permission to fire at the rebels, replied with unusual calm: "Permission granted — fire with the fire hoses."[1]

To the outsiders who could not understand why he did not order a counteraction, Marcos later explained, as we have seen, that the situation was not desperate enough to warrant the use of superior force. Moreover, he did not believe that he was born to kill students — "I don't have the heart to shoot them down."[2] Furthermore, he knew that to unloose the guns of Malacanang on the

students would have resulted in a massacre of the innocent since the majority of the enraged demonstrators were not Maoist radicals but moderates.

To the writer of these lines, however, the reason for that decision goes beyond mere compassion or humanity. It must be viewed in the light of Marcos's dream of a revolutionary transformation of his society.

In the translation of that dream to reality Marcos needed a helping hand, a countervailing force emanating directly from the people which he could use against the entrenched power of vested interests and of politicians. Social activism was that countervailing force — a liberalizing influence on society necessary in reforming rigid institutions and accelerating the pace of social and economic change. Demonstrations, Marcos contended correctly, "strengthen the hand of any man who wants to reform government."[3]

Marcos believed that the grievances and discontent of the people as articulated by the activists were just; they proceeded from a logical analysis of the state of the national life. And when the demonstrators looked at the nation:

> "they see one in which advantage and privilege reign supreme and accrue only to a very few. When they look at our politics, they see no real participation of the masses and only the excesses and avarice of politicians. And when they look at our government, they are oppressed by the feeling that the nation's resources are going to waste or, worse, being cornered by a few people."[4]

Marcos not only recognized the justness and legitimacy of demonstrations but also saw the need to make them more vigorous. For a demonstration is a way of expression, a way of making the people's demands known, and in a rigid social system dominated by a few vested interests, a "demonstration without vigor can only be ignored."[5]

The conclusion therefore asserts itself: Ferdinand E. Marcos considered the demonstrators his allies, not enemies. He needed their zest, daring and revolutionary passion, their raging desire for

fundamental, radical changes which coincided with his. He needed their boundless energy and even their fanaticism, for it could be directed as a battering ram against the forbidding walls of the system separating the handful of privileged elite from the majority of the masses.

Thus, he would not suppress them. If he used brute force against them, he would lose the countervailing power he needed to attain his own revolutionary goals.

But Marcos knew the youth, bursting with energy and dynamism, could go out of bounds. He therefore counseled them to keep their activism vigorous and energetic but peaceful, orderly and within constitutional limits. He reminded them to avoid unjustified violence and vandalism, for these militated against the noble ideas they were expressing about freedom and democracy. He urged them to demonstrate in large numbers in the name of freedom and democracy, but never to submit to spasms of violence and orgies of vandalism for such eruptions would curtail the freedom and the rights of other citizens.[6] Ultimately, their usefulness would be reduced.

VIEWED in this light, then, the decision of Marcos during that long night of siege of the Palace becomes easily understandable. His order not to fire at the youth rebels was a calculated risk only a leader with exceptional perception could take. The gains were large. Not only did he survive that crisis; he emerged from it a larger figure. More than any other event in the past his decision proved overwhelmingly that he was humane and compassionate as a leader, not a fascist as his enemies and critics had pictured him to be. His light, almost playful order to the military, "Permission granted — fire with the fire hoses," and his confession, "I don't believe that I was born to kill students . . . I do not have the heart to shoot down students," will doubtless find their place in the treasury of immortal statements by great men in history.

Marcos also saw the need to remind the youth to be vigilant in policing their own ranks. The Revolt at Congress on January

26 and the January 30 Siege of Malacanang were storm signals indicating that the movement was wide open to manipulation by external forces. The student reformists were beyond using violence and resorting to senseless destruction of properties and vandalism. But the preceding two eruptions, and similarly violent and orgiastic mass actions, proved that Maoists had succeeded in penetrating the ranks of the genuine reformists and would direct the movement towards their own ends.

As a committed democrat Marcos would not countenance the prospect of seeing the revolution fall under the leadership of Communists. On June 20, 1970, he voiced the warning:

> ". . . I consider one of the gravest consequences of the conspiracy to obliterate our freedom the infiltration by the enemy of genuine reform movements, and of nationalist groups which seek to bring to the fore the Filipino spirit. How successful this campaign of subversion is may be gleaned from the fact that even our young men and women, many of them college students, are being tantalized into making common cause with the subversives, doubtless carried away by a feverish sort of idealism."[7]

His assessment was realistic. The contagion of Communism was rapidly spreading. In the countryside the New People's Army was becoming more unmanageable. In Manila and other cities numerous organizations of students, professionals, and workers were rapidly multiplying. Universities and colleges were being rocked almost daily by strikes, boycotts, pickets, rallies and demonstrations by students, faculty, and administrative personnel. The dreaded Communist symbol, the hammer and sickle, had begun to appear in the revolutionary banners, streamers, placards, manifestoes and posters.

In campuses, hitherto moderate student organizations fell one after another under the control of the radicals. With equal speed the radicals either seized the leadership of existing faculty organizations and employees' associations or formed their own factions. The revolutionary fever swiftly infected the workers in the mass media.

Even the once apolitical National Press Club of the Philippines, whose members were employed by the oligarchic mass media, fell to the radicals. In the Catholic Church, some moderate elements also became radicalized.

While watching the tide of events, Marcos doubtless knew the direction it was taking. Under the *status quo* the restive masses had no immediate hope of satisfying their needs. Marcos himself did not have the power to do so. On the other hand, the Communists were winning the battle of propaganda. They were titillating the people with the promise of immediate redress of their grievances — through a revolution. There was no other recourse, no other means of ending their misery and poverty than to revolt and destroy the ruling class. Revolution, said the Communists, was the only way to salvation.

On December 18, 1970, Marcos counseled his countrymen not to be carried away by the Communists' promise of the good life. He appealed to them to commit themselves anew to democracy, for democracy

> "provides us basic human freedoms which are essential to the full realization of our potentials as individuals and as a society of individuals, of men of dignity. Democracy alone, infinitely more than Communist totalitarianism, can guarantee freedom of speech. Only in a democratic system may the citizens of a country choose their leaders by means of a popular election."[8]

In contrast, he said, candidates in a Communist country are handpicked by the rulers, a ruling elite that came to power by violence and could not be changed except by violence. He emphasized that where democracy stood for freedom, Communism stood for suppression of that freedom.

But Marcos himself knew democracy in the Philippines had not been as successful as it should be. It had been a failure because it had not been flexible enough to allow the great majority of the people to share and enjoy the privilege and power monopolized by a well-entrenched oligarchy. Between the promise of the Communists and the promise of democracy as it then existed, that of the Com-

munists was more attractive. He must offer the people a better alternative to lure them away from the Communists. That alternative was democracy itself, but democracy transformed.

> "The only meaningful kind of democracy for the masses, especially in the developing countries, is that which seeks to assure them an expanding freedom, not only politically but also socially and economically. Democracy is at best irrelevant when it is not related in a vital way to the lives of the people, and it is hateful when oppression is waged in its very name by the few against the many. Democratic leaders must possess the political will to carry out those social and economic reforms that will in fact disprove the Communist claim that there is no hope, no relief, and no future for the poor and the oppressed within the framework of a democratic social order."[9]

Specifically he would have the democratic system identify itself with the great masses of the people rather than with just a narrow and self-obsessed oligarchy. The fruits of development would be distributed more equitably and justly among the people to make democracy more acceptable to them. This transformation must be realized immediately. In the task of transforming democracy, the military would assume a crucial role. It would be used as the instrument of the people's welfare — the allies of the common people in the struggle for justice and a better life.[10]

By the end of 1970 Marcos knew with certitude that the tide of revolution had become irreversible. Its great and overwhelming power derived from the fusion of the diverse dissenting elements of Philippine society. The bond that held them together was their common demand for revolutionary reforms.

Marcos considered this development — the new militancy of almost all elements of Philippine society — one of the great events of 1970.[11] It convinced him that the hour for decision had come, that he must race with the enemies of democracy for the leadership of the revolution. If he hesitated a moment longer the revolutionary tide would be mounted by the subversives and manipulated to bring

about the downfall of democracy and the Republic, and inaugurate a totalitarian regime.

MONDAY, January 25, 1971 was the finest hour of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Time will immortalize this date as a great milestone in the history of the Philippines. For it marks the fateful day when Marcos formally launched what he has called the "Democratic Revolution," a revolution unique in history because it was to be constitutional, legal and within the framework of democracy.

Unequalled in his gift of expression, Marcos surpassed himself when he formally announced it in the storied halls of Congress. The occasion was the traditional joint session of the country's senators and congressmen to hear the President report on the state of the nation and submit his recommendations. If the lawmakers were shocked by what they heard their President and Chief Executive say that day, it was because Marcos addressed them not as the leader of the old system but the leader and spokesman of the revolution.

Pointing to the thousands of Filipinos lined up along the streets of Manila as he rode from Malacanang to Congress, gesturing towards the thousands of others gathered outside the halls of Congress peacefully and quietly crying for change, Marcos declared that the people had mounted a revolution, but not with arms. "They demand a revolution in the tradition of our democracy. They fight a democratic revolution."[12]

By thus identifying the revolution as democratic, Marcos succeeded, in one master stroke, in isolating the Communists from the rest of the revolutionaries, the great majority of whom were not ideologues. By describing the revolution as quiet and peaceful he had drawn a dividing line between the Maoist-oriented anarchists and the reformists on the other.

After proclaiming it a democratic revolution, Marcos immediately identified its leadership.

> "They have asked me to come to speak to you today, now, before it is too late, about their dreams and aspirations.

"So I come to speak of a society that is sick, so sick that it must either be cured now or buried in a deluge of reforms."[13]

As the leader of the revolution, he announced the direction, the course, that it would take. He would guide it towards the "roots of our disappointments," against a system that mocked the people's dreams and sacrifices because it permitted the few to exercise irresponsible power over the many. Because this concentration of power in a few was the primary source of the nation's aberrations, it must be destroyed.

"This brutal pattern in which time and circumstance make a mockery of our heroic efforts must now be broken. For survival is no longer enough for our people. They want — and they deserve — more.

"We live, work, and die in a democratic political system corrupted by a social economic order that is best described as oligarchic. When economic power, driven only by the pursuit of gain, encroaches on political power — the power of the people because it is accountable to the people — then we have a system that permits the rule by the few for the few."[14]

For too long, Marcos said, political power had virtually been the handmaiden of economic power. The people demanded the eradication of the inequities deriving from this anomaly as well as the restructuring of the social order, and would not be content with mere posturings or pious protestations.

In the past he had merely appealed to the rich to demonstrate concern for the poor or they might lose everything. This time he was more blunt, discarding the cliches of a traditional President and adopting the language of a revolutionary leader. "When the 'economic royalists' prove to be insatiable," he declared, "when they use the combination of media and economic power to coerce and intimidate the duly elected leaders of the people and to advance their privileges and financial gains, there is no course left but to eradicate them."[15]

He admitted that as a democratic President it was his task to reconcile the privileged few with the deprived many. But if the oligarchs would remain adamant and block the progress of the many he would gladly break with the few to fight for the many.

But while exposing the oligarchic character of Philippine society he did not prescribe punitive measures. He would not hurt the few if hurting them would not help the many. The orientation of the democratic revolution was towards harmony, not alienation, of the different social classes, "but this can only be achieved by ending privilege and the exercise of irresponsible power."[16] The government had the means to check the oligarchs, but only temporarily, under the *status quo*. New laws were needed to guarantee that the oligarchs would never impose their will on the people, but these new laws could not hopefully be passed in a Congress dominated by the oligarchy.

> "This leadership is not under any illusion that such an objective is easily achieved. It may take generations to do so. But we must start now. Frictions will arise. But I am determined that these frictions will not divide the nation into hostile camps . . . It is imperative, therefore, that we unite in a common endeavor."[17]

Marcos then prescribed an immediate reexamination of the postulates of Philippine society: the ownership of land, the place of the worker in industry in terms of security and dignity, the re-creation of an exploitative society into a cooperative one, and the broadening of the nation's horizons in the world community.

Having thus broadly outlined the thrust of the revolution, Marcos said:

> "I ask that our people brace themselves for a democratic revolution that will reach to the roots of our institutions. And if it is the nation's wish that the President himself lead this revolution, then I accept the challenge."[18]

IF the oligarchs were shocked by this turn of events they did not show it. What they demonstrated was skepticism. Some

journalists strongly doubted the President's sincerity,[19] especially after the President met with some oligarchs in an oligarch's home in Makati. Others expressed wonder how Marcos, whom they considered an oligarch himself, could lead a revolution of the masses against the oligarchy.

Marcos was not fazed by these criticisms. His decision to fight what he had described as "oppressive oligarchs" was irrevocable. He would move against them for the good of the state. "I did not ask for this fight," he said. "I am a patient man, but I will not run away from a fight, especially from those who seek to further their own selfish interests at the expense of all, particularly of the poor."[20] And he would end once and for all the control of big sectors of the mass media by vested-interest groups as these groups could not be made to account for their actions. Their control of so much of the press, radio and television made it impossible to bring their own anomalies and offenses to public notice. Moreover he could not present his side "unless I give in to them on some dubious deal."[21]

He believed that the oligarchs were using the mass media not only in shielding their secret designs and evil machinations from the public but in strengthening the hand of the subversives, for the constant, unremitting attacks of the mass media against the administration were sapping the people's strength and their hope in democracy.[22] The most insidious part of the seditious movement in the country, according to Marcos, was the propaganda against the government. He warned sternly:

> "If urban terrorism is not enough reason for martial law, *propaganda against the government certainly is.* Armed revolt is only the *coup de grace,* the main battle [between the government and the subversives] is propagandist in nature."[23]

The answer of the oligarchs to this warning was more criticism of Marcos and the government. They opened the doors of their media wider to the dissidents. For the first time in the nation's postwar history the avowed enemies of the democratic government enjoyed total freedom in expressing their views in the mass media.

Hitherto unknown leaders of activist organizations emerged, their statements and press releases receiving full play in the press, radio and television. Eventually Communist manifestoes were being reprinted in the media, and Amado Guerrero, head of the Communist Party of the Philippines, began to be quoted like a chief of state. All acts of protest against the government were played up prominently, while the efforts of the government to solve the country's ills were buried in the inside pages, if not ignored.

Meanwhile the tempo of demonstrations continued to increase. On January 30, 1971, first anniversary of the Battle of Mendiola, violence in a demonstration along Mendiola, Claro M. Recto and Legarda streets and vicinity resulted in injuries to a number of persons. In February, transportation in metropolitan Manila practically ground to a halt as a result of a violent strike by an association of jeepney drivers protesting an increase in the price of oil. Radicals supported that strike. In the same month, radical students of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, seized control of the administration, barricaded the entrances and points of exit of the university, and used the university radio station to broadcast Maoist propaganda. The students, who were eventually driven out of the campus, called the university "Diliman Commune."

The demonstrations fanned out to the provinces. There were eruptions in Bicol, the Visayas, and even Mindanao. By July, 1971 the American military installation, Clark Air Base in Pampanga, was wracked by violent demonstrations resulting in the death of one person, injuries to several personnel of the United States Air Force, and damage to property.

This series of increasingly violent demonstrations logically paralyzed the great majority with fear. To them the triumph of the Communist radicals, flying the dreaded red symbols of the KM, SDK, the NPA and the New Communist Party of the Philippines, seemed imminent. Many decided to buy insurance for their future security. Commuters, whether in public utility or private vehicles, obliged with little personal donations to activists approaching them in the streets. It was not their future alone that they wanted to in-

sure but their present. For there had been several cases of bus and jeepney riders injured by stones, rocks and even pillboxes hurled by never-identified persons.

The situation had so deteriorated, in fact, that the great majority of the people, especially in the urban areas — employees, teachers, apolitical students, business and industrial workers, even street workers and peddlers — could no longer find peace, much less security and order. Every day of commuting from home to office was an experiment in danger. Owners of stores, restaurants and shops in the downtown areas closed their establishments before sundown for fear of violence on themselves and their property. Whenever a rally or demonstration was announced, people avoided passing by the places the demonstrators would be in, or the routes they would take.

This helplessness of the citizens was compounded by the fact that the government seemed to have lost its will and its power to secure and protect them from the anarchists. President Marcos was correct in complaining that his voice could not be heard on radio and television. All the large mass media relentlessly dramatized and sensationalized every plan or action taken by the dissenters.

So effective was the propaganda assault against the President that to be identified or tagged as a Marcos follower or man became a stigma. Everyone who defended the government and the President was mocked and labeled *tuta* (puppy) of the President. This was true even in the campuses. If the majority of the students and faculty still possessed confidence in his capability and power to counteract and save the government from collapse, they chose to remain quiet in the face of attacks against the President for fear of reprisal from the radicals.

THE prevailing anarchy and violence in the streets, the rising criminality, the looting that occasionally accompanied riots and clashes between demonstrators and law officers, rose to a climax one Saturday in August, 1971, two months before an off-year election. On that Saturday, August 21, a few seconds after the candidates of the Liberal Party for Manila's elective posts had been officially

proclaimed, two combat grenades exploded within seconds of each other on a stage at Plaza Miranda. All of the eight LP senatorial candidates were critically wounded, though they all eventually recovered from their near-fatal wounds.[24]

At midnight President Marcos signed Proclamation 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, the second President to do it since President Elpidio Quirino.

Less than 24 hours after the bombing, Manila police and Metrocom troops raided the main and annex buildings of the Philippine College of Commerce in Manila, renowned hotbed of activism. Government troops simultaneously rounded up several persons suspected of subversion and connection with the bombing. Among the most prominent figures arrested and detained in Camp Crame were Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente, president of PCC; radio-TV commentator Roger Arrienda; Luzvimindo David, KM secretary-general; Teodosio A. Lansang of PCC, who, before joining the college, had stayed for 14 years in Soviet Russia and Red China; and Orlando Mercado, announcer of the popular news program, *Radyo Patrol*.

On August 23, approximately 36 hours after it had taken effect, Marcos at exactly 1:10 p.m. went on a nationwide radio-broadcast from his study room in Malacanang to announce the suspension:

"My Countrymen:

"I address you today at a time of national emergency.

"For the first time in our nation's history last Saturday, August 21, eight candidates for national office, several other candidates for various lower offices, several high officials of a political party, mediamen, and scores of plain men, women and children became the victims of a mass assassination attempt while attending a political rally.

"Many were killed, and many were wounded in that tragedy.

"Some of the victims — including two senators of our Republic — are still in hospital, fighting for their lives.

"But the most heinous, the most barbaric, the most unmitigated assault was perpetrated not against any particular person, or group of persons, but against our very own way of life, our very own system of government, which guarantees peaceful political competition and the free expression of contending ideas.

"The bomb attack on Plaza Miranda is not only the worst crime ever perpetrated by any group of men against our democracy. It is also one of the worst crimes that may be committed against it.

"In one devilish act, desperate forces of an alien ideology, possessed only by their total contempt for our freedoms and the rule of law, and seeking to institute a state of terror and lawlessness, not only brought injury and death upon our nation, but by that self-same act also sought to turn the anger of our people against our government.

"In a long and continuing series of barbaric acts and depredations, this is merely the latest and most audacious one. But, it is an act that will be long remembered. It is an act that wise counsel bids us never to forget.

"Plaza Miranda is enshrined in our nation's history as the testing ground not only of freedom, but also of new ideas. Of every act, position, or policy, Ramon Magsaysay used to say: 'Can it be defended in Plaza Miranda?

"Today, gloom, terror and shame cover this forum of free speech.

"A state of rebellion, receiving moral and material support from a foreign source, guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group, and increasing the tempo of violence very day, endangers public safety and the security of the state today.

"The forces of this rebellion seek to set our nation into armed conflict so that brother may kill his own brother and father his own son, and supreme authority may ultimately proceed from the barrel of the gun.

"At the cost of innocent lives and our most fundamental values and institutions, at whatever cost to our nation and people, these forces seek desperately today to create a revolutionary situation, as a necessary prelude to our nation's slaughter.

"This is the situation they are seeking after Plaza Miranda. This is the situation that we must deny them.

"Public safety and the security of the state make it necessary that government take, at this time, immediate and effective action to ensure the peace and security of the population and to maintain the authority of the state. Such action we have taken and shall continue to take as the situation so requires.

"Thus, after making available to my office the best tempered and most judicious counsel after consultations with our national leaders, I have as of midnight of Saturday, Aug. 21, suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus,* in accordance with the provision of our Constitution.

"Persons connected with rebellion and with the crime committed during the political rally of the Opposition Party in Plaza Miranda have been apprehended and are now undergoing interrogation. The military are now in custody of these persons.

"Between the actual suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus,* and the official announcement as I make it today, is a time difference of 36 hours. In the best interest of the nation, it was decided that this announcement be withheld until today, to enable our government to operate against the lawless elements with a minimum of obstruction.

"It was 20 years ago when our government first felt it necessary to call upon the same extraordinary measure that we

have just invoked. Let us pray that after this, we may never have to call upon it again.

"This, then, is the text of my proclamation:

"PROCLAMATION NO. 889 AUG. 21, 1971

"WHEREAS, on the basis of a carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

"WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their membership through sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student, and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and

depredations against our duly constituted law enforcement agencies and, worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;

"WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on Aug. 21, 1971 which has resulted in the death and serious injury to scores of persons;

"WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State,

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto or in connection therewith.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of August in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-one.

"(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines

"By the President:

"(Sgd.) Executive Secretary

"In closing, I would like to say that the functions of government shall go on normally with respect to all citizens

of our Republic, with the exception of the participants in the rebellion who waived and renounced their rights to membership into our nation and our Republic by their use of violence in promoting their ends.

"The suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* will last for as long as it is necessary.

"I wish to assure everybody that this power shall not be abused and shall be utilized with prudence and with caution, and only against those who have in any manner helped, promoted or participated in the rebellion and insurrection, which is the basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*.

"We are decided that this rebellion and this insurrection should be crushed with all the powers of the State.

"We are decided further that the crime that was committed in the Plaza Miranda rally of the Opposition Party shall be solved.

"Our people expect this, and as of now all investigation agencies submit a report to the effect that the best available theory is that this was an act committed by subversives.

"Ours is a strong and proud nation. Our past is replete with stories of ordinary men who gave their all in the name of freedom. But our future is secure only if we all unite today in broadening rather than in narrowing down the dimension of our freedoms.

"And yet the organized anarchy of a few seeks to constrict the very freedom our democracy is seeking to expand.

"In the past, the leader of a great revolution said:

> 'The temples of the gods are not built to serve as sanctuaries for the desecrators who come to profane them, nor was the constitution designed to protect the plots of those who seek to destroy it . . . a revolution has its rules

based on justice and public order. It has nothing in common with anarchy and disorder. On the contrary, its aims are to put down anarchy and disorder to establish and consolidate the reign of law. It has nothing in common with arbitrary power; it must be guided not by the passions of the individual, but by the public interest.'

"Today, our government is waging its own revolution. But it is a revolution that is not premised on anyone's blood, that does not seek blood from either the present or the future. It is a revolution that counsels and seeks revolutionary change within a democracy where the constructive and healing power of freedom has long dated, outmoded and made obsolete the use of public violence even in the attainment of good.

"It is, in short, a democratic revolution which we wage. And it is by such a revolution that we hope to save the present, and secure the future of our nation."

THE suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* enabled the government to arrest and detain several suspected subversives with minimum obstruction. But it did not give Marcos the freedom to act swiftly and effectively against the oligarchy. The lightning arrest of some radical leaders considerably defused activism, but only in the cities. For a while the ensuing protest rallies and demonstrations generally lacked the size and energy of mass actions before the writ was suspended.

The oligarchs continued to retain control of their mass media whose operation was not covered by the suspension. Consequently they intensified their propaganda campaign against Marcos. By suggestion and innuendo they joined his partisan enemies in blaming Marcos for all the depredations and acts of terrorism, including the Plaza Miranda bombing. That the people accepted and believed their accusation was proved by the defeat of the Nacionalista Party senatorial candidates in the November 1971 election. Though most of them were unable to campaign due to their serious injuries, the Liberal candidates won 6 out of 8 positions: Salonga, Magsaysay,

Osmena, Jr., Mitra, Ilarde, Kalaw. Only two Nacionalistas — Ernesto Maceda and Alejandro Almendras — got elected.

The outcry against the continued suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* was intense and persistent. Once more it united all the dissenters. Radicals and moderates organized citizens groups and assemblies invoking the name of democracy and civil liberties, and denouncing Marcos for using it to impose a dictatorship. The constitutionality of the suspension was challenged before the Supreme Court. On December 11, 1971 the Supreme Court promulgated a decision upholding the President's action. Part of that decision reads as follows:

> "... our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably; but the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (HMB) after liberation — which clashed several times with the Armed Forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus,* the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castaneda. Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences.
>
> "The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June 20,

1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the grounds stated in the very preamble of said statute — that

> 'x x x the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
>
> 'x x x the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a *clear, present* and *grave* danger to the security of the Philippines; and
>
> 'x x x in the fact of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country x x x'

"In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —

> 'The year following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the *Lapiang Manggagawa* (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the *Malayang Samahan ng Mga Magsasaka* (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals, the PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism.'

"Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which — composed mostly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the 'Protracted People's War' or 'War of National Liberation.' Its 'Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution' states, *inter alia*:

> 'The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous . . .
>
> x x x x x x x x x
>
> 'The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. *The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task* at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable to taking the road of armed revolution . . .'

"In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National Defense — conducted raids, resorted to kidnapings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its record of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.

"At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a

particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, *other*, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is *per se* proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was *announced publicly* by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency.

"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."

This 28-page decision, penned by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, was unanimous.[25]

The radicals' answer to this was more riotous rallies and demonstrations.

IT is significant that before President Marcos promulgated Proclamation 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* he had just finished writing a book entitled *Today's Revolution: Democracy*.[26] He called it "a study of revolution." Its main thesis is that "democracy and revolution are inseparable — that democracy is the revolution." "My purpose in setting out on this study about a year ago [in 1970] was not to encourage complacency but to break it, to offer not a consolation but an alternative," Marcos said in his Introduction.

Marcos emphasized that the poignant wish for a tranquil life would find no sanctuary in the present world. For:

"It is an era of swift, violent, often disruptive change, and rather than lament this vainly, we have to decide whether we should be the masters or victims of change."

So swift was the tide of events that it overtook the publication of the President's book, which he began to write after the eruption

of 1970. As the manuscript went to press, he had to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*.

On hindsight Marcos admitted that the decision to suspend the privilege was the result of more than one year's study and deliberation. There was unanimity as to the need for the immediate solution of the Communist rebellion and the conspiracy to overthrow the government, but "a substantial sector of the leadership advocated caution." Then sometime in April and May 1971 government sources of information, who were actually ranking officers in the New People's Army, revealed the existence of a plot to terrorize the city of Manila. The government leaders, however, agreed that no action would be taken unless there was additional evidence from these sources that the plan of assassination, kidnaping, burning and terrorism in Manila was to be immediately and actually implemented, or that any act would be undertaken by the Communists to implement the plan.

This was, said Marcos, the "July-August Plan," and under it:

"the terrorism that the two Central Luzon provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac had experienced before 1970 was to be extended by the NPA (New People's Army) into the metropolitan Manila area. Execution of the plan would be by the New People's Army units and leaders who had not only found Manila a haven and sanctuary from the intensified operations by our specially trained government troops in the provinces but who were also later assigned on specific missions of terrorism. These units and men were sighted and their preparatory activities confirmed. When the Plaza Miranda Liberal Party rally was bombed with hand grenades, resulting in the death and injury of many, our sources of information inside the New People's Army confirmed the beginning of the implementation of the July-August plan of intensified terrorism for those months, whether independent of any Plaza Miranda carnage or not, they did not clarify.

"It was to be confirmed later on that three days before the Plaza Miranda rally there was an order from the Communist

> Chairman for an increase of violence by the terrorists. Succeeding incidents and reports repeatedly bore out the veracity of the order."[27]

The gravity of the problem pivoted, said Marcos, on whether it was time to meet the Communists head-on on their own ground in the cities. It was clear to him that the use of extraordinary powers would not be merely for the purpose of solving any specific violence at Plaza Miranda or elsewhere but to dismantle the entire Communist Party apparatus in the Republic. Since he believed that in two more years the Communists would have grown so strong that the entire government machinery would not be able to solve the problem of subversion, he decided not to wait that long. And it was to thwart the Communists' plan to take over the government by force that he issued the proclamation. The power to do so was specifically provided in Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution thus:

> "The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."

As a result of the suspension of the writ privilege, the government attained these objectives: (1) Prevented the spread of terrorism from the rural areas to the cities, especially Manila; (2) Obtained information on Communist organizations, missions, sources of funds, equipment, intelligence net and recruitment; (3) Arrested some leaders of the rebellion, and (4) Started to dismantle the Communist apparatus in the Philippines.

That only "some" leaders of the rebellion were arrested under the powers of arrest and detention of the proclamation is significant.

It meant, among other things, that, as the President said, in a television interview[28] in August 1971, "a great number of [the leaders] have been able to escape the dragnet. I must tell you that actually the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* leaked out immediately upon my signing it. We are trying to find out how and why. But, I repeat, many of the leaders of the subversive movement were able to escape."

This was an admission by Marcos himself that the contest between him and the subversives for the leadership of the revolution was far from over. #

CHAPTER

DEMOCRACY AS REVOLUTION 9

IT is customary for revolutionary leaders to prepare a manifesto of their plans and intentions, a vision of the future to which they intend to lead their people. Ferdinand E. Marcos is no exception. While he revealed a brief and sketchy outline of the Democratic Revolution when he launched it formally on January 25, 1971, he reserved the full, documented discourse on the subject in his book, *Today's Revolution: Democracy*[1] which he finished writing that year but which he released only after he had suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* on August 21, 1971.

The book is a brilliant study of revolution. Written in a lucid, forceful style in the tradition of classic revolutionary tracts, the book marks its author as a profound political thinker and advocate of a type of revolution remarkable for its uniqueness. For, as we have briefly noted earlier, President Marcos's theory is that democracy is a revolutionary doctrine, that it is a continuing revolution simply because democracy has not attained the full limits of its potentials. And in his book he is unconditionally offering democ-

racy, the "Democratic Revolution," as the better alternative to a violent or Jacobin revolution.

Richard Critchfield of the *Washington Star* agrees that *Today's Revolution* is "a brilliantly-reasoned manifesto calling for a government-led, non-violent revolution to fundamentally remake Philippine society by redistributing its private property and wealth."[2] It is a revolution aimed principally at preventing millions of poor, deprived Filipinos from joining a bloody uprising. Marcos stresses more than once in the 152-page volume which received but scant public notice when distributed for the first time, but which became a national best-seller after the declaration of martial law, that to relieve the misery of the masses it was necessary to break the absolute power of the country's oligarchy. Failure of the government leadership to break that oligarchic power, according to Marcos, would make a violent revolution inevitable, and from there the inauguration of a totalitarian rule.

Accepting that at the time he wrote the book revolution was not merely a potential threat but a fact, Marcos contends that "if we value our sacred rights, our cherished freedoms, we must wrest the revolutionary leadership from those who would, in the end, turn the democratic revolution into a totalitarian regime."[3] He considers revolution an imperative of individual and social change whose end should be the advancement of human freedom. He welcomed the demands of the revolutionaries for they coincided with what he wanted to institute in the country. But as the revolutionary movement was in danger of falling under the leadership of undemocratic forces, the government must act to provide it with direction and leadership.

What sets Marcos apart from the classic revolutionary leaders of history is the fact that he believes he could revolutionize Philippine society without violently liquidating social and economic classes and without utilizing terror to perpetuate and stabilize the regime. He would establish a new Philippine society without totally destroying the old social system. As he puts it:

> "I believe in democracy as the continuing revolution, that any other revolution is unjustified if it cannot meet the democratic criterion.
>
> "I believe that even if a society should be corrupted by an unjust economic or social system, this can be redressed by the people, directly or indirectly, for democracy has the powers of self-rejuvenation and self-correction."[4]

Marcos's unquestioning faith in democracy's powers of self-rejuvenation and self-correction, and its inherent ability to redress the grievances of the people without the liquidation of classes, is not without historical basis. One case was England where, in contrast to France, radical transformation of society was achieved without bloodshed. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that:

> "... from an early time a fundamental difference existed between the behavior of the governing classes in England and in France. The nobility, the cornerstone of medieval society, revealed in England a peculiar ability to merge and mix with other social groups, while in France it tended, on the contrary, to close its ranks and preserve its original purity of birth.
>
> "In the earlier Middle Ages all Western Europe had a similar social system. But some time in the Middle Ages, one cannot say exactly when, a change pregnant with tremendous consequences occurred in the British Isles and in the British Isles only — the English nobility developed into an open aristocracy while the continental noblesse stubbornly remained within the rigid limits of a caste."[5]

Elaborating on de Tocqueville's observation, Walter Lippmann writes that in England democracy had a healthy and progressive evolution, in contrast to France where democracy was morbid and degenerative. "The crucial difference," he writes, "is between what we might call enfranchisement by assimilation into the governing class, as exemplified in England, and, *per contra,* enfranchisement by the overthrow and displacing of the governing class as exemplified in France. In the one the government remains but becomes

more responsible and responsive; in the other, the government is overthrown with the liquidation of the governing class."[6]

The English way of democratization presumes, according to Lippmann, the existence of a state which is already constitutional in principle, which is under laws that are no longer arbitrary, though they may be unjust and unequal. Into this constitutional state more and more people are admitted to the governing class and to the voting electorate. The unequal and the unjust laws are revised until eventually all the people have equal opportunities to enter the government and to be represented.[7]

The English way appeals to Marcos. For it adheres to the democratic tradition. Expansion of the areas of human freedom is the only justification for a revolution. A revolution that restricts rather than expands human freedom, according to Marcos, may still deserve the name of revolution but it is not an act of liberation. Not even the success or triumph of a revolution could justify it if its ultimate end is not fuller democratization.

He would not subscribe to the Communist model. For although Marcos admits he could see and appreciate the social and economic good of Communism, he could not understand how its political society can be called democratic when a single party, the Communist Party, or a group of men who control it, has a monopoly of political power.[8] He believes the Communist form of government does not recognize any inherent right of the people to cast out their rulers, change their policy, or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions, by force or by a general uprising, when the legal and constitutional methods of making such changes have proved inadequate, or so obstructed as to be unavailable. In a democracy the people and the government are bound together by the principle of consent, but in a Communist society, Marcos observes, the people do not merely consent: they *must* consent.[9]

Of the Red Chinese model, Marcos writes that he has serious doubts, "for it may just very well be a desperate political response to the social and economic problems of 700 million people." The

Philippines, in his view, must not take the Chinese example as a pattern. For

> "I personally believe the Chinese model is applicable nowhere else, unless it is to people of comparable size, history and temperament: it is a unique case."[10]

In a democracy like the Philippines a Democratic Revolution is necessary, according to Marcos. He argues that the stability and strength of a democracy depend on the concept of a continuing revolution by constitutional means. He describes the Democratic Revolution as "constitutional, liberal, and nationalist."[11] It is nationalist in the sense that its origins can be traced to the Filipino historical experience.

> "The Democratic Revolution derived . . . from a general theory, [and] is also Filipino in concept and inspiration. It is faithful to our historical aspirations and experience, rooted, as it were, in the historical demands of the Filipino people which gained full expression in the Revolution of 1896."[12]

Marcos contends that the Revolution of 1896 was waged by Filipinos in their desire for a political authority that would be the instrument of national liberation, the promoter of the people's intellectual and moral development and their economic and social well-being. The 1896 Filipino revolutionaries envisioned a society based on moral principles, governing in turn the people's economic and social relationships.

This kind of society could only come about, as pointed out by Jose Rizal, with the unity of people and government, since, as Rizal wrote, "a fatuous government would be an anomaly among a righteous people, just as a corrupt people cannot exist under just rulers and wise laws."[13] It took Apolinario Mabini, however, to complete this formulation; he considered the revolution an imperative of social regeneration, the radical change not only of institutions but also of the people's ways of thinking and behaving. Writes Marcos:

> "[Mabini] called these the 'external' and 'internal' revolutions, for in his view, as in ours, the moral education of the people

is a necessity, that it should be established on firm foundations, thus purging themselves of their vices. The Revolution of 1896 was not merely a clash of arms leading to physical liberation: it was a cleansing experience: a moral act."[14]

Marcos agrees with Mabini, too, on the necessity of an internal revolution and on the revolutionary act as the first step in the long and arduous process of liberation and regeneration. Mabini, Marcos points out, knew that in a colonial system from whose institutions the subjugated native could not expect elementary justice, the only recourse outside revolution was "a protective ring of personal relationships which justified cheating and dissembling as part of the strategy for survival." And this was exactly what happened in 1896, says Marcos.

> "A group of landlords offered to put up a bank to lend money to the Revolutionary Government with large tracts of the national patrimony for collateral; military leaders and civil officials subdivided territories among themselves; Andres Bonifacio was charged, among other outlandish accusations, with having received money from the enemy, the Spaniards; Antonio Luna, whose military qualities Rizal greatly admired, and at whose death Mabini commented, 'The revolution is dead!' was assassinated by the soldiers of the Revolution; the so-called 'constitutionalists' drafted a charter which placed power in the hands of what 'constitutionalist' Felipe Calderon frankly called an 'intellectual oligarchy,' because they feared the masses who were bearing the brunt of the revolutionary struggle. On the threshold of creating a new society, the *ilustrado* class established an all-powerful Assembly which revived the Spanish system of taxation and returned to its colonial owners the friar lands which were precisely one of the causes of the 'revolt of the masses.' "[15]

Neither the Philippine Revolution of 1896 nor the Democratic Revolution could be understood by the people without a recognition of their own racial deficiencies and corruption, whether brought about by colonialism or not. The exclusively institutional revolu-

tionists, many of whom borrow their insights from alien sources, ignore this "internal" task postulated by Mabini either out of convenience or out of expediency. Marcos admits that colonialism — or imperialism — has corrupted the peoples that it has touched; therefore, the task of regeneration must begin with the liquidation of those institutions that perpetuated the colonial order. But more than this, he says, a point is reached when the subjugated peoples themselves must change their ways of thinking and behaving, their outlook and attitudes, to be truly and completely free.

> "A native elite stepping into the shoes of a foreign elite may constitute an improvement over the colonial order, but it is not the most significant step in the process of decolonization. Revolution should be national, otherwise it is just a *coup d'etat* of color. More so if the native elite is nothing more than a 'Westernized' segment of the population. It was Mabini rather than Marx who spelled out the meaning of revolution for the Filipinos: 'Any agitation promoted by a particular class for the benefit of its special interests does not deserve the name of [political revolution or evolution.]' "[16]

Marcos connects the "native elite" with corruption, as he does the colonialists. Corruption in administrations is social, not a simple administrative problem, he argues. "Corruption exists because of the intervention of wealth in politics."[17]

He argues that the examination of the imperfections of political authority should go beyond the authority itself to the wider realm of the society or national community that influences it. For the corruption of political authority lies not in itself but in the source of its power. Colonial governments, for instance, are corrupt because they are established on the superiority of one people or race over another; the colonized are objects rather than citizens.

> "Now a democratic political authority, whose source of power is the people, is corrupted when the people themselves or an influential minority among them, attempt to use its institutions or the authority itself for their private advantage. We inaugurate at this point the oligarchic permeation of the

democratic political order, the root cause of social corruption. The effective practice of the few becomes a model to the rest, hardening in the end into a way of life, a 'culture.' "[18]

Marcos believes oligarchs are not interested in political power as such but in economic gain and social privilege. They demand a minimum of peace and order within the community but they can and do secure their persons with a private force. It is not that they wish the poor to remain in misery but that the improvement of their lives should not interfere with the oligarchical profit. But neither is there evidence that the poor resent the ways of the oligarchy. "Our conservative ethic," says Marcos, "is such that so long as one's fortune did not come from outright thievery and graphically illustrated exploitation, it merits the honors and respect of men."[19] Marcos challenges this ethic. He believes it is too personal and simplistic, and a corruption of the individualism which holds a man solely responsible for his life. It does not take into account the fact that no single individual can be responsible for the social conditions into which he is thrown by the accident of birth. Thus this poverty of social thought, to Marcos, popularizes the notion that the poor are poor because they are not industrious or lucky.

Marcos disagrees with this notion. His position is that while there are a few instances in which this is true, the issue, judged from the sociological perspective, points to the conclusion that mass poverty and oligarchical wealth are the result of social arrangements.

"This, in all candor, is the disease of our democracy. An ethic that has a simplified view of the accumulation of wealth illegitimately, while the wealth of the economic personnel are legitimately amassed. It ignores the fundamental fact that the political personnel cannot enrich themselves without the connivance of the economic personnel, since corruption, to be successful, must satisfy the greed of both the corrupted and the corruptor. 'Sharing the benefits' has become the greatest impetus to social corruption at all levels. The efflorescence of social corruption has also abetted the sad phenomenon of the poor extorting from the poor."[20]

In the institutional sense the oligarchs, for being privileged, are guilty, for social corruption exists because of general consent and tolerance. "This is the full moral perception of the revolution that has been bequeathed to us by Mabini," Marcos says. "Here is the meaning of the 'internal' revolution which he considered indispensable to 'social regeneration.' "

A people may have the most responsive political authority, but unless they are faithful to its tenets and use its institutions wisely, that authority will be eroded by the few who will manipulate it for private gain. The political authority will thus suffer from a diminished force and moral authority. The rise of a revolutionary situation will inevitably follow this erosion of force and confidence, with the poor realizing or being made to realize that their poverty has been caused by the oligarchical society. This is the reason why the revolutionaries, for all their elaborate theories, anchor their appeal on the age-old conflict between the rich and the poor. And they would succeed if the political order decays.

Drawing from the lessons of history, Marcos states that revolutions based on this premise may have abolished classes formally but have not appreciably made men more equal and more free.

> "Dictatorship had to be enforced in the name of freedom and revolution. The reason is that the deposed governments have been weak, thus necessitating as a successor a despotic rule, not only to further the aims of the revolution but also — and above all — to prevent another bloody upheaval."[21]

He then argues for a "strong government," as Franklin Delano Roosevelt had advocated — a government strong enough to protect the interests of the people and a people strong enough and well informed enough to maintain their sovereign control over government. Even Filipino revolutionists like Mabini and Calderon, whose views were divergent, both recognized the necessity of a strong political authority.

Marcos theorizes that the power of government holds a community together. That government must be based on common con-

sent. If that power is diminished the community falls apart. Implied in this principle is the integrity of the political authority. If it submits to inordinate influence by any segment of society seeking to promote its interests at the expense of the whole, the political authority compromises its ability to promote the common welfare.

> "When government finds itself in this position, it must either succumb or liberate itself. The 'capture' of government by a special segment loses its legitimacy, since it cannot profess to exist by common consent. It may continue to command force, but its use of it is repressive. On the other hand, should government decide to liberate itself, it becomes an initiator of revolution, and its use of force is legitimate rather than repressive."[22]

But for the government to initiate the revolution is not enough; the people themselves must be committed to it. And since the revolutionary education of Filipinos stopped at the threshold of what Mabini had called "internal" revolution, that education had to be resumed, writes Marcos, "now at a time of great social and economic changes." For the revolutionary necessity that dates back to the anti-colonialist struggle of 1896 for a political authority that would be the instrument of national independence still continues, and has become more acute owing to the growing complexities of the modern world. He notes that revolutionary change has a special urgency, that "time is limited and the choices are few."

"We can either take the revolution into our institutions and thus give it a democratic direction, or we can, out of confusion, lack of will or indifference, leave it in the streets and the countrysides, where it can flourish wildly and bear, in the end, bitter fruit," Marcos writes. "No responsible government, however, particularly democratic government, will deliberately elect the latter course. It has to assert its mandate."[23]

The assertion of that mandate was expressed in Marcos's Democratic Revolution, a rededication to the historical aspirations of the Filipino people, making demands not only on the political authority but on the people. With the people and the political

authority or government joined together in waging the Democratic Revolution, the drastic transformation of Philippine society could be realized — without bloodshed, peacefully, constitutionally.

CRITCHFIELD was correct in his analysis that the main thrust of the Marcos Revolution would be "to break the power of the Philippines' immensely rich, ruling oligrachy."[24] For as shown in the preceding chapters, Marcos believes that the oligarchy has selfishly exploited the country's resources, neglected its impoverished masses, corrupted its political system, bought its press (and other media) and brought Philippine society to the point of a bloody breakdown. At a press conference Marcos reaffirmed his doctrine of "peaceful internal revolution," and emphasized that he had not acted sooner "because I did not have the power."

The native oligarchy is composed of approximately 400 intermarried families of mixed Spanish, American, Chinese and Filipino descent. Their original fortunes were based on great landed sugar and rice estates, deeded by the Spanish monarchs. As the country modernized, more and more economic power fell into the hands of this tiny number of Filipino families until they won almost total monopoly of the country's plantation agriculture, mining, industries and manufacturing, shipping, banking, radio and television networks, and newspapers and magazines.

Some of these oligarchs became national politicians. To safeguard their power, both economic and political, they established political dynasties. Relatives were governors, mayors, police chiefs and even barrio chieftains. These feudal lords were armed with modern automatic weapons and enjoyed economic privileges.[25]

To Marcos the Democratic Revolution's first agenda for change is the narrowing of the economic gap between the rich and the poor to stabilize and democratize Philippine society. For he considers the Philippines as an "oligarchic democracy" that produces corruption and moral degeneration.

In such an oligarchic society, the masses themselves, following the example of those above them, seek their own illusory privileges.

Corruption at the top is matched by social corruption below. "The oligarchic elite," Marcos stresses, "manipulate the political authority and intimidate political leaders; the masses, in turn, perpetuate a populist, personalist and individualist kind of politics."

A victim of unremitting media attacks, Marcos in his book minces no words in hitting back at media owners. Among other things he contends that the control of media by the oligarchs perpetuates simplistic politics that had been obstructive of meaningful change. He correctly observes that "editorial prerogative" had been used to justify "selective journalism," that media owners easily reversed their social or progressive ideas when they themselves were beset by labor problems.[26] Even the popular prejudice against any increase in taxes, even when such taxes were earmarked for development projects, was primarily the work of media, Marcos writes.

> "The freedom of the press is sanctimoniously invoked whenever the work of media is criticized. But is its hospitality to the most spurious statements and the most outrageous allegations a fair step in, say, improving the quality of political debate, or keeping the people well-informed? Do media not promote the decadence of the masses by reducing the discussion of national issues to the level of entertainment? The usual excuse is the 'low taste' of the masses, but pandering to, exploiting it, assuming the judgment to be true, cannot deserve the abused name of 'public service.' "[27]

Ironically the very radicals the media pretended to sympathize with called them reactionary. The radicals condemned the press for lengthily and noisily committing itself to the peripheral issues of society but not to the fundamental ones, say, private property. To Marcos the only interpretation of the cry for radical change was the alteration of the manner with which the right to and enjoyment of private property was recognized. "But the media," he points out, "have maintained their high objectivity by not commenting on the issue; they have contented themselves with reporting the statements of constitutional delegates and other public figures, thus displaying an uncharacteristic non-committalness."[28]

Marcos believes that the question of private property could be resolved only in either of two ways: socialization or democratization. But not being a Marxist, he would not opt for the first. He would democratize rather than abolish property. He states his position thus:

> "Democratization [of wealth and property] simply means the 'sharing' of private wealth with the entire society, and this calls for the regulation of property for collective human ends. Thus, private wealth and property are not abolished, for [abolition] will stultify private initiative and turn man into a pure collective being . . . But the unbridled use of wealth and property mocks the ends of human society, for it accomplishes 'the elevation of the few and the degradation of the many.' "[29]

According to Marcos the wealth of the few, like the power of the few, is a violence on the poor; when exercised irresponsibly it becomes "a New Barbarism." Just as power can be democratized by popular representation, free speech and other free institutions, private wealth should be democratized by regulation for the worthy ends of human society.

Marcos once more strikes a contrast between Communism and democracy. He stresses that the Communist answer to the violence of wealth is its abolition, but that abolition strikes the very heart of human initiative, and tends to restrict the precious area of personal freedom. "It should be emphasized at this point that our concern with private wealth and property is based on democratic principle, for while Communism destroys personal freedom, the unrestricted control of wealth and property by a few private individuals similarly restricts the personal freedom of the rest," he writes. "As Alexander Hamilton observed some two hundred and fifty years ago, the man who has control over another man's subsistence also exercises control over his will."[30] Marcos would break this control. Through the Democratic Revolution, he would bring about a "new society" in which equality of opportunity is not a fraud but a fact. For

> "An oligarchic society may sincerely believe in equality of opportunity but so long as there is a wide economic gap, the

opportunity does not in fact exist. True equality of opportunity begins at the *starting line*, when a human being is born. This simply means that a few should not be born 'with everything' while the many have nothing.

"When we proceed from this premise, everything else follows: the radicalization of society begins."[31]

MARCOS added an epilogue to his book. He wrote the epilogue as *Today's Revolution* went to press, which was after he had suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. The rest of the book, as we have seen, is a discourse on revolution and an outline of the New Society that Marcos envisioned for his people. The epilogue embodies his personal reflections. It is a statement, a manifesto of his determination to carry out his Democratic Revolution. He uses the epilogue to answer charges of his so-called "dictatorial designs." His initial reaction, he admits, was one of amusement, knowing how his critics loved to exaggerate. "But our troubled times," Marcos writes, "do not permit us to be amused by irresponsibility. In the first place, I have been compelled by circumstances to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* precisely to protect those civil liberties which the suspension is supposed to have abridged."[32]

His critics were anxious that after suspending the writ he might eventually proclaim martial law all over the land; they had been seeing something ominous because he had repeated several times that he would not hesitate to proclaim martial law if the situation demanded it. The truth was that he had to issue the threat to warn the extremists that they should not go beyond the limits of legitimate dissent.

Marcos has a broad and liberal interpretation of "legitimate dissent." Unlike most Filipino leaders, he believes that even the public advocacy of a Communist form of government falls within the limits of dissent. However,

"... when this advocacy is supported by assassination, disorder in the streets, by bombing, and by various forms of harassment designed to panic the citizenry, and outright rebellion or

subversion, we are no longer confronted with simple dissent. By no stretch of the imagination can you call terrorism, physical as well as moral, adherence to democratic dialogue."[33]

Marcos reiterates his fear that the youthful demonstrators were being manipulated for sinister ends by hard-core subversives — ends that would stifle the very freedoms they were exercising. He abhors and rejects that possibility. Therefore he would try to win the young over, "demonstrate to them that the revolution they want, the radical changes they cry for, can be achieved by constitutional means. But our words will be hollow unless those of us who have the power, the influence, and the means can show them *now* what we can do to recast our society, giving them a preview of what they will inherit in their time."[34]

In his conviction, when a democratic government takes strong measures to preserve itself, such as the suspension of the writ, it is not for the purpose of concentrating power in the hands of one man. Dictatorship is anti-democratic and he would have none of it. The nation's problems, as well as the perils of democracy, may be legion, but the leadership must not panic into dictatorship, he emphasizes. However, "we shall panic into dictatorship if we allow the erosion of our freedoms by subversion, on the one hand, and irresponsibility, on the other."

At the time he was writing the epilogue, September 1971, President Marcos had already outlined what the Democratic Revolution, which he launched in January that year, would seek to achieve. According to him the Constitutional Convention which he had called, the reorganization of government he had begun to undertake, the land reform and electoral reforms he had instituted, were all intended for the purpose of constructing a new social and economic foundation for national unity. In his own words:

"We should foresee, along these lines, the regulation but not the abolition of private wealth and property. Such regulation should not be so stringent as to actually confiscate property or stifle private and individual initiative which has historically propelled man's advances in most areas of endeavor. It should

include the overhauling of the Civil Service; the reform of the judiciary, such as the appointments of persons from a list submitted by the Supreme Court and the 'forced draft' of lawyers five times a year as *counsel de officio* so no man, no matter how lowly, may be without talented counsel; and the mobilization of the out-of-school unemployed for military or civil duty, which includes employment in government projects, such as the settlement of virgin areas and the organization of cooperatives. The private sector, on the other hand, will play an important role in the revolutionization of society. It can be the action agent in extending those social benefits now given by the governments of welfare states, such as housing, hospitalization, and schooling.

"The plans to implement these policies will be worked out by a reoriented political authority, one that will pursue from hereon the Democratic Revolution."[35]

Marcos admits that he was not embarked on a journey to the ideal state. Aware of the limits of the possible he would radicalize the social order in a manner that would promote the fulfillment of the individual. There could never be a perfect society, but a society that would permit human beings to fulfill themselves in whatever manner that befits their dignity and freedom as individuals was worth his single-minded dedication.

He observes that history reveals that the crises of societies and civilizations have always been determined on moral terms: the outcome of the struggle belongs to those societies armored by a strong leadership, an awareness of the common danger, unity of action, and, above all, a conviction in the rightness of their cause. In times of stress, in revolutionary times, the decisive factor is the fighting faith of men and nations. If life is struggle and history is the continuing struggle for freedom, Marcos maintains that the necessity of revolution should be accepted, and from that the imperative of a militant creed. And this is his Creed or Fighting Faith:

"I believe, therefore, in the necessity of Revolution as an instrument of individual and social change, and that its end is the advancement of human freedom.

"I believe that only a reactionary resistance to radical change will make a Jacobin, or armed, revolution inevitable, but that in a democratic society, revolution is of necessity, constitutional, peaceful and legal.

"I believe that while we have utilized the Presidential powers to dismantle the violent revolution and its Communist apparatus, we must not fail our people; we must replace the violent revolution with the authentic revolution — liberal, constitutional and peaceful.

"I believe in democracy as the continuing revolution; that any other revolution is unjustified if it cannot meet the democratic criterion.

"I believe that even if a society should be corrupted by an unjust economic or social system, this can be redressed by the people, directly or indirectly, for democracy has the powers of self-rejuvenation and self-correction

"I believe that in this troubled present, revolution is a fact, not merely a potential threat, and that if we value our sacred rights, our cherished freedoms, we must wrest the revolutionary leadership from those who would, in the end, turn the democratic revolution into a totalitarian regime.

"I believe that in our precarious democracy, which tends towards an oligarchy because of the power of the wealthy few over the impoverished many, there remains a bright hope for a radical and sweeping change without the risk of violence. I do not believe that violent revolution is either necessary or effective in an existing democracy.

"I believe that our realization of the common peril, our complete understanding of our national condition, will unite us in a democratic revolution that will strengthen our democ-

ratic institutions and offer, finally, our citizens the opportunity of making the most and the best of themselves.

"I believe that democracy is the revolution, that it is today's revolution.

"This is my fighting faith.

Malacanang Palace
September 7, 1971."[36]

IN essence, then, Ferdinand E. Marcos was convinced that late in 1971 revolution had become a fact, a reality. He feared, however, that it would be the violent type and that it could ultimately end in a totalitarian regime. To avert that possibility, to keep the revolution in the democratic course that he had defined when he launched the Democratic Revolution on January 25, 1971, he must wrest the leadership from the anti-democratic forces. To succeed in this, it might be necessary to use the extraordinary powers vested in the presidency by the Constitution — the third and last option still open to him: to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Under such martial powers he would be able to dismantle the Communist apparatus, remove anarchy and quell the rebellion, and show the people that democracy is flexible enough to admit a radical and sweeping change without the risk of violence.

For, as Marcos had stressed earlier, democracy had never attained its full potential, in the Philippines as elsewhere, and that precisely because it had not attained its full limits it is a revolutionary doctrine. He would show the people that the Democratic Revolution — "liberal, constitutional and peaceful" — could advance human freedom without violence and bloodshed.

Hardly one year after Marcos had written his "Fighting Faith," the time struck for him to prove it. #

CHAPTER

REVOLUTION AND REFORMS

10

WHEN President Marcos launched the Democratic Revolution on January 25, 1971 his idea was to carry it out in a legal, peaceable and constitutional manner. There would be no bloodshed, as in a Jacobin revolution; the great majority of the masses would be enfranchised with equal economic and political opportunities. Thus he welcomed the formation of the Constitutional Convention. He said:

> "It is our fervent hope that the transformation of our society will take place peaceably and legally through the making of a new Constitution. The cynical few would prejudge the Constitutional Convention as a futile exercise even before it has begun. But I am expressing, I believe, the sentiments of the delegates-elect that those few may rest assured that their rights as Filipinos and free citizens will be promoted by the Constitutional Convention."[1]

The task of changing the framework and redefining the basis of national unity would be exercised by the Convention.

But events had moved swiftly and overtaken the Convention. The crisis had ripened even before the delegates could finish the draft of the new Constitution which would embody the radical changes envisioned by Marcos. If he vacillated, if he did not use

the Constitutional powers still left open to him, the revolutionary transformation of Philippine society within the democratic framework would not have been possible. The revolution could get out of hand, pave the way for a Communist takeover of government and bring about the death of the Republic. Consequently Marcos's dream of greatness for his people and his country, which he had been repeatedly articulating since he assumed the presidency, and which was evidently the central motivation of his actions and decisions as President, would never materialize. In its place would emerge totalitarianism, a system in which people would lose all their cherished freedoms.

In fact the series of bombings which culminated in the near-liquidation of the eight Liberal Party senatorial candidates in Plaza Miranda on August 21, 1971 seemed to be the angry response of the insurgents to the President's government-led revolution. Even after he had suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, terrorism and anarchy escalated rather than abated. The suspension and the arrest of some leaders initially stunned the radical activists, but it did not take long before they regrouped, particularly in the cities. Many of them fled to the countrysides.

The point must be emphasized that even after President Marcos had been compelled to resort to the last alternative provided by the Constitution, he did not digress from the constitutional, peaceful and legal means of attaining his revolutionary goals.

On January 11, 1972 he restored the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. This was the cue for the radicals to renew and intensify their activities. A new series of bombings ensued, causing great damage to private and public property and injuries to a number of innocent persons.

Then on June 18, 1972, the Philippine Constabulary captured at Barrio Taringsing, Cordon, Isabela, a copy of a revolutionary program of the Communist Party entitled "Regional Program of Action 1972."[2] The document contained a timetable for fomenting mass discontent and precipitating a mass revolution. Whatever doubt there might have been about its authenticity was wiped out by the series of bombings that followed its discovery. The intensity and

frequency of such acts of terrorism gave further credence to the military establishment's claim that the lawless elements had succeeded in bringing and introducing into the country a substantial quantity of materiel — high-powered rifles, rockets and rocket launchers of the Red Chinese and Russian varieties — in preparation for the violent overthrow of the government.

The decadent society President Marcos had aptly described as "sick" further deteriorated. As a result of the escalating anarchic violence and terrorism, the economy drastically slumped: the productive sectors were virtually immobilized because of frequent bombings, picketing, violent strikes and boycotts; and numerous business establishments — department stores, restaurants, even moviehouses — were compelled to close shop. Insecurity and fear paralyzed the people.

The people had more than enough reason to be fear-stricken. For not only were the lawless elements growing in number and intensifying their depredations: they seemed to have succeeded in reducing the government to absolute impotence. National and local government functions could hardly be carried out. The judiciary, itself ridden with corrupt elements, could not administer justice. Local police and civilian authorities could not regulate, much less control, the raging tide of criminality and lawlessness, largely because their own ranks were infested with criminal elements and proteges of warlords and politicians. Crimes like kidnaping, blackmail, armed robbery, holdup, swindling, profiteering and hoarding of commodities were rampant.

Moreover, there was total decay of moral values among the people themselves as evidenced by the widespread lack of discipline, respect of authority, and regard for even the most elementary rudiments of ethical human conduct.

Because of the corrupt system of politics controlled and manipulated by the oligarchs and a few vested-interest groups and institutions, Philippine society descended rapidly into the maelstrom of chaos, anarchy and immorality. It became a society seemingly without a soul or conscience. It was, indeed, a sick society, so sick it was on the brink of death. Its recovery seemed utterly hopeless.

Ferdinand E. Marcos knew that while the national condition was critical it was not beyond redemption. He knew that the lawless elements had grown in strength, and that the people were beginning to yield to the temptations offered by the Communist ideologues and clerico-fascists. But more than anyone else, he also knew that in reality the government had not lost its power to check and dismantle the rebellion, lead the people along the democratic course, and inspire them to channel their talents and energies toward the improvement of their own lives.

Marcos knew he must no longer postpone action. The time had struck for a bold and irreversible decision.

On September 21, 1972 President Marcos made the most profound and audacious decision ever made by a Philippine Chief Executive. He issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law. It was the last alternative open to him under the Constitution, and he resorted to it because it was historically necessary. He needed extraordinary powers, the full authority vested in the presidency by the Constitution, to quell and dismantle the rebellion, and thus save the Republic from the lawless elements. Simultaneously, he would use his full powers to revolutionize — modernize — the sick society.

Although he signed the proclamation on September 21, Marcos formally announced his decision only in the evening of September 23, a Saturday, in a nationwide radio-television address. As with the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus,* he delayed the announcement to enable the military to make arrests with the least obstruction. His statement that preceded the proclamation[3] proved to be a soothing, bracing tonic that allayed the fears of many that he would use martial law to install himself as a totalitarian dictator for life and that his martial regime, as in other countries, would be characterized by violence and terror. His famous, deliberate baritone voice reached millions of anxious Filipinos in the privacy of their living rooms. Articulating each word and phrase clearly, confidently, Marcos assured the people that the proclamation of martial law did not mean a military takeover and the government would continue to function under a civilian Chief Executive. He assured the people that he pro-

claimed martial law pursuant to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution. He told the people:

> "The proclamation of martial law is not a military take-over. I, as your duly elected President of the Republic, shall use this power . . . to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our democracy. A republican and democratic form of government is not a helpless government. When it is imperilled by the danger of a violent overthrow, insurrection and rebellion, it has inherent and built-in powers wisely provided for under the Constitution. Such a danger confronts the Republic."[4]

Marcos then set the general demands of his martial administration. Every form of corruption, culpable negligence or arrogance of public officials and employees would be dealt with immediately. The armed forces would be cleaned up: military offenders would be swiftly punished. No one, whether friend, relative or ally would be allowed to offend the "New Society." Persons who did not actively participate in the rebellion could move about and perform their daily activities without any fear from the government. But those who had actively participated in the conspiracy and operations to overthrow the duly constituted government by violence would be adversely affected. He then set a high moral tone for the bureaucracy:

> "But all public officials and employees, whether of the national or local governments, must conduct themselves in the manner of a new and reformed society."[5]

In addition, Marcos simultaneously issued general orders for the government to control media and other means of dissemination of information, as well as all public utilities. All schools were ordered closed for at least one week. Illegal carrying of firearms was made punishable with death, and curfew was established from midnight to four o'clock in the morning. He temporarily suspended the departure of Filipinos abroad, with the exception of those on official mission. He prohibited in the meantime rallies, demonstrations and strikes. Then he announced he had ordered the arrest of those directly involved in the conspiracy to overthrow the government.

Marcos at that point stressed that a real rebellion existed in the country which threatened the Republic itself and the continued survival of democracy. He emphasized that because of the breakdown in law and order, and the prevailing chaos and anarchy fomented by the subversives, the national economy was on the verge of collapse. He also called attention to the violent disorder in Mindanao and Sulu, which resulted in the killing of over 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos in the area, and considerable casualties among government troops.

He admitted that he had used the other two alternatives under the Constitution: call the troops to quell the rebellion and suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. But the rebellion did not stop; instead, it worsened. For in reality the organization, operation and membership of the Communist Party increased and expanded when the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* was restored on January 11, 1972. Consequently, Marcos had no other recourse but to proclaim martial law. But he stressed that his objective was not merely to quell the rebellion. In his own words:

> "I assure you that I am utilizing this power vested in me by the Constitution to save the Republic and reform our society. I wish to emphasize these two objectives. We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic. But at the same time we must now reform the social, economic and political institutions in our country. The plans and orders for reform to remove the inequities of that society, the clean-up of government of its corrupt and and sterile elements, the liquidation of the criminal syndicates, the systematic development of our economy — the general program for a new and better Philippines — will be explained to you. But we must start out with the removal of anarchy and and the maintenance of peace and order."[6]

It became clear, then, that President Marcos would use martial law to quell and dismantle the rebellion. But after achieving this goal, after removing anarchy and restoring peace and order he would use his martial powers to remove the cause of the people's

grievances, the inequities in Philippine society, and radically transform the nation's social, economic and political institutions. Marcos would utilize martial law to wage and pursue his revolution to its logical conclusion.

The Reforms Begin

WITH characteristic speed and precision, Marcos the revolutionary directed the armed forces to dismantle the rebellion. He ordered the arrest and detention of persons who actively participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government by violence. But as he had pledged to the people, when he formally announced the Democratic Revolution on January 25, 1971, the operation was carried out peacefully and in accordance with the Constitution. The mass executions and bloody clashes between the government troops and the people which his enemies had claimed would characterize martial law once proclaimed, did not materialize. Marcos showed the world that he could quell a rebellion and anarchy peacefully and constitutionally.

Marcos then immediately laid down a program designed to "completely transform" Philippine society. A whirlwind of radical reforms followed.

He gave the highest priority to peace and order. To restore the tranquility and stability of the nation and secure the people from violence, injuries and loss of lives in the quickest possible manner, he waged a campaign against loose firearms and private armies. Through General Order No. 6, promulgated on September 22, 1972 he prohibited the keeping of any firearm without permit and prohibited the carrying of firearms outside residences. This order was immediately followed by General Order No. 7, dated September 23, providing that only officers and men of the armed forces and police officers in the actual performance of official duty should be allowed to carry firearms outside residences. Private security guards, which were used by political warlords and economic overlords as private armies, were authorized to carry their licensed firearms only from the premises of their offices, corporations or firms, to their place of work and return. Security guards were prohibited from carrying firearms higher than 12-gauge shotguns, caliber .22 rifles or caliber

.38 pistols or revolvers. In no case were these firearms to be carried outside those places. All high-powered long firearms of private security agencies and company guards as well as high-powered firearms under the custody of the Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Posts and the courts, were to be deposited with the Philippine Constabulary.

If peace and order swiftly returned after the proclamation of martial law it was largely due to the speed and efficiency with which the President's campaign against firearms and private armies was carried out. The most recent report indicated that the armed forces had collected more than 500,000 firearms of various types.

At the same time, President Marcos proceeded to reorganize the government bureaucracy. As he had pledged in his statement on the proclamation of martial law, he would make public officials and employees conduct themselves in the manner of a reformed society.

He approved and adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was prepared by the Commission on Reorganization through Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24.

Then on September 29, Marcos began to purge the bureaucracy of its corrupt and sterile elements. He issued Letter of Instruction No. 11 requiring all national government officers appointed by the President to submit their resignations from office not later than October 15. His intention was to make the government machinery more responsive to the needs of the people and to effect economy. He followed this up with Letter of Instruction No. 12 directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to dismiss immediately all officials and employees under them facing charges or were "notoriously undesirable."

On the same date he promulgated Letter of Instruction No. 14 directing all heads of departments, agencies and offices of the government to require all officials and employees under them who were facing charges or were notoriously undesirable on grounds of dishonesty, incompetence or other kinds of misconduct as defined in the Civil Service Law, to resign immediately or face charges and immediate suspension. Simultaneously he issued Letter of Instruction

No. 14-A fixing a period of one week within which officials and employees should resign. He decreed that should they fail or refuse to resign within one week, they should be suspended immediately until their cases were disposed of.

These measures resulted immediately in the dismissal of thousands of corrupt, undeserving government men, the streamlining of the government machinery, and accumulation of tremendous savings which Marcos later channeled to economic development and social services.

President Marcos then turned to the problem of feudalism, one of the central causes of the nation's sickness. Only five days after the proclamation of martial law, he promulgated, on September 26, Presidential Decree No. 2 putting the entire country under land reform. His objectives were to achieve dignified existence for the small farmers, liberate them from the pernicious institutional restraints and practices which had retarded the agricultural development of the country and produced widespread discontent and unrest among the farmers. He directed all agencies and offices of the government to extend full cooperation and assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reforms, and ordered the Agrarian Reform Coordinating Council, created in 1971 under Executive Order No. 347, to convene immediately and exercise its functions.

This unprecedented presidential action was followed, on October 21, by an even more historic decision. With Presidential Decree No. 27, written in his own handwriting, Marcos emancipated the Filipino tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil by transferring to all tenants in the country the ownership of the land they tilled.

The decree applied to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a sharecrop or lease-tenancy system. The tenant-farmer would be deemed owner of a portion consisting of a family-size farm of five hectares if not irrigated. The landowner, in all cases, would retain an area of not more than seven hectares if he himself were cultivating or would cultivate it. The value of the land to be transferred to the tenant would be equivalent to two and one-half times the average harvest of three normal crop years upon the promulgation of the decree.

The total cost of the land, including six percent annual interest, would be paid by the tenant in 15 equal annual amortizations. In case of default, the amortizations would be paid by the farmers' cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer was a member, with the cooperative having a right of recourse against him. The government would guarantee such amortizations with shares of stock in government-owned and/or government-controlled corporations. Title to the land would be actually issued only after the tenant-farmer became a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative. Such title would not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the government.

In justice to the landowners, President Marcos promulgated on November 19, 1972 Presidential Decree No. 57 amending Presidential Decree No. 27. This decree embodied the following amendments:

1. The landowner shall be exempt from the capital gains tax on the proceeds of the amortizations paid him by the tenant-purchaser and likewise from income tax due on the accruing interests paid as an addition to the total cost of the land.

2. The active participation of rural banks and all other financial institutions shall be required in order to provide immediate sources of funds to augment loans and credits to be made available to the tenants' or farmers' cooperatives consistent with the implementation of the supervised credit program.

3. The Agricultural Guarantee Loan Fund constituted under Republic Act 6390 shall include the guarantee coverage to the participating financial institutions under the same terms and conditions allowed and applied to the rural banking system.

4. The existing agricultural guarantee funds wholly or partly contributed or funded by the government agencies shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Agricultural Guarantee Loan Fund Board established under Republic Act 6390.

Impatient for results, Marcos wanted speedy and efficient implementation of his land reform program. On December 22 he

authorized the Sceretary of Agrarian Reforms under Presidential Decree No. 84 to sign on behalf of the President land transfer certificates issued to tenant-farmers. On December 24 he promulgated Presidential Decree No. 5 creating the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to finance and guarantee the payment of farm lots acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 and to extend agricultural credit support and the corresponding guarantee coverage to achieve a high level of production in land reform areas in the country. Among the sources of the Fund were the Central Bank, Government Service Insurance System, Philippine National Bank, Social Security System, and Agrarian Reform Special Account.

At the same time President Marcos activated the 1,900 trainers of the Department of Agrarian Reforms in cooperatives and sent them to the provinces to train organizers in the barrios and municipalities. He also directed the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Bureau of Plant Industry and Agricultural Productivity Commission to send 3,000 land technicians to the provinces to work with the rural banks and other lending institutions in extending financial assistance to the farmers through the grant of crop loans.

Along with land reform, Marcos laid extra emphasis on cooperatives. For as early as December 1, 1970, President Marcos had already called for "a cooperative ideology" in Asia. He told the delegates to the First Asian Conference on Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives in Manila that since Asia is poor in material wealth but rich in human and natural resources, it should mobilize, motivate and organize its vast human and natural resources in the cooperative manner so that the Asian region could be transformed into "a giant power bloc that can outpace the existing power system in the establishment of a new civilization."[7]

He stressed, however, that a consciously planned and implemented program of education in cooperatives was a condition for the realization of "the cooperative vision." He stressed:

> "We shall need to elevate cooperatives or the cooperative system into an ideology, an ideology of change and development, an ideology of social reform and human reformation — a revolutionary ethic."[8]

On April 14, 1973, Marcos adopted his "cooperative ideology" as a national policy when he promulgated Presidential Decree No. 175, a measure he considered equal in significance to his decree emancipating tenant-farmers from feudal bondage. He saw the cooperative institution as a means of attaining a more equitable distribution of income and wealth and providing the common man with a dignified level of existence. He anchored his confidence in its success on the *bayanihan* (cooperation) spirit inborn in Filipinos, if that spirit were properly guided.

Under this decree it became the declared policy of the government to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the low-income sector of the population. It defined cooperative as "an organization composed primarily of small producers and consumers who voluntarily join together to form business enterprises which they themselves own, control and patronize." Cooperatives were extended such privileges as exemption from income taxes and sales taxes, preferential right to supply agricultural products produced by members of the cooperatives to state agencies administering price stabilization programs, and exemption from the application of the Minimum Wage Law.

By wisely and courageously using his powers under martial law, President Marcos succeeded in emancipating Filipino farmers from their bonday to their landlords, a bondage spanning more than 450 years. He had begun to succeed eminently in solving the explosive agrarian problem without violence or bloodshed.

IN his vision of a New Society President Marcos conceived of the working man as a productive, creative individual living a wholesome life and receiving just rewards from the profits of industrialization. In pursuit of this vision he immediately acted, after proclaiming martial law, to promote industrial peace, maximum productivity, and secure special justice for all the people. He knew fully well that the industrial workers, like the tenant-farmers, had been victims of injustice, oppression and exploitation, and that because most of their deep grievances could not find redress, they were exposed to deception and manipulation by non-democratic forces.

President Marcos thus created a National Labor Relations Commission, under Presidential Decree No. 21, dated October 14, 1972, with the Undersecretary of Labor as Chairman, and the Director of Labor Relations and Director of Labor Standards as members. As constituted, the Commission would have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following:

1. All matters involving employee-employer relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act 875.

2. All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081.

3. All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Pursuant to this Decree the National Labor Relations Commission issued implementing instructions on November 9, 1972 on termination of employment. Employers were required to secure a written clearance from the Secretary of Labor for any of the following cases:

1. All dismissals, with or without just cause, of regular employees with at least one year of service.

2. All shutdowns of establishments or any branch or subdivision thereof, except when the cessation of work or operations is due to serious accidents or *force majeure.*

3. All terminations of employment made known to the employee before the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 21 but which would take effect after October 14, 1972.[10]

The instructions sought to protect basic rights of employees. Any termination of employment, suspension, lay-off, or shutdown, with or without the clearance of the Secretary of Labor, should not prejudice any right granted an employee by existing laws, collective bargaining agreements or presidential decrees. In appropriate cases, the Secretary of Labor or the Commission could order the reinstatement, with back wages, of the employee who was dismissed, suspended, or laid-off, or require the payment of termination pay and grant other just and equitable benefits.

Furthermore, the Commission prohibited employers for dismissing employees in any of the following cases:

1. When the dismissal or forced cessation of work would constitute an unfair labor practice or circumvent an order of the Secretary of Labor, the Commission or any constituted authority.

2. When the employee concerned was a woman or child worker and the cause for dismissal, suspension or lay-off was not attributable to the fault of such employee.

3.. When a farm workers' organization or group of farm workers had presented to the landowner, farm employer, or manager, a petition or complaint regarding any matter likely to cause a strike or lockout, or while an agricultural dispute was pending before the Court of Agrarian Relations.

4. When the employee to be dismissed, suspended or laid-off had filed any complaint or instituted any proceeding under the Minimum Wage Law, or had testified or was about to testify in any such proceeding.

5. When the dismissal, suspension, or lay-off would violate any existing law or Presidential Decree.[11]

The instructions applied to all private establishments and enterprises, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether operated for profit or not.

The President's creation of the National Labor Relations Commission was followed by the promulgation on January 15, 1973, of Presidential Decree No. 99, providing minimum compensation for household helpers; Presidential Decree No. 143 providing for a weekly rest period for workers; Presidential Decree No. 148, amending the Women and Child Labor Law; and Presidential Decree No. 173 amending the National Apprenticeship Act.

With these decisions, President Marcos ushered the Filipino worker into a new world of justice and dignity.

One week after the proclamation of martial law, President Marcos proceeded to recast the educational system. He was correct-

ly convinced that the revolution must recast not only the established social, economic and political institutions but also the habits, attitudes, values and outlook of the people so that the youth, with their idealism, energy and enthusiasm could provide maximum contribution to the building of a New Society.

Thus, on September 29, Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 6-A, the Educational Development Decree of 1972, whose broad national goals were the following:

1. To achieve and maintain an accelerating rate of economic development and social progress;

2. To assure the maximum participation of all the people in the attainment and enjoyment of the benefits of such growth; and

3. To strengthen national consciousness and promote desirable cultural values in a changing world.

With these guidelines, the educational system would seek to provide a broad general education that would assist every individual in attaining his full potential as a human being, enhance the range and quality of individual and group participation in the basic functions of society, and acquire the essential educational foundation for his development into a productive and versatile citizen. It would train the nation's manpower in the middle-level skills required for national development and develop the high-level professions that would provide leadership for the nation, advance knowledge through research and apply new knowledge for improving the quality of human life. Furthermore, it would respond effectively to changing needs and conditions of the nation through a system of educational planning and evaluation.

To attain these objectives the decree provided for a ten-year program designed to modernize and radically transform the educational system. It called for improvement of curricular programs and quality of instruction in all levels by upgrading physical facilities, adopting cost-saving instructional technology, and training and retraining teachers and administrators. Accreditation schemes, admissions testing, and guidance counseling would be upgraded. Access

to educational opportunities would be democratized through the provision of financial assistance to deserving students, more skills training programs for out-of-school youth and unemployed adults under the National Manpower and Youth Council, and continuing education programs for non-literate adults. Higher education would be restructured to make it more responsive to national developmental needs through a planned system of incentives and assistance to both public and private colleges and universities and synchronization of curricular programs, staffing patterns, and institutional development activities. Existing programs would be expanded and new ones established to train middle-level technical and agricultural manpower. Moreover, reforms would be instituted in the educational financing system to facilitate the shift of funding responsibility for elementary and secondary education from the national to the local governments, thus increasing government participation in higher education.

To attain the general and specific goals of the educational system the decree created an Educational Special Committee to which the National Board of Education would endorse educational projects for approval. Headed by the Secretary of Education and Culture, with the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of the Budget as members, the Committee would evaluate and approve projects submitted to it, and administer the Educational Institutions Development Fund which was also created by the decree. An office of planning and research, called Planning Service, was created to assist the National Board of Education. Moreover, an Educational Development Projects implementing Task Force was established under the office of the Secretary of Education and Culture to supervise and implement foreign-assisted development projects.

The funds needed to carry out the President's educational reforms were provided for in the decree, which authorized him to contract loans, credits or indebtedness with any foreign source or lender in a total amount not exceeding $100 million or its equivalent in foreign currencies. In addition to this, the decree appropriated ₱500 million out of the funds in the national treasury. Moreover, it established an Educational Special Account in the national treasury which would be constituted by proceeds from bond issues, ₱20 mil-

lion annual share of the national Government in the Special Education Fund, ₱15 million from the Special Science Fund for fiscal year 1972-1973 and fifty percent annually thereafter of the total annual receipts from the taxes provided for under Republic Act 5448, future savings of the Department of Education and Culture resulting from the implementation of management reforms, and augmentations from the general funds.

Marcos made another historic decision on April 17, 1973 when he promulgated Presidential Decree No. 176 Filipinizing education. Under this decree all educational institutions, except those established by religious orders, mission boards and charitable organizations, would be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines, or corporations or associations 60 per centum of the capital of which were owned by Filipino citizens. Schools already in operation which were not so owned were required to conform with the citizenship requirement on ownership not later than the beginning of school year 1976-1977. Morever, control and administration of all schools in the country would be vested in Filipino citizens.

By thus promulgating Presidential Decree No. 6-A and No. 176 and other complementary decrees and instructions on education President Marcos had begun to revolutionize the system to make it more responsive to the nation's social and economic development needs, while at the same time liberating it from foreign control and influence.

THE thrust of the Marcos Revolution, as we have seen, is towards the diffusion of wealth which until martial law was proclaimed had been concentrated in the hands of a privileged few. His aggressive and courageous approach to agrarian, labor, education and government reforms was a giant step towards that direction. But this was merely one aspect of his program. He knew that more than transferring to the farmers ownership of the land they tilled, the government under his leadership must spread wealth and progress throughout the country and deep into the rural areas.

Thus, on July 20, 1973 President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1157 announcing approval and adoption of a four-year develop-

ment plan which he described as "the principal instrument in achieving the transformation of our society."[12]

Under the plan the government would spend ₱38.6 billion out of an estimated revenue of ₱33.5 billion from 1974-1977. The ₱5.1 billion difference between the expenditure and income would be generated through borrowings. In the President's words, the development was designed to:

1. Promote social development;
2. Expand employment opportunities;
3. Attain a more equitable distribution of income and wealth;
4. Accelerate economic growth;
5. Promote regional development and industrialization; and
6. Stabilize prices at reasonable levels.

"Greater attention will now be given to the socio-economic uplift of the less privileged members of society, not through dole-outs and palliatives, but rather through a greater opportunity for a more active involvement in the society, economic and political affairs of the nation at large," said Marcos in his announcement.[13]

Under this plan Marcos would continue with the balanced development of both agriculture and industry. There would be increased emphasis on the expansion of food production, agricultural exports, and conservation of natural resources. Labor-intensive industries would be given impetus to generate more employment. Accordingly, Marcos envisioned a program to initiate medium and small industries in the hinterlands. This program, grand in scale and profound in significance, will not only reduce unemployment but will hasten the industrial development of the far-flung regions. Accent would be put on export oriented industries using local materials, and sophisticated processing of traditional exports to increase export receipts and employment.

At the same time, under the new Marcos plan, the land reform program would be fully implemented, including the transfer of land

titles to tenant-farmers, intensified formation of farmers' cooperatives, provision of credit facilities, and development of infrastructure — like feeder roads — and farmers' markets.

Family planning — one of the major aspects of the social phase of the plan — would be extended full government support so that by 1977 the population growth rate of 3.01 per cent in 1970 would be reduced to 2.55 percent.

Integrated into the four-year development plan were other socially oriented efforts: health and nutrition projects, improvement of medical services, free medical care to indigents, intensified manpower development, inculcation of good morals and principles of citizenship, and establishment of a low-cost housing program. To ensure that the benefits of the program would reach as many people as possible in all parts of the country, the social development project, said Marcos, would be concentrated on less developed regions, particularly the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu.

The emphasis on the socio-economic development of the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu, which were rocked by violent disorder and lawlessness, derived from the President's avowed goal of harmonizing all the sectors of Philippine society as a condition for the nation's rise to greatness. He wanted the cultural minority groups, which he called "cultural communities," to be not only fully integrated into the national mainstream but to be given opportunities for full growth and development so they could become self-reliant members of Philippine society. Thus, he immediately launched in Mindanao and Sulu a massive development program, with Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor in charge of operations, embracing education, land reform, extension of credit facilities, opening of banks to be owned, managed and operated by Muslims, tourist development, and an unprecedented road building program designed to help hasten the industrialization of the region.

Simultaneously, Marcos, under the plan, would sustain and expand his infrastructure program. Within the four-year period he envisioned the completion of an extensive and efficient transport system, development of water resources, expansion of electric power generation and distribution, establishment of an integrated telecom-

munication system, and construction of adequate school buildings, hospitals and government offices.

President Marcos made tourism a major program of the govment. He considered tourism one of the principal instruments in the socio-economic development of the country "because it generates much-needed dollars, effects multiple expansion of incomes, creates employment, and provides benefits from infrastructure."[14] It was in recognition of the pivotal role of tourism in national development that on May 11, 1973, he promulgated Presidential Decree No. 189 creating the Department of Tourism, and named Jose D. Aspiras, his former Press Secretary, as Secretary of Tourism.

No longer hampered by an abusive oligarchy and its arrogant extensions, Marcos could now confidently carry out far-reaching social and economic reforms that in due time would lift the common *tao* to the level of dignity and respect hitherto enjoyed only by the rich and privileged.

THE dispatch and decisiveness with which President Marcos proceeded to restructure Philippine society was unprecedented. It could have been accomplished only by a leader who, before making decisions, had evaluated and analyzed all factors and all possible consequences of his decisions. Meanwhile the Constitutional Convention, which began the work to draft a new Constitution on July 1, 1971 which Marcos hoped to use as a major instrument in the radical transformation of the country, was running short of funds. It could not even liquidate its rentals at the Manila Hotel, the original Convention site. On October 5 Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 14 appropriating ₱13,200,000 for the Convention which badly needed this amount to be able to complete its work. The assembly had transferred to the Quezon City Hall.

After one and one-half years of hectic work 316 Constitutional Convention delegates finished the draft of the New Charter on November 29, 1972. The voting record on the new Constitution was 273 in favor, 15 against, and 1 abstention.

On December 1, 1972, President Marcos formally received the signed English and Pilipino versions of the new Constitution in ap-

propriate ceremonies at Maharlika Hall in Malacanang from former President Diosdado Macapagal, Convention president, who had succeeded to the office upon the death of former President Carlos P. Garcia.

President Marcos described the new Charter as one that bore the stamp of the Filipino peoples' own experience, the history they had gone through, the sufferings and lessons learned from the past, their dreams and hopes — the sum total of the wisdom gathered from the past experience of mankind. He added:

> "I believe that this Constitution fully reflects the ideals and the vision of a New Society that we have started to build in our time. I believe this Constitution fully meets the challenge of the present and of the future and the high expectations of our people. At the same time, I believe that this work must stand or fall in the scale of the people's own decision."[15]

On the same date he issued Presidential Decree No. 73 submitting the Constitution to the people for ratification. He ordered the armed forces and all the government agencies to allow and encourage publication, free discussion and debate on the new Constitution before presenting it to a plebiscite on January 15, 1973. He created a 9-man National Ratification Coordinating Committee, with himself as chairman, to facilitate the dissemination of information on the Charter from Manila to the barrios. The committee members were Senate President Gil J. Puyat, Speaker Cornelio T. Villareal, Governor Benjamin Romualdez, Delegate Gilberto Duavit, Information Secretary Francisco S. Tatad, Labor Secretary Blas F. Ople, Secretary Jose Rono of Local Governments and Community Development, and Presidential Assistant Guillermo C. de Vega, who was appointed chairman of the coordinating secretariat.

On December 19 President Marcos issued an appeal to the people to vote on the Constitution. He emphasized that all living Filipinos should be proud of the fact that a new Constitution embodying their highest aspirations and best ideals was written in their time. At the same time he reported to the people what his administration had accomplished since the imposition of martial law:

restored peace and tranquility, disarmed the civilian population, seized 475,000 arms of various types, disbanded private armies, brought down the crime rate to almost zero, fought corruption in the government and reorganized the government to make it more responsive. Marcos added:

"We have abolished privilege, restored full equality before the law, and made the enforcers of the law the servants, rather than the masters, of the law.

"We have instituted basic refoms in the judiciary, so that those who administer and dispense justice shall first of all be good, just and honest men.

"We have expanded the opportunities to life of every man, woman and child in our society.

"We have made land reform a reality for millions of dispossessed in our society.

"We have brought down prices, so that from his wage the daily worker may feed, clothe and house his family a little better than he could in the past.

"We have given new impetus to industry, so that the economy will continue to move, and businessman make his just profit.

"We have brought a new purpose to our national life.

"And the benefits of progress we have gained by our efforts we have sought to share equally among all members of our society.

"But none of these — none of the reforms we have begun — will find lasting root in our society if we fail to ratify this new Constitution.

"On this charter, I place all my faith and hopes for our nation and our people. On it I place everything I have stood for. I ask you to join me now.

"Do not reject the labors of our countrymen, do not disappoint their hopes. Do not frustrate their aspirations, and do not hesitate either.

"Be firm in what you do today, so they will have a heritage they can proudly pass on to posterity.

"Vote for this Constitution, so that our nation will be born anew."[16]

So intent was Marcos in allowing free public discussion of the new Constitution that as early as December 17 he had directed Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to suspend the effects of martial law temporarily for the purpose. He ordered Enrile, Tatad and Justice Secretary Vicente Abad Santos to open all media to those opposing and to those favoring the ratification of the new Constitution, and to direct printing presses to print all forms of propaganda whether for or against the new Charter, with the military allowing its free distribution.

Before the January 15 plebiscite could be held, the Commission on Elections and various local governments requested the President to postpone it for the reason that there was too little time to campaign for or against the ratification.

The suspension of the effects of martial law proved, however, to be ill-timed. No sooner had it been ordered than a number of old politicians, oligarchs, professional oppositionists including subversive elements in various disguises, came out with divergent proposals primarily intended to forestall the impending ratification of the new Constitution.

President Marcos seized this opportunity to introduce another historic innovation in the domain of Philippine political institutions. In one bold move he promulgated, on December 31, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 86, creating Citizens Assemblies or *barangays* throughout the country. He would "broaden the base of citizens' participation in the democratic process and afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues." His source of authority was Republic Act 3590, otherwise known as the Revised Barrio Charter, providing for the Barrio Assembly consisting of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over, citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and who are duly registered in the list of Barrio Assembly members kept by the barrio secretary.

In his decree Marcos lowered the voting age of Filipinos to 15 years so that the greatest number of the population could participate in charting their own future and destiny. Moreover he was convinced that fifteen-year-olds were fully qualified to participate in the political process since "today's youth are better informed and more politically conscious than the youth of yesterday."[17] He believed that the revolution in mass communication had heightened the awareness of the young.

With the barangays thus established, Marcos moved speedily to make them decide vital issues including the ratification of the new Constitution and the continuation of the martial law regime. On January 10, 1973, 36,000 Citizens Assemblies all over the country began a six-day meeting to decide six important questions. The machinery for the smooth functioning of the assemblies was set up by the Department of Local Governments and Community Development headed by Secretary Jose Rono. Coordinating with him was Presidential Assistant Guillermo C. de Vega who, on the eve of the assemblies' meeting, issued the following statement:

> "So long has the exercise of free debate been limited to the select few of our economic, social and political set-up that the people themselves now feel, in one compulsive and resonant voice, that it should be brought down to their own level.
>
> "In times of crises such as the Republic faces today, we can lean on the barangays as the most authentic voice of our people's aspirations and the clearest guide of the national purpose."[18]

After the week-long referendum the barangays voted as follows:

1. Do you approve the Citizens Assembly as a way of popular government to decide issues affecting our people?

Yes	15,290,639
No	462,852
Abstention	776,930

2. Do you approve the new Constitution?

Yes	14,976,561
No	743,869
Abstention	829,991

The "Yes" votes on the question were conditional. The voters made it clear they favored the proposed new Constitution except the establishment and convening of the *ad interim* National Assembly as provided in the Transitory Provisions.

3. Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

Yes	1,322,434
No	14,298,814
Abstention	909,173

The citizens made it clear that they did not want any more plebiscite as they considered their votes in favor of the new Constitution as its ratification.

4. Do you want to hold elections in November 1973, as provided for in the 1935 Constitution?

Yes	1,206,721
No	14,431,057
Abstention	892,643

5. If the elections in 1973 will not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?

Over Seven Years	2,016,711
Seven Years	8,513,167
Six Years	2,264,668
Five Years	1,388,555
Four Years	809,991
Three Years	528,973

Two Years	446,321
One Year	380,200
0 Year	181,835

6. Do you want martial law to continue?

Yes	15,224,518
No	843,051
Abstention	462,852[19]

Consequently, on January 17, President Marcos issued a Proclamation announcing the people's ratification of the new Constitution (Proclamation No. 1102) through the Citizens Assemblies and declared the continuation of martial law in accordance with the mandate of the people through the Citizens Assemblies (Proclamation No. 1104).

Simultaneously he issued Proclamation No. 1103 declaring that in consonance with the will of the Filipino people expressed in the January 15 plebiscite the interim National Assembly provided in Article XVII of the new Constitution shall not be convened (in accordance with the voice of the people). At the same time he said he would seriously study the demand of many assemblies that he establish a revolutionary government.

By virtue of Proclamation 1102 the new Constitution took effect on high noon of January 17, 1973, except the provision on the *ad interim* National Assembly.

Under the new Charter the most important single provision can be found in Article XVII, Section 3, subsection 1, which reads:

> "The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its session until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under the Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by the Constitution."

Significantly, under the same Transitory Provisions, subsection 2, it is provided that:

> "All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued and done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."

With the imposition of martial law, then, and the ratification of the new Constitution through a nationwide referendum conducted via the barangays, President Marcos was able to obtain unlimited powers which he needed in pursuing his revolutionary program of drastic social, economic and political transformation of Philippine society. He had been liberated from the bondage of the old system which had prevented him from swiftly pursuing his vision of national greatness. In the meantime that the interim National Assembly had not been convened, all legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the presidency.

The validity of the new Constitution as drafted and passed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and as ratified by the Citizens Assemblies was questioned by some leaders of the former opposition party, and some members of the defunct Convention. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court after Marcos had proclaimed that the people had ratified the Charter. On April 2, 1973 the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 4, dismissed the petition brought before it which sought to invalidate the new Constitution and prevent its enforcement. Said the Supreme Court resolution:

> "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."[20]

The resolution, covering 89 pages, was penned by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. The decision of the highest court in the land

settled five questions, namely: (1) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 1102 "announcing the ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" was justiciable question or political and therefore nonjusticiable; (2) whether or not the Constitution had been validly ratified; (3) whether or not the Constitution had been acquiesced in by the people; (4) whether or not the petitioners (or those who questioned the validity of the ratification of the new Constitution) were entitled to relief; (5) whether or not the new Constitution was now in force.

With this historic decision upholding the validity of the new Constitution, the highest tribunal of the Republic had given final judicial approval to all the revolutionary decisions and measures President Marcos had taken, and would continue to take. The revolution which he had formally and officially announced on January 25, 1971 in Congress but which he actually began to wage only on September 21, 1972 when he placed the Republic under martial law, had been granted official sanction and approval by the Supreme Court. As he had promised, his Revolution would be different; it would seek to attain radical goals like those of the great revolutions in history, but it would not lose its democratic, constitutional and therefore peaceful quality and character.

NO more comprehensive portrayal of the range and grandeur of Ferdinand E. Marcos's vision of greatness for his country could be attempted than the manner in which he himself described it in his first inaugural address. As he put it then:

"We must renew the vision of greatness for our country.

"This is a vision of our people rising above the routine to face formidable challenges and overcome them. It means the rigorous pursuit of excellence.

"It is a government that acts as the guardian of the law's majesty, the source of justice to the weak and solace to the underprivileged, a ready friend and protector of the common man and a sensitive instrument of his advancement and not captivity.

"This vision rejects and discards the inertia of centuries.

"It is a vision of the jungles opening up to the farmer's tractor and plow, and the wilderness claimed for agriculture and the support of human life; the mountains yielding their boundless treasure, rows of factories turning the harvests of our fields into a thousand products.

"It is a transformation of the Philippines into a hub of progress — of trade and commerce in Southeast Asia.

"It is our people bravely determining our own future. For to make the future is the supreme act of freedom.

"This is a vision that all of you share for our country's future. It is a vision which can, and should, engage the energies of the nation. This vision must touch the deeper layers of national vitality and energy. We must awake the hero inherent in every man. We must harness the wills and the hearts of all our people. We must find the secret chords which turn ordinary men into heroes."[21]

THE New Society that Ferdinand E. Marcos has begun to build is a society of brave, creative and productive new Filipinos — a braver and brighter world of dignified Filipinos. It would be a new breed of people armed with the passion to rise above the routine, the courage to face and overcome formidable challenges and obstacles, and the resolve to discard the inertia of centuries and consecrate their vitality and energy to the rigorous pursuit of excellence.

Moreover, the new Filipinos would be cultured, artistic, with a a taste for the beautiful, and proud of their cultural heritage and national identity. For the President's lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, would give them "the atmosphere of what is good and true and beautiful" — *kabutihan, katapatan, kagandahan.*

Said the First Lady: "When Ferdinand was elected President in 1965, he told me: 'I will build a house; you make it a home.'" Since then she knew what her role as First Lady would be. Ferdinand would be the brain; Imelda would be the heart. Ferdinand would build the body; Imelda would provide it with a soul.

It had been that way ever since. As President of the Republic, Ferdinand E. Marcos concentrated on matters of state — peace and order, national unity, political and ideological conflicts, economic development and reforms, foreign affairs, education. His task was to build a nation, to weld all the diverse, clashing elements of Philippine society into one national homogeny, to lead them to his vision of greatness. In the performance of that task he would likely be impersonal, even unsentimental, for leaders are driven by great passions and transcendental obsessions whose pursuit tends to blunt the edges and harden the fibre of their emotions. Men of power develop hearts of steel. Moved by the passion to overcome and conquer because only victory would enable them to realize their visions, they become inured to what Imelda has called "the true and good and beautiful."

More than anyone else, Imelda Marcos knew Ferdinand. She knew that the warrior President, in the implementation of his vision, could neglect the finer aspect of life — culture, the lively arts. Marcos himself had said that his job was to build a house; it would need Imelda's superbly feminine touch and taste for the beautiful to make it a home. Imelda would infuse the house that Ferdinand would build with goodness, truth and beauty.

Thus, when Imelda Marcos first ascended the stairs of Malacanang as the President's wife, she carried into her exalted status the firm resolve to enlarge the dimensions of her role as First Lady. She would not allow herself to be a mere ornament in the Palace. Neither would she limit herself to playing official hostess to state visitors and other dignitaries at state functions as most presidential wives did before her. Fully aware and confident of her unrivalled personal charm and glamour, she would not be content to grace and preside at social ceremonials. Rather, she would strive to complement Ferdinand's endeavors, providing the tempering, humanizing influence in her husband's governance. And as the conscience of his administration, she would see to it that not all issues were decided by Ferdinand on strictly political grounds, that ethical and moral values were taken into consideration in the making of presidential decisions.

From the beginning, therefore, Imelda complemented Ferdinand's strength and power with her warm personal touch — and style.

Marcos was obsessed with liberating the masses from their bondage to poverty and oppression, arming them with skills necessary for productive enterprise, and providing them with employment opportunities. Imelda would help them live and enjoy their lives. She would encourage them to know and appreciate their native heritage, the beauty of their indigenous culture, and thus instill in them a sense of national pride. It would therefore be necessary to preserve and propagate Philippine art and culture. For a people without culture, which is their soul, cannot hope to be great.

Simultaneously, Imelda would embark on social action designed to assist the handicapped and underprivileged in the country — the aged, the delinquents, the drug addicts. She would inspire and encourage them to turn a new leaf and usher them into a new and better life.

From the start, then, Imelda Marcos organized her labors into two programs: social welfare and cultural.

In her social welfare projects the First Lady has been eminently successful. In her own way she has revolutionized the field of social action in the country. Rather than stress charity, she emphasizes self-help and volunteerism on the part of the disadvantaged, while encouraging philanthropy of resources, funds and skills on the part of the government and the private sectors.

Through *Project Tulungan,* her nationwide social action program, Imelda has advanced the welfare of a great number of unprivileged by initiating continuing programs in health, social services, educational activities, housing, family life, vocational training and placement, recreation, and adult education. As Imelda frowns on parasitism, she harnesses trained volunteers to teach the less privileged how to improve the quality of their lives and infuse them with dignity, pride and self-respect. The ultimate goal of her welfare projects is self-development.

Project Tulungan has established centers in economically depressed areas like Tondo in Manila, where thousands of residents avail themselves of medical services and approximately a thousand

children participate daily in the center's nutrition program. Hundreds of mothers attend family planning and "mothercraft" sessions. Young and old are encouraged to demonstrate the highest ideals of humanitarianism and volunteerism. A network of other centers has been set up not only in the Greater Manila area but as far down south as Zamboanga.

Under the First Lady's integrated social welfare program are innumerable other projects assisting the disadvantaged. She has a Reception and Study Center for Children and Youth which provides temporary shelter, care and rehabilitation for young people with "special problems." On her initiative, a *Nayon ng Kabataan* (Youth Village) has been set up, providing for the care, training and shelter of 200 orphaned and abandoned children. The Marillac Home for Girls is a national center for the rehabilitation of young girls who have come in conflict with the law. Vicente Madrigal Village for Boys is an 18-hectare farming community for approximately 500 young boys who have committed infractions against the law. In Quezon City, Imelda has built a home for old people, the Golden Acres, occupying a 2-hectare lot. She has another humanitarian project, "Save a Life in Every Barrio," designed to bring prompt welfare and medical assistance to barrio dwellers.

And as thousands of Filipinos, coming mostly from low-income groups, succumb to cardiac diseases annually, the First Lady has established the Heart Foundation of the Philippines. As she envisions it, the Foundation would be the Heart Center in Asia wherein heart specialists and researchers would consolidate their studies.

In times of national emergencies brought about by natural calamities and disasters like typhoons, floods, earthquakes and fires, Imelda Marcos does not wait for the distressed to turn to her. She goes to them to comfort and assist them. As the country is often visited by such disasters, Imelda has established a Special Disaster Fund for victims of calamities. Every year-end the First Lady raises funds to underwrite the traditional *Maligayang Pasko* (Merry Christmas) Festival, distributing, with the assistance of friends and student leaders, hundreds of thousands of gift packages to disadvantaged families in the country's depressed areas, in the slums.

Then she holds a Christmas Party in the Palace grounds for orphans and residents of welfare institutions.

After the proclamation of martial law, Imelda waged her own revolution — the Green Revolution — a nationwide movement encouraging every family to grow and raise its own food requirements of fish, poultry, pork and vegetables. The Green Revolution is her own contribution to her husband's call for increased food production in the country. "A productive people is a progressive nation!" was her own slogan to inspire the people to great productive endeavors.

While the Green Revolution of Imelda was largely addressed to millions of housewives all over the country, it has caught the imagination of everyone. The people from Aparri to Jolo have responded vigorously and committed themselves to the movement, which supports Ferdinand's own revolution. Millions of Filipinos in the country's 1,430 municipalities and 34,000 barrios have begun to sow and cultivate their own backyards, raising their own food supply. As a further incentive to the Green Revolutionists, Imelda sponsors a national Green Revolution contest with at least ₱200,000 in prizes.

IMELDA's passion for social work, her profound social commitment, finds expression in her multifarious projects on charities, cottage industries development, rural electrification, and food production. That passion is equalled only by her deep personal commitment to preserve and propagate Filipino culture.

No other presidential wife, up to this moment of the nation's history, has demonstrated Imelda's firmness of will and resolve to bring to the fore the best of Philippine cultural heritage.

Through her initiative and leadership the Philippines now has its own Parthenon, the Cultural Center of the Philippines, which she fondly calls "sanctuary of the Filipino spirit." In the words of the President, the Center is the haven of "the imaginative genius of the Filipino people." Created in 1966, the first year of Marcos in the presidency, as "a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people, for the purpose of preserving and promoting Philippine culture in all its varied aspects," it took Imelda's inspired leadership and initiative to build it. As envisioned, the Center would be "a national

theater, a national music hall, an art gallery" and would include such other buildings and facilities as would be necessary for the holding of conferences, seminars, concerts and similar cultural activities.

Now that the country has its own Cultural Center, an architectural gem set against the blue, placid waters of Manila Bay, and Filipino artists are at last receiving inspiration and patronage from the government, the people could sense the virgin stirrings of a cultural renaissance. With Imelda, Filipino musicians, writers and poets, painters and sculptors, dramatists and dancers, have begun to receive their just recognition and rewards.

The repository of the country's relics and cultural artifacts — the National Museum — has also received the First Lady's loving attention. She has moved it to a new home: the renovated, refurbished third floor of the former Department of Agriculture building on Agripina Circle; the fifth floor would be used as the Museum's planetarium. On Imelda's initiative, too, the historic sites of Fort Santiago, where Jose Rizal wrote his immortal poem, *Mi Ultimo Adios,* prior to his execution, the Paco Cemetery, where Rizal's remains were kept, have been restored, as well as the ancient, historic gates of Intramuros. Imelda has memorialized the route of the Bataan Death March with historic markers and lined it up with fire trees to instill in the young a sense of history and pride in the valor of Filipinos who died defending their country during the Second World War.

One of the country's major tourist attractions, the *Nayong Pilipino* (Philippine Village) adjacent to the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, is Imelda Marcos's own idea. The village draws together a far-flung network of Filipino villages in one beautifully landscaped site. It consists of seven villages built around a six-hectare man-made lagoon, and each village reflects and symbolizes the way of life of a particular region of the Philippines. Imelda Marcos envisioned *Nayong Pilipino* not only as a tourist attraction, but as a means of inspiring her people — and foreigners — to appreciate Philippine arts and crafts. And since it is, as described by President Marcos, "a microcosm of the Philippines" that "celebrates the Filipino heritage," it is an effective

instrument in the development of the people's pride in their national identity.

One other outstanding feature of the *Nayong Pilipino* is the Museum of Philippine Traditional Culture depicting the fascinating, unique culture, life and heritage of the country's diverse ethnic groups.

The completion of Rizal Park, its transformation into "one of the great esplanades in Asia," was due largely to the initiative and imagination of Imelda Marcos. Today, millions of Filipinos and tourists alike stroll and relax at the Rizal Park which, at twilight, is silhouetted against the famous sunset of Manila Bay. It was also because of Imelda's leadership, and the assistance of Teodoro F. Valencia that Roxas Boulevard has been landscaped and beautified.

Matching the innovativeness of her husband, Imelda Marcos does not hesitate to try out new means of promoting Philippine culture, native ingenuity, and the nation's products. This was evidenced by *Bagong Anyo* '72 (New Look '72), unique showcase of Philippine fabrics and dress designs by leading Filipino couturiers. Inspired by Imelda, the showcase had its premier showing at the *Nayong Pilipino* on November 11, 1972, received wide acclaim because the costumes and accessories exhibited and worn by a number of the country's leading mannequins and models depicted the different costumes worn by Filipinos through the past 100 years. Repeated showings of *Bagong Anyo* were held in many other places, including the Rizal Park.

Moreover, to draw interest in vehicles made in the Philippines, Imelda Marcos recently organized a parade of low-cost automobiles and commercial vehicles in an event called *Parangal ng Sasakyang Pilipino* (Tribute to Filipino Vehicles.) Those who joined the parade were companies participating in the government-sponsored Progressive Car Manufacturing Program. For the first time, Filipinos realized that their own country was on the threshold of industrialization.

To help curb the rapid population growth (3.5 percent annually, one of the highest in the world) in the country, and to

complement the government's family planning program, the First Lady envisioned a Population Center, one of three modern buildings now rising in Makati, Rizal. Designed by leading architect Leandro V. Locsin, who also designed the Cultural Center, the Population Center is one of a complex of three buildings — the other two being the Ecology Center and the Asian Center for Social Welfare. In the Population Center, Imelda Marcos would consolidate all the fragmented efforts of various government agencies and private population and family planning councils. Upon its completion, the Population Center would be one of the most modern and complete of its kind, equipped with a research laboratory and audio-visual facilities, plus a modern library and offices.

The emerging new Philippine society must protect itself from the dangers posed by pollution. In the words of President Marcos, "The scourge of pollution hovers over all the world, and does not spare the Philippines. We have to act, and act with dispatch, if our people are to be spared the misery that comes with pollution. Other nations are now desperately seeking the restoration of the ecological balance. Let us avoid this. To do otherwise would be to deny our nation the benefits that derived from our national development and achievement."[22]

Imelda's response to the challenge of her husband is the Ecology Center, part of the three-building complex cited above. Its goals are to determine the nature of pollutants in air, soil and water and to establish standards of permissible levels that will not affect public health; conduct scientific research on the effects of the pollutants on human beings, plants, animals, aquatic life and physical property; develop new, rapid and accurate methods for the determination and elimination of environmental pollutants to cope with the rapid industrial growth and increase in population; study and develop unit operations and processes for the proper treatment and control of wastes and pollutants in industry, and serve as an informational, educational, and training center for private and government personnel for proper methods of prevention and control of population.

When completed, the Ecology Center would be another tangible evidence that the New Society is indeed a modern Philippine society abreast of the latest world technological innovations.

The third building in the complex — the Asian Center for Social Welfare — would provide a program of activities focused primarily around training and research in social welfare and social development, and the production of social work literature based on a system of priority relevant to the needs of the Asian region. (Like her husband, Imelda Marcos thinks in Asian terms). She envisions it as the mainspring to promote social welfare programs that are linked to economic development programs. The First Lady, who was instrumental in the upgrading of social work into a full profession in the country, and the elevation of the social welfare agency into a department, would also have the Center serve as a forum and focal pcint for the short-term training of key social welfare and social development personnel in Asia — a training center for trainers.

Beautiful and unsurpassed in elegance and poise, Imelda Romualdez Marcos is destiny's gift to Ferdinand, to her country, to history. For in Imelda Marcos are combined the political sense, will to power and great drive of Roosevelt's Eleanor, including her gentility, inflexible liberalism and wisdom. At the same time Imelda provides Marcos the revolutionary President with a refreshing welcome change from his official and political chores, as well as a fresh perspective of the world, for she possesses youth, high cultural taste, and love for the beautiful and the sublime. To Marcos the statesman, Imelda is a pearl of great price, for with her charisma she can soften and melt the hearts of even the most feared leaders of the world, whether in capitalist or Communist societies.

And among their own people, the 40 million Filipinos whose future Ferdinand — and Imelda — have begun to change radically, the First Lady symbolizes the finest and the best in Filipino womanhood, the epitome of what every Filipino woman wishes to be.

The historic revolution that Ferdinand E. Marcos announced formally on January 25, 1971, but which he actually carried out only on September 21, 1972 when he proclaimed martial law, has begun to transform the country. Out of the old, sick, decadent society is evolving a New Society that sings of freedom, justice, dignity, peace and prosperity. The brain and leader of that unique revolution is Ferdinand E. Marcos; its heart — Imelda. #

CHAPTER

OMEGA AS ALPHA 11

THE thesis of this book is that President Ferdinand E. Marcos is a revolutionary who had been obsessed with recasting Philippine society from the moment he was elected sixth President of the Republic in 1965. He never gave up that vision. He was convinced that revolution was the only means to realize his goal, and that only by undergoing a radical, revolutionary transformation could the Philippines be a great nation.

The Marcos theory of change has no parallel in Philippine presidential history in its boldness and conception. It marks him off as the country's most creative, innovative and audacious leader.

The creative quality of his vision is amply demonstrated by the nature of his theory of revolution. It would be a peaceful, legal and constitutional revolution. Like other revolutions it would be an act of liberation, for a revolution is nothing if not a liberating act, but it would be waged without bloodshed and violence. The Marcos theory of revolution has neither a parallel nor a precedent

in the history of Asian nations, and perhaps even of Western countries, in the novelty of its conception and boldness of its execution.

Marcos saw the Constitutional Convention as one of the major democratic instruments with which to carry out his revolution. That assembly would forge a Constitution embodying drastic changes in the country's economic, political and social structure. It would democratize property and wealth, power and privilege, which throughout history had been monopolized by a few. From there the leadership would unite and harmonize the people, which would be relatively easier to accomplish after the causes of insurgency, discontent and subversion had been removed. Out of that process would emerge a new Philippine society.

The setting against which the new Constitution was being written was chaotic and turbulent. The government under the leadership of Marcos was beleaguered by myriad forces threatening to overthrow it. On the Left were the traditional and the Maoist Communist forces raising the red banner of revolution, a people's revolution. On the Right were what Marcos himself called the "conspirators of a *coup d'etat,* warlords and private armies, and an abusive oligarchy bent on assuming the actual powers of government."[1] On another side of the spectrum lay the secessionist forces in Mindanao and Sulu, aided by foreign interventionists. On still another side were some clerico-fascists, criminal syndicates, various elements in the oligarchic media, and some privileged classes obsessed only with the preservation of their privileges, all instigating anarchy and disorder.

In the Center was the government, at the head of a great number of passive, apolitical Filipinos.

Those forces conspired to discredit the Convention. Through insistent propaganda they interpreted it as the last desperate attempt of Marcos to perpetuate himself in power. They accused Marcos of manipulating the Convention to suit his personal caprice. But notwithstanding the bitter attacks directed at the Assembly the delegates continued to do their task of writing a new fundamental law.

The forces ranged against the government intensified their activities. Riots, clashes with the military and the police, robberies, kidnapings, daylight holdups, and terrorist bombings rose to intolerable heights. Lawlessness became the order of the day. The crescendo of chaos and disorder climaxed in the bombing of the Liberal Party candidates at Plaza Miranda.

Marcos suspended the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* to quell the rebellion and arrest the perpetrators of the crime. By January 1972, or approximately six months later, he restored the writ. Immediately afterwards, insurgency and subversion resurfaced, marked by a series of bombings. By September 1972 even the Convention itself, in the final phase of writing a new Constitution, was bombed by unidentified persons. Insurgents battled government forces in the countrysides. The Republic teetered precariously on the brink of collapse.

Marcos proclaimed martial law.

To the surprise of his enemies and the relief of the great majority of the people who had resigned themselves to the imminent possibility of a bloody upheaval, Marcos gave them an entirely new type of martial regime. He remained as the civilian Chief Executive and commander-in-chief of all the armed forces. He did not establish a ruling military junta. He did not send military armored trucks and tanks rumbling in the streets. The people seldom saw uniformed soldiers on street corners. There was no ominous knocking at doors in the dead of night. Moreover there were no mass executions of the enemies of government, no mass liquidation in detention camps and gas chambers, as his enemies had charged and as the people had feared. It was martial law without bloodbath.

Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, a civilian and one of the President's most trusted men, had the responsibility of maintaining the civilian complexion of the Marcos martial regime. On orders of Marcos, Enrile adopted and implemented a rigid and stern policy against any abuse by any member of the armed forces. Officers and enlisted men found to have committed

any abuse were prosecuted and punished. Marcos himself had decreed this, for he believed that "the soldier, more than any other man, must set the standard of nobility" especially during the period of national emergency.

The supremacy of the civilian authority over the military even under martial law was emphasized in a speech by Secretary Enrile in these words:

> ". . . the armed forces are performing their job on orders of the civilian authorities. The President, while assuming the role of commander-in-chief, remains the civilian leader of the country. Your Secretary of National Defense is a civilian, not a military officer. Civilian authority remains supreme and it is only in the aid of the civilian authority that the armed forces have been assigned specific tasks to carry out, including the dismantling of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the maintenance of peace and order, and enforcement of the decrees, orders and instructions of the President."[2]

The initial reaction of the foreign press to the imposition of martial law was critical. Such reaction came, however, from journalists with hardly a knowledge of the lawlessness and anarchy which precipitated the proclamation, much less of the peculiar political experiences which the Filipino people have undergone. Eventually, the treatment of the foreign press of martial law in the Philippines began to be placed in a better perspective after a number of distinguished journalists journeyed to the Philipines and saw the truth for themselves. Typical of the renowned foreign journalists who had written honestly and impartially about martial law was C.L. Sulzberger, chief foreign correspondent of the *New York Times,* who wrote:

> "Mr. Marcos has now in effect taken all the reins of power and makes no promise as to when he will relinquish them.
>
> "But, while fettering a free press, terminating Congress and locking up some opponents (many of whom were later amnestied), he has hauled the Philippines out of stagnation."[3]

Sulzberger noted that sharecropping or tenancy was being ended through land reform, new roads were being built, the educational system was being revised, and corruption had been diminished. He described Marcos as "an imaginative, gifted man" who "hopes to reshape society by creating an agrarian middle-class to replace the archaic sharecropper-absentee landlord relationship."

Another journalist, Frederic S. Marquardt, former editor of the *Philippines Free Press* and editor of the *Arizona Republic,* wrote approvingly of martial law in his paper. A Philippine-born American, Marquardt was impressed by the benign, compassionate and "light-hearted" character of Philippine martial law, compared to the martial regimes of Spain's Francisco Franco and Argentina's Juan Peron.

> "Those who criticize the lack of democracy in the Philippines today are usually the ones who accept the lack of democracy in Red China as perfectly natural because, they say, the system in Red China works. The system also is working in the Philippines . . . There is almost universal consensus that order has been established after a period of intolerable lawlessness . . . In sharp contrast to the Franco and Peron dictatorships, there are no soldiers on the streets and relatively few police. A curfew is in effect from midnight to 4 a.m. but there are few violators. Business has been stable under martial law and inflation has been contained . . . The old Malayan concept of *musiawara,* a national consensus arrived at without formal vote, is the guiding principle in this country today."[4]

SAUL Alinsky[5] observed that revolutionary changes never occur without conflict because even a non-violent protest is bound to produce a violent reaction. There is no evolution without revolutions, and there are no revolutions without conflict.

This is no less true in the case of the Marcos revolution. Although it is being carried out peacefully, legally, and constitutionally, it has produced violent reaction. For this revolution is not altogether non-violent. While it has none of the violence of

brute physical force, such as the open clash of arms that marks traditional revolutions, it exacts violence of another dimension on the privileged few — the oligarchs. Through legal and constitutional means Marcos has begun and continues to disenfranchise them of their economic and political power.

Their reaction is to attack with counter-violence, not through the laws or the Constitution but through physical force. Hence the plots to assassinate the President and his family. The assassination plan on the President was said to have started in December 1969, after Marcos had been elected to a second term as President, when it appeared to the oligarchs and their conspirators from the Right that Marcos was determined to break their monopoly of economic wealth and power. From 1970 to December 1972 no less than seven attempts were made against his life. According to Secretary of Information Francisco S. Tatad:

> "The plan included the support for the Communist campaign of terrorism and violence to create a revolutionary situation and grab power even if the Communists should have succeeded in taking over the government.
>
> "The signed confessions [of those arrested and detained, among them Manuel Crisologo, Antonio Arevalo, and Eduardo Figueras] also indicate that the plot to assassinate the President included the First Lady as well as the children and that there are still plotters and conspirators who have not been apprehended by government authorities. The confessions of detainees warned that the assassination attempts shall continue."[6]

THE official announcement of the assassination plot was made by the government after Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos narrowly escaped death at the hands of an assassin. The attempt on the First Lady's life took place on a Thursday, December 7, 1972, during the awarding ceremonies of the National Beautification and Cleanliness Contest at the Nayong Pilipino, a tourist attraction near the Manila International Airport which she had patiently developed. The assassin, wearing a dark suit, posed as a member

of a delegation from Mindanao and went up the stage with them to receive their prize in the contest from the First Lady. Suddenly he whipped out a foot-long bolo concealed in the left sleeve of his coat.

"However, Mrs. Marcos saw him unsheathing the weapon and she instinctively backed away. And when the man lunged at her, the First Lady bravely parried it.

"Mrs. Marcos fell after the would-be assassin's first try. But the man attempted to stab her again. Repeatedly, he went after the First Lady.

"Then the attacker tried to hack his way out when security men moved in. He was subdued within seconds and shot to death."[7]

The First Lady suffered injuries which took a long time to heal.

The assassination attempt on Mrs. Marcos was witnessed by thousands of people gathered at Nayong Pilipino, and hundreds of thousands of others throughout the land because the event was televised nationwide. The instant national reaction was one of pity for Mrs. Marcos and anger at the assassin. World leaders were shocked and dismayed over the outrage. President Richard M. Nixon of the United States led other world leaders in expressing shock over the incident and in "praying for her immediate recovery and giving thanks that she was able to weather the attempted assassination."[8]

The great wave of sympathy for Mrs. Marcos generated by the incident, the prayers and thanksgiving masses, the letters and telegrams that flooded Malacanang from all over the country, not to mention other parts of the globe, was a yardstick of her personal popularity with the masses of Filipinos and their acceptance of the revolutionary thrust of the Marcos administration.

The reaction of President Marcos to the incident was to reiterate his determination to proceed with his program of eradicating all

the threats against the stability of Philippine society and to push through his reform program. He said:

> "When we undertook this experiment, we knew we would pay a price; but I cannot forgive myself that it had to be her to pay such a price. I wish I had been there when this happened."[9]

On January 7, 1973, one month after the assassination attempt on his wife, President Marcos addressed the Filipino people on a nationwide radio-television hook-up to report on the achievements of his martial administration after one hundred days. He informed the people that the government had eradicated the armed elements in actual confrontation with government troops, collected half a million loose firearms, arrested some leaders of clerico-fascist groups, dismissed corrupt and incompetent public officials and civil servants, restored integrity and purpose in the government service, and enforced the law equally.

Through land reform, President Marcos said, the Filipino tenant had been emancipated from bondage to the soil. His administration likewise provided the working men with greater protection of their rights to the rewards of their labor. The government had embarked on large-scale projects to achieve the agro-industrial goals of the country and set a new pace of production. He called attention to the people's "new sense of pride and self-esteem," the efforts of other countries to seek expansion of their ties of amity, cooperation and assistance with the Philippines, and the interest of foreign investors in committing their resources to the nation's economic development.

He admitted that 100 days was not enough to institute any change in society, nor to crush or even neutralize the enemies of change, or the historic passage of a nation from an old order to a new one. For:

> "Such is always marked with resistance — from those who must give up their illegitimate privilege and special positions, and lose their power and submit to the will of the government. We had no illusions that the enemies of change would com-

pletely disappear. On the other hand, we believe that every small success of our reform measures would mobilize them towards a last desperate gamble. They would merely wait for the situation to settle down somewhat and then they would emerge anew to seek a reversion or an activism to the old."[10]

He warned the people against slipping back to the habits of the past. On the second month of martial law the government was succeeding in its reforms. But on the third month there was a sliding back to the old ways and the reforms suffered. The sliding back was accelerated, said Marcos, by the political campaign for the new Constitution. The freedom of discussion and debate on the new Charter which he had granted was being utilized by the enemies of change as an excuse to seek concessions and privileges, not only from the society in general but also from the President and members of the Cabinet. "Clearly," he declared, "this was a reversion to the system of political blackmail and corruption of the past. This cannot be tolerated. We have to and we will fight back."

At the same time the subversives had regrouped and reconstituted their ranks to wage open opposition to the new reforms he had initiated. Insurgency had resurfaced not only in the south where "foreign funding" continued to flow into dissident hands and where foreign-trained troops, if not actually foreign troops, had been introduced. In the Greater Manila area the Maoist, traditionalist, and rightist elements had renewed their activities which included "an extensive assassination and liquidation plan" that counted among its targets the First Family, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Public Information, the Chief of Staff and key generals of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

"This plot was discussed at a meeting of the central committee of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines at an 'underground' house in Novaliches, Quezon City on December 26, 1972, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the organization of the CPP and the birth anniversary of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. In a raid conducted on one of several 'underground' houses of the armed city partisans on December

> 28, 1972, government operatives killed two armed partisans and captured their leader. High-powered firearms, fragmentation grenades and voluminous Communist propaganda materials were also confiscated. This raid led to the arrest of a CPP central committee politburo member and 29 cadres operating from the different 'underground' houses throughout the Greater Manila area."[11]

Marcos revealed that the resurgence of dissidence and of common crimes stemmed from the uniqueness of the martial law he had imposed, "a smiling martial law," according to some foreign observers — one that "does not rule with the barrel of the gun or install barbed wires in the streets, or deploy large contingents of troops and tanks in centers of population." Said Marcos:

> "We have called it Martial Law — Philippine Style, unique in the history of martial rule because it is humane and forgiving, and does not stand up against the wall even the gravest offender provided he offers to mend his ways and take part in our reform program. Where violence could be avoided, we have avoided and will continue to avoid it; but the fact that we have not used and will not use it on our people, in the manner that other governments have used it on theirs, does not mean that we will not use it, if and when so compelled, on the enemies of the state."[12]

He then announced a selective amnesty for dissidents, insurgents, and subversives, including rightist conspirators who were not leaders of the conspiracy. He would give them all an opportunity to reform themselves and help in his reform program. Then in order to prevent the nation from sliding farther back into the old ways, he ordered the military to enforce all the general orders, instructions and decrees that he had promulgated. He also revoked his previous order suspending the effects of martial law in the campaign for the new Constitution, and invited the people to take part in the Citizens Assemblies or barangays being formed in the barrios, wards and districts throughout the country to enable them to participate in the national referendum on January 10-15, 1973, as discussed in the preceding chapter, to decide vital questions

affecting the nation. Then he enfranchised all 15-year-old Filipinos to participate in the assemblies, the first time in Philippine history that 15-year-olds were granted political right.

Marcos then declared that there was no turning back for the people.

> "We have committed ourselves to this revolution. We have pledged to it our future, our fortunes, our lives, our destiny. We have burned our bridges behind us. Let no man misunderstand the strength of our resolution.
>
> "We shall be humane, but we will not relent. We will be compassionate, but we must be firm. We shall be wise and prudent, but we will not withdraw. We shall forge ahead, and God willing, we shall bring about the transformation of our society."[13]

He left no room for doubt that he was fully determined to carry out his revolution.

THE new Constitution of the Philippines which the Filipino people overwhelmingly ratified in a national referendum on January 10-15, 1973 by a vote of 14,976,561 against only 743,869 is so written as to serve as an instrument in the achievement of radical reforms in Philippine society. Representing the synthesis of the collective efforts of 316 delegates for one and one-half years, it "breaks into new political frontiers," in the words of Dr. Guillermo C. de Vega, a Marcos braintrust, "with a little experimentalism, yet as a whole there is nothing in it which goes beyond popular expectation." Writes de Vega of the new Charter:

> "It upholds Democracy as the cornerstone of all political reconstruction but for Democracy to surmount its critical test in this part of the world, the document prefigures it necessary to diffuse wealth and comfort; promote civil rights, at the same time fortifying the respect for law in all classes of society; mobilize the resources of the nation not for the gratification of momentary passions but for solidifying the national power; and, finally, bring back sovereignty to the traditional — rural

— elements of Philippine communities by and through the instrumentality of a strong leadership at the helm. The framers of the new Constitution engaged their collective talents for 18 months in producing a synthesis of modern needs and traditional values, a perfect balance between liberty and authority in a democratic setting. They envisaged a parliamentary government that is strong, and stable enough to withstand the caprice of political interests, because they know the government would be a farce if not ensured against narrow partisan ambitions, and parliamentarism would belong to the realm of desiderium."[14]

The center of political controversy in the new Constitution is Article XVII, otherwise known as the *Transitory Provisions*, which describes the transitional, emergency period the country is undergoing, the drastic and revolutionary alterations in the Philippine political condition. This article contains devices "hitherto unknown in the field of constitution-making," such as the devices by which the government could be reorganized in the period of transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system. "We see in this article as well," writes de Vega, "the grant of absolute, in fact, extraordinary authority to the head of state not only in the matter of legislating measures compatible with the necessities of the times but also in the review of decrees, orders and even contracts which may no longer serve the purpose of their enactments."

Under this article an *ad interim* National Assembly is provided which will elect an *ad interim* Prime Minister. The Assembly and the Prime Minister will head the government during the period of transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system. But the *interim* National Assembly that will elect the *interim* Prime Minister can be convened only by the incumbent President. In the meantime that he has not convened the Assembly he shall exercise all the duties and powers of a Prime Minister. Marcos, therefore, under the new Constitution, continues as President but exercising the powers of the Prime Minister pending the latter's election by the unconvened National Assembly.

As long as Marcos does not convene the *interim* National Assembly, executive and legislative powers of government are fused in him.

Exactly when he will convene the *interim* National Assembly can only be speculated on. It must be noted, however, that the people who approved the new Constitution made it clear that they were in favor of the new Constitution "except for the establishment and convening of the *ad interim* Assembly."[15] They also voted overwhelmingly in favor of the continuation of martial law, which meant that they wholly accepted the validity and necessity of the revolutionary reforms Marcos had introduced. Considering that the reform program of President Marcos is not a temporary measure with palliatory effects but a total revolutionary program designed to recast not only the social, political and economic institutions of the country but the Filipino himself, his values, attitudes and habits, the logical conclusion is that the convening of the *interim* National Assembly is not immediately foreseeable. If it is convened at all within the immediately foreseeable future Marcos would do so only after he has been fully convinced that the Assembly would be an active partner in and accelerator of the attainment of the radical goals he has earnestly begun to pursue, one of which was to end what he had called "ceremonial type of democracy."

On the question of when the *interim* Assembly would be convened and the question of when he would relinquish his martial powers, President Marcos said: "This matter will be reviewed and re-assessed periodically. It is my intention to maintain martial law and to exercise the powers thereof only as long as necessary. There must now be a conscious and deliberate effort to return to normalcy, and when normalcy returns . . . it will be the duty and obligation of everyone to see to it that we implement all the provisions of the new Constitution."[16]

THE concentration of unlimited executive and legislative powers in President Marcos during the period of transition is a historical necessity. For the revolution which he leads must secure and advance its gains. With inadequate powers the gains of the revolution would be doomed, for the enemies of change, now conveniently relegated to the sidelines, will most certainly reemerge from the background and retaliate with vigorous vengeance. The oligarchs, whose economic and political power he has whittled down; the lawmakers who had been forced to give up their privileged positions; some of the clerico-fascists he had stopped from agitating

and instigating the masses to violence; as well as the Communists and fanatical ideologues whose rebellion he had quelled and some of whose just and legitimate demands that coincided with his own he had preempted — these, and other elements that had conspired to make the Republic a sick society, will block the radical transformation of the Philippines the moment Marcos loses his full powers. Convening the *interim* National Assembly, for instance, whose members may not share his ideals and whose own objectives may be diametrically opposed to his goals, could spell the doom of the revolution.

It was precisely to enable the Philippine Revolution to secure its gains that the great political thinker, Apolinario Mabini, advocated the concentration of powers in President Emilio Aguinaldo, pending the shift of the revolutionary government to a republic. In a memorandum to Aguinaldo, to be submitted to the Council of Government, Mabini observed that during that transitional period:

> ". . . The ship of State is threatened by great dangers and terrible tempests, and this circumstance, in my opinion, renders it advisable that the three powers be to a certain extent combined for the present in a single hand, so that she may be guided with the force necessary in order to avoid all reefs."[17]

In another message, to be delivered by Aguinaldo to Congress which had been struggling to have more power than the executive, Mabini emphasized that the President needed ample powers to cope with "future contingencies." Pending the recognition by international law of the independence of the Philippines, the President would need such powers to protect the emerging republic "against giants in ambition and power." In the words of Mabini, through President Aguinaldo:

> "You [the members of Congress] also know that I am charged with the most difficult task of steering the ship of State in these moments fraught with danger; hence I hope that you will understand that I need such ample powers that I shall be safe above the ebb and flow of public opinion, and that you will give me strength and energy to avoid all shoals

and to prevent, by the adoption of swift and opportune measures, the absolute predominance of brute force."[18]

As Aguinaldo needed unlimited powers then to protect the infant republic from hostile and powerful elements, so does President Marcos need such powers now.

The fear that the President may use his unlimited powers to proclaim himself dictator or President for life has its basis in the Actonian thesis that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. However, observes Dr. de Vega:

> "It is admitted that the new Constitution did not fix a period within which the incumbent President should convene the *interim* National Assembly, thus creating a hiatus where it is possible for him, should he so desire, to be a President for life, but certainly this is no lacuna. The unwritten rule is clear, as it must have been to the perspicacious delegates comprising the majority wing, that no government, even those backed by the sheer might of force, can possibly continue without popular support. A valid example because of its Asian happening is Indonesia's Sukarno. Notwithstanding his consecration as President for life under the Indonesian Constitution, from that palladium of power just the same he fell no sooner than the minute he failed to redeem his sworn pledges with his people."[19]

Now, at this point, it may be asked why the framers of the Constitution chose not to fix the term of the transition period during which President Marcos is allowed to continue in office. Again, Dr. de Vega explains:

> "Actually, every age is an age of transition for, in everything, in society, whether we speak of customs or morality or political structures, the new always overlaps the old in a continuing cycle of events whose beginning and end can never be fixed. This is the law of national life that invariably is kept unwritten in a constitution but recognized in its whole breadth and spirit. When, therefore, the 1971 Constitutional Convention granted the incumbent President the power to determine the precise moment for him to convene the *ad interim*

> Assembly, or for him to decide under Section 9, Article XVII, the most apt deadline for the reorganization of the government, its learned members were merely expressing a universal, valid, albeit unwritten principle in constitutional law."[20]

FERDINAND E. Marcos, the politician turned revolutionary, has chosen to change the nation's history by deciding to wage his own revolution. He has read the stars correctly, he has chosen the men who would cast their lot with him and join him in a journey fraught with grave perils. That he has chosen the correct course is amply demonstrated by the unbounded enthusiasm that characterizes the people's acceptance of his novel and historic measures and their overwhelming approval of his continued use of unlimited powers. They have given sanction to his revolution because it is their own revolution. With the Filipino people mobilized behind him, Marcos cannot fail. Together they can build a New Society, a new people liberated at last from the exploitation, oppression and injustice, local and foreign, that had been the nation's curse and burden for centuries.

"Give us time," Ferdinand E. Marcos declared early in his first term as President of the Republic. "Give us several years and the Filipino people will rise up as one man. All they need is guidance and direction, and selfless devotion of a leader in order that ultimately they will show the world that here in Asia, this race — the Filipino race — is a race that can be a leader race!"

He is on the way to redeeming that pledge.

The role that destiny has assigned to Marcos is a great and epic one. It is the nation's fortune that he is gifted with the qualities which the outstanding performance of that historic role demands. Innovative and dynamic, visionary and daring, Marcos has begun his command performance.

There is an electric quality in the impact of his performance. For Marcos is now certain, more than ever before, that the people have entrusted their fate to him. They have unconditionally accepted him as their leader for he has shown them that he is armed not only with the vision to see beyond but the courage to implement his vision. The grave and terrible risks he has taken in the

implementation of that vision rooted in the ethos of the people have convinced them that he is totally committed to shoulder, endure and transcend the passing storm in their own collective evolution. He has won the people's faith because they could hear issuing from his lips their own voices praying for deliverance from their plight, and could see glowing in his eyes their own dream that has begun to be realized.*

——oOo——

*In another national referendum on July 27-28, 1973, an overwhelming majority (90.67%) of the registered voters answered "yes" to the question of whether President Marcos should continue in office beyond 1973 to enable him to finish the reforms he had initiated under martial law. Here are the specific figures as released by the Commission on Elections on August 3, 1973:

Total number of citizens who voted	19,920,567
Total "Yes" votes	18,052,016
Total "No" votes	1,856,744

In this referendum 15-year-old Filipinos were allowed to vote for the first time in Philippine history. According to Chairman Leonardo B. Perez of the Commission, the 15-18 year-old voters cast their votes as follows:

Total "Yes" votes	2,156,753
Total "No" votes	231,735

NOTES

Chapter 1 — The Presidency in Retrospect

1. Alejo L. Villanueva, Jr., "Camelot Anyone?" *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: March 20, 1971).

2. Isabelo T. Crisostomo, *The Challenge of Leadership* (Quezon City: J. Kriz Publishing, 1969).

3. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: New American Library, 1951). Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. calls Hoffer's book a "brilliant and original inquiry into the nature of mass movements."

4. Aside from the standard texts on Jose Rizal, see also this writer's essay, "The Political Ideas of Rizal," *Weekly Nation* (Manila: June 17, 1968).

5. The leadership of Andres Bonifacio is studied in detail in Teodoro A. Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956). See also this writer's essay, "The Authentic Hero," *Graphic* (Manila: December 4, 1968).

6. Cesar Adib Majul, *Apolinario Mabini: Reolutionary* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1964).

7. Apolinario Mabini's *The Philippine Revolution,* Leon Ma. Guerrero, trans. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969).

8. Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: W. Morgan Shuster, 1944). Also this writer's "Quezon: The Romantic Revolutionary," *Weekly Nation* (Manila: August 18, 1969).

9. William T. Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun* (Military Service Publishing Co., 1939, Fighting Forces Series, Washington: March 1944).

10. Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Aide-de-Camp to Freedom.* Translated from Spanish by his daughter, Maria Kalaw Katigbak (Manila: T. M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 1965).

11. Claro M. Recto, *My Crusade* (Pio C. Calica and Nestor Carag, Manila: 1955). The book contains some of the major speeches and essays of Recto.

12. Karl Jaspers, *The Future of Mankind.* Excerpted in the *Nature of Politics,* Michael Curtis, ed., (New York: Avon Library Edition, 1962).

13. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *A Short History of the Philippines,* A Mentor Book (New York: New American Library, 1969).

14. Direct American influence on the political career of Magsaysay is a documented fact. See Carlos P. Romulo and Marion Gray, *The Magsaysay Story* (New York: The John Day Co., 1956); *Magsaysay of the Philippines* (Quezon City: The Phoenix Press, 1953); and Victor Lieberman's essay, "Why the Hukbalahap Movement Failed," in *Solidarity,* Vol. I, No. 4, (October-December 1966). Claro M. Recto also exposed this in his *My Crusade, op. cit.*

15. Edward R. Kiunisala, "A Message from Garcia," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: May 4, 1968).

16. Diosdado Macapagal, "The President and His Predecessors," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: March 30, 1968).

Chapter 2 — THE PATIENT REVOLUTIONARY

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Mandate for Greatness," first inaugural address, December 30, 1965. This speech is published in *A President's Call to Greatness,* Vol. I, No. 1, a collection of his speeches. Mr. Marcos became sixth President of the Republic after defeating President Diosdado Macapagal in the November, 1965 presidential election.

2. *Ibid,* p. 2.

3. *Ibid,* p. 3.

4. *Ibid,* p. 4.

5. *Ibid,* p. 6.

6. Ferdinand E. Marcos, State-of-the-Nation Address, January 24, 1966. In *A President's Call to Greatness,* pp. 8-26.

7. *Ibid,* p. 13.

8. *Ibid,* p. 24.

9. *Ibid,* p. 25.

10. *Ibid,* p. 25.

11. Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines* (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1969).

12. *Ibid.*

Chapter 3 — VISION OF GREATNESS

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, address before the officers and members of the Philippine Veterans Legion, May 29, 1966.

2. Theodore White, *The Making of the President 1960*, Giant Cardinal Edition (New York: Pocket Books, Inc. 1962). See also this writer's essay, "The Presidency," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: October 26, 1968).

3. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, a Mentor Book (New York: New American Library, 1964).

4. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). Mr. Sorensen was a close adviser of President Kennedy.

5. John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect, A Profile in History* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1962).

6. Time essay, *Time Magazine*, July 28, 1968.

7. The preceding discussion of the presidency is a condensation of this writer's essay, "Will Marcos be a Great President?", *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: February 21, 1970), published two months after his re-election.

8. Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines, op. cit.*

9. President Marcos delivered this speech before the Philippine Veterans Legion on May 29, 1966. Published in *A President's Call To Greatness*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1968), *op. cit.*

10. Delivered on July 7, 1966 at the Manila Hotel. Also published in Vol. I, No. 1 of his collection of speeches, *A President's Call To Greatness.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Epic of Nation-Building." State-of-the-Nation Address (January 22, 1967).

13. It is significant that this same statement was practically repeated by the President in his Statement on the Proclamation of Martial Law dated September 21, 1972, or more than five years later. In the Martial Law Statement President Marcos said: "To those who are guilty of treason, insurrection, rebellion, it may pose a grave danger. But to the citizenry whose primary concern is to be left alone to pursue their lawful activities, this is the guaranty of that freedom."

14. From John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, January 20, 1961. The American President, like President Marcos, was an assiduous and sensitive student of history. His speeches, too, pulsed and throbbed with profound echoes from the past.

Chapter 4 — A NEW IDEOLOGY

1. J. A. C. Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion* (Penguin Books, University of Chicago Press, 1963).

2. William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966).

3. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer.*

4. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964). McLuhan is the celebrated prophet of mass media whose views are widely accepted and wildly debated.

5. Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines,* Chapter 13.

6. This statement was made to this author by Blas F. Ople, Secretary of Labor and one of the President's braintrusts. See Chapter 10, *The Challenge of Leadership.*

7. *Ibid,* Chapter 9.

8. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "A Nation of Achievers," State-of-the-Nation Message, Monday, January 22, 1968. This was the official report of the President on his second year as Chief Executive.

9. *Ibid,* p. 5.

10. Napoleon G. Rama, "The Winner," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: November 25, 1967).

11. Napoleon G. Rama, "The Other Winners," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: November 25, 1967).

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. "A Nation of Achievers," *op cit.,* p. 11.

15. *Ibid,* p. 31-32.

16. *Ibid,* p. 42.

17. *Ibid,* p. 70.

18. *Ibid,* p. 71.

19. *Ibid,* p. 71.

Chapter 5 — To Cross The Frontier

1. Napoleon G. Rama, "President At Ease," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: May 4, 1968).

2. *Ibid.* Rama, who became a Vice President of the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention, was arrested and detained in the military stockade immediately after the proclamation of martial law by President Marcos. He was released before Christmas that same year. The *Free Press* was one of the magazines ordered closed by the martial regime.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 2, 68.

4. Generoso G. Marcial, "The Shadow and Substance of the Marcos Administration," *Graphic* (Manila: September 11, 1968).

5. *Ibid.* The *Graphic,* published by J. Antonio Araneta, was as critical as the *Free Press* of President Marcos. The difference was that its owner belonged to a family of oligarchs. Like the *Free Press* the *Graphic* was ordered closed at the onset of martial regime.

6. Monina Allarey Mercado, "The Impact of the Marcoses," *Graphic* (Manila: September 11, 1968).

7. *Ibid.*

8. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "New Filipinism: The Turning Point," State-of-the-Nation Message to Congress (Manila: Bureau of Printing, January 27, 1969).

9. *Ibid*, p. 15.

10. *Ibid*, p. 2.

11. *Ibid*, pp. 2-3.

12. *Ibid*, p. 3.

13. For a more detailed description of student activism in Asia in the early '60s, see "A Period of Discontent," *Graphic* (Manila: November 20, 1968), and "The President and the Youth," *Graphic* (Manila: July 8, 1970), both by the present writer. Also *Newsweek* (November 3, 1969).

14. For a profile of Dubcek and his government, see Jose F. Lacaba, "The Withering of the State," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: August 3, 1968).

15. A dramatic account of the student revolution in France can be found in *Newsweek* magazine (November 3, 1969), among other publications.

16. Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines.*

17. *Ibid,* "A Period of Discontent."

18. *Ibid.*

19. From this writer's "The President and the Youth." It gives a writer a measure of satisfaction to realize that once in a while his views coincide with the tide of events.

20. For a brief but dramatic account of the French Revolution dominated by Robespierre and the Russian Revolution headed by Lenin, see *Life* magazine's series on revolution, beginning with the issue of October 2, 1969.

11. "New Filipinism," *op. cit.,* p. 3.

22. *Ibid,* pp. 3-4.

23. *Ibid,* p. 5.

24. *Ibid,* p. 6.

25. *Ibid,* p. 6. Republic Act 4880, signed into law by President Marcos on June 7, 1967, was sponsored by former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada and former Congressman Melanio Singson.

26. *Ibid,* p. 7.

27. *Ibid,* p. 117.

28. *Ibid,* p. 117.

29. *Ibid,* p. 117.

30. *Ibid,* p. 118.

31. *Ibid,* p. 118.

Chapter 6 — THE SECOND MANDATE

1. A. B. Santos, "Democracy in the Philippines," *The Asia Magazine,* August 4, 1968.

2. *Ibid,* p. 4.

3. Quijano de Manila [Nick Joaquin], "That Was 1969," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: December 27, 1969).

4. Joaquin, *ibid.*

5. Quijano de Manila, "The Unchallenged," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: July 5, 1969).

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Cited in Lionel Trilling, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture* (Boston: The Boston Press, 1955), p. 30.

18. C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology;* Translated by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 39.

19. Michael Curtis, *The Nature of Politics* (New York: Avon Library Book, 1962), p. xxvii.

20. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Manila: 1971), p. 59.

21. Napoleon G. Rama, "Campaigning With Marcos & Osmena," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: August 30, 1969).

22. *Ibid.*

23. Napoleon G. Rama, "Osmena vs. Marcos," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: September 20, 1969).

24. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, op. cit.*

25. Napoleon G. Rama, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

26. Quijano de Manila, "And Still Champ," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: November 22, 1969).

27. The validity of the issue of nationalism should be seen in the light of the intensified nationalist agitation in the cities and in the countrysides at the time. See also this writer's "Will Nationalism Decide the Presidential Election?", *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: October 25, 1969), in which he predicted the reelection of President Marcos.

28. Quijano de Manila, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

29. *The Manila Times* (Manila: October 3, 1969). For an earlier report by the *Philippine News Service* on the PCC mock elections, see the *Manila Chronicle* (Manila: October 19, 1969), and *The Manila Times* column, "Point of Order," by Jose L. Guevara (Manila: October 16, 1969).

30. Quijano de Manila, "And Still Champ," *op. cit.*

31. Quijano de Manila, "Winding It Up."

32. Quijano de Manila, "And Still Champ."

33. Napoleon G. Rama, "Final Round," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: November 1, 1969).

34. Quijano de Manila, "And Still Champ."

35. *Philippines Daily Express* (January 9, 1973). Osmena filed his electoral protest against Marcos on January 19, 1970.

36. *Ibid,* "And Still Champ," p. 72.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Michael Curtis, *The Nature of Politics,* p. xxvi.

Chapter 7 — THE VOLCANO ERUPTS

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "To Transform the Nation — Transform Ourselves," second inaugural address, December 30, 1969 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969) p. 5.

2. *Ibid,* p. 6.

3. *Ibid,* p. 7.

4. *Ibid,* p. 9.

5. *Ibid,* p. 11.

6. Kerima Polotan dramatically describes this event in her "The Long Week," *Philippines Free Press,* February 7, 1970.

7. Jose F. Lacaba, "The January 26 Confrontation," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: February 7, 1970), p. 7.

8. *Ibid,* p. 45.

9. Quijano de Manila, "The President States His Side," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: March 7, 1970), p. 2.

10. *Ibid,* p. 2.

11. Lacaba, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

12. *Ibid,* p. 48.

13. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy,* p. v.

14. Jose F. Lacaba, "And the January 30th Insurrection," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: February 7, 1970), p. 16-B.

15. *Ibid*, p. 16-B.

16. *Ibid*, p. 16-B.

17. *Ibid*, p. 16-B.

18. *Ibid*, pp. 16-B, 16-C.

19. *Ibid*, p. 16-C.

20. "The President States His Side," *op. cit.*, p. 43.

21. *Ibid*, p. 44.

22. *Ibid*, p. 44.

23. *Ibid*, p. 44.

24. The morning after, the papers reported that four students died in the "battle": Feliciano Roldan of FEU, Ricardo Alcantara of UP, Fernando Catabay of MLQU, and Bernardo Tausa of Mapa High School. Almost 300 demonstrators and bystanders were arrested; and most of them were detained in Camp Crame.

25. *Ibid*, p. 16-C.

26. *Ibid*, p. 16-C.

Chapter 8 — THE HOUR HAS COME

1. Filemon V. Tutay, "The Battle of Malacanang," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: February 14, 1970).

2. Teodoro M. Locsin, "The Voice of Reason," *The Philippines Free Press Press* (Manila: March 7, 1970). President Marcos made the statement in an address before the Rotarians, International District 380.

3. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Social Justice and National Unity," Labor Day Speech, May 1, 1970. Published in his collection of speeches, *In The Seventies*, Vol. V (Manila: 1972).

4. From a speech of President Marcos before Catholic educators in Baguio City, March 5, 1970. Included in the collection.

5. Locsin, "The Voice of Reason."

6. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Scale of Reform," speech before the Philippine Jaycees, Rizal Provincial Capitol, March 6, 1970. In that address he also said meaningfully: "Like many of our countrymen, I feel an enormous frustration at not being able to command change more speedily and without risking error."

7. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Greater Commitment," speech before the Veterans Federation of the Philippines at Fort Bonifacio. Published in his collection, *In The Seventies*, pp. 186-189.

8. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Need for Leadership and Democratic Action," delivered at the second graduation exercises of the Philippine Command and General Staff College, Camp Aguinaldo, December 18, 1970. Published in *In The Seventies*, pp. 273-280.

9. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "A Shield of Freedom for Asia," speech delivered at the SEATO Ministerial Conference in Manila, July 2, 1970. Published in *In The Seventies, pp.* 199-209.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Democratic Revolution." State-of-the-Nation Address, January 25, 1971. To him the two other main developments of 1970 were the adoption of a floating rate of the peso and the series of floods and typhoons which resulted in damage of approximately ₱614 million.

12. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Democratic Revolution," p. 1.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid*, p. 2.

15. *Ibid*, p. 3.

16. *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

17. *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

18. This is the last paragraph of the President's speech, "The Democratic Revolution." As it turned out, that speech evolved into a full-blown book on revolution, *Today's Revolution*: *Democracy*, in which he spelled out his historic program of reforms.

19. One such journalist was Amando E. Doronila, columnist of the *Daily Mirror* and one-time president of the National Press Club.

20. Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Revolt of the Masses — Marcos Style," *The Philippines Free Press* (Manila: January 30, 1971).

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. The victims were LP President Gerardo Roxas, Senator Jovito R. Salonga, Senator Sergio Osmena, Jr., senatorial candidates Edgar Ilarde, Ramon P. Mitra, Jr., John Osmena, Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw (originally a Nacionalista, she was then running as a Liberal), Melanio Singson, Genaro

Magsaysay and Salipada Pendatun. Killed were nine persons, including a *Manila Times* photographer, Ben Roxas; 96 others were injured.

25. *The Manila Chronicle* (December 11, 1971).

26. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy, op. cit.*

27. *Ibid*, pp. xix-xxi.

28. *Manila Evening News* (August 31, 1971), p. 2.

Chapter 9 — DEMOCRACY AS REVOLUTION

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Manila: 1971). Throughout this chapter the book will be referred to, in the notes, as *TRD*, with page numbers indicated.

2. Richard Critchfield in the *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: October 14, 1972).

3. *TRD*, p. 139. This is part of the book's epilogue which carries the President's credo, "My Fighting Faith."

4. *TRD*, p. 139.

5. Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (New York: A Mentor Book, 1955).

6. *Ibid*, p. 55.

7. *Ibid*, p. 56.

.8 *TRD*, p. 34.

9. *TRD*, p. 34.

10. *TRD*, p. 37.

11. *TRD*, p. 64.

12. *TRD*, p. 64.

13. *TRD*, p. 65.

14. *TRD*, pp. 65-66.

15. *TRD*, pp. 67-68.

16 *TRD*, p. 69.

17. *TRD*, p. 71.

18. *TRD*, p. 72

19. *TRD*, p. 73

20. *TRD*, p. 74.

21. *TRD*, pp. 75-76.

22. *TRD*, p. 77.

23. *TRD*, p. 78.

24. Richard Critchfield, *op. cit.*

25. For instance, writes Critchfield: " . . . Liberal Party Senator Benigno Aquino [Jr.], the top opposition leader now under arrest, and a former governor of Central Luzon's Tarlac province, is married into the fabulously rich Cojuangco family, which owns, besides an industrial empire, Hacienda Luisita, the world's largest sugar plantation. Such vast holdings long have been the root cause of peasant grievances.

"Tarlac is troubled — and now flood-ravaged — Central Luzon's most heavily Communist-infested province."

26. The President is obviously referring here to *The Philippines Free Press* whose progressive labor stance became untenable after its workers formed an independent labor union. That union was dismantled after the management-controlled union obtained official "recognition." Its officers and members resigned *en masse*, charging the management with unfair labor practice.

27. *TRD*, p. 99-100.

28. *TRD*, p. 100.

29. *TRD*, pp. 118-119.

30. *TRD*, pp. 119-120

31. *TRD*, p. 120.

31. *TRD*, pp. 122-123.

33. *TRD*, p. 124.

34. *TRD*, pp. 124-125.

35. *TRD*, pp. 135-136.

36 *Ibid*, pp. 138-140.

Chapter 10 — REVOLUTION AND REFORMS

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Democratic Revolution," *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

2. The "Regional Program of Action 1972" is printed in full as part of Proclamation 1081. See Appendix B.

3. For the full text of his Statement on the Proclamation of Martial Law, see Appendix A.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. Presidential Decree No. 57 was signed and issued by President Marcos on November 19, 1972.

8. Presidential Decree No. 21 was signed by President Marcos on October 14, 1972.

9. Implementing Instructions No. 1 issued by the National Labor Relations Commission on November 9, 1972.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Bulletin Today* (Manila: July 21, 1973), pp. 1, 24.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. The *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: December 7, 1972).

16. The *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: December 20, 1972).

17. *TRD, op. cit.,* p. 125.

18. The *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: January 10, 1973).

19. The *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: January 18, 1973).

20. The *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: April 3, 1973), p. 2.

21. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Mandate for Greatness," first inaugural address (December 30, 1965).

22. From "Imelda Romualdez-Marcos: Action Programmes" (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1973), p. 7.

Chapter 11 — OMEGA AS ALPHA

1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The New Society is in Peril," a report to the nation (January 7, 1973). Published in the *Daily Express* (Manila: January 8, 1973).

2. Juan Ponce Enrile, "Coping with a National Emergency and Laying the Foundations of the New Society," speech before the National Convention of the Reserve Officers Legion, November 5, 1972. Published in the *Evening Express* (Manila: November 6, 1972).

3. C. L. Sulzberger, "Chaos was the Alternative," column in the April 11, 1973 issue of the *New York Times.* Reprinted in *The Times Journal,* (Manila: April 15, 1973). Mr. Sulzberger visited Manila in March, 1973 with his wife.

4. Quoted in Teodoro F. Valencia's column, "Over a Cup of Coffee," *Bulletin Today* (Manila: April 15,1973). Mr. Marquardt's statements were contained in his columns in the *Arizona Republic* on April 10, 11 and 12, 1973.

5. Saul Alinsky, "The Professional Radical," *Harper's Magazine* (June 1965). Mr. Alinsky, author of *Reveille for Radicals*, is a radical but not a Marxist.

6. *Philippines Sunday Express* (Manila: December 10, 1972). It was Information Secretary Francisco S. Tatad who read Proclamation 1081 after President Marcos had delivered his Statement. Undoubtedly the youngest member of the Marcos Cabinet, he also read over the radio and television all the initial implementing general orders, presidential decrees and letters of instructions issued by the President. Associated with the plot were "big Filipino names" including Sergio Osmena III, Jesus Cabarrus, Jr., and Eugenio Lopez, Jr., whom the military arrested and detained.

7. *The Times Journal*, December 8, 1972, p. 1. The assassin was later identified as Carlito Sena Dimailig, a 27-year-old geodetic engineer from Calaca, Batangas. See also the *Daily Express* (Manila: December 8, 1972).

8. *Philippines Daily Express* (Manila: December 9, 1972), p. 2. President Nixon coneyed his message to the President immediately upon knowing of the incident.

9. *Daily Express, ibid.*

10. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The New Society is in Peril," *op. cit.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Guillermo C. de Vega, "The Constitution in Times of Crisis," *Philippines Quarterly*, Vol. I, March 1973. pp. 3-9. A Ph.D. in history and political science, Dr. de Vega is "one of the three key men assisting President Marcos." A prime exponent of the parliamentary system which the new Constitution provides, he headed the Constitution Ratification Committee and was deeply involved in setting up the Citizens Assemblies or *barangays* which decided vital national issues, including the ratification of the Constitution.

15. Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The People Demanded to be Heard, and They Were Heard," extemporaneous remarks at the proclamation of the ratification of the Constitution and the continuation of martial law, at Malacanang, January 17, 1973. Published in full in the *Daily Express* (Manila: January 20, 1973).

16. *Ibid.*

17. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos: *The Crisis of the Republic* (University of the Philippines, 1960).

18. Agoncillo, p. 382.

19. De Vega, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

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APPENDIX A

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN A NATIONWIDE RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCAST

As of the 21st of September, I signed Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law. This proclamation was to be implemented upon my clearance, and clearance was granted at 9:00 in the evening of the 22nd of September. I have proclaimed martial law in accordance with powers vested in the President by the Constitution of the Philippines.

The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by the military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our democracy. A republican and democratic form of government is not a helpless government. When it is imperilled by the danger of a violent overthrow, insurrection and rebellion, it has inherent and built-in powers wisely provided for under the Constitution. Such a danger confronts the Republic.

Thus, Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution provides:

> "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus,* or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."

I repeat, this is not a military takeover of civil government functions. The government of the Republic of the Philippines which was established by our people in 1946 continues. The officials and employees of our national and local governments continue in office and must discharge their duties as before within the limits of the situation. This will be clarified by my subsequent orders which shall be given wide publicity. (Refer to General Order No. 3).

We will explain the requirements and standards or details as soon as possible. But any form of corruption, culpable negligence or arrogance will be dealt with immediately.

The armed forces is already cleaning up its own ranks. I am directing the organization of a military commission to investigate, try and punish all military offenders immediately. For more than any other man, the soldier must set the standard of nobility. We must be courageous but we must be humble and above all we must be fair. As this is true of the soldier, it must be true of the civilian public officer.

Let no man who claims to be a friend, relative or ally presume to seek license because of this relationship. If he offends the New Society, he shall be punished like the rest.

Persons who have nothing whatsoever to do with such conspiracy and operations to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by violence have nothing to fear. They can move about and perform their daily activities without any fear from the government after the period of counteraction is over.

The persons who will be adversely affected are those who have actively participated in the conspiracy and operations to overthrow the duly constituted government of the Republic of the Philippines by violence.

But all public officials and employees whether of the national or local governments must conduct themselves in the manner of a new and reformed society.

In addition to this, I issued general orders for the government in the meantime to control media and other means of dissemination of information as well as all public utilities. All schools will be closed for one week beginning this coming Monday. The carrying of firearms outside residences without the permission of the armed forces of the Philippines is punishable with death; curfew is established from twelve o'clock midnight to four o'clock in the morning; the departure of Filipinos abroad is temporarily suspended; exceptions are those of official missions that are necessary. Clearance will be given by the Secretary of National Defense. In

the meantime, rallies, demonstrations are prohibited. So too are strikes in critical public utilities.

I have ordered the arrest of those directly involved in the conspiracy to overthrow our duly constituted government by violence and subversion.

It is my intention beginning tomorrow to issue all the orders which would attain reforms in our society.

This would include the proclamation of land reform all over the Philippines, the reorganization of the government, new rules of conduct for the civil service, the removal of corrupt and inefficient public officials and their replacement and the breaking up of criminal syndicates.

Again I repeat — this is the same government that you — the people — established in 1946 under the Constitution of the Philippines.

There is no doubt in everybody's mind that a state of rebellion exists in the Philippines.

The ordinary man in the streets, in our cities, the peasants and the laborers know it. Industrialists know it. So do the government functionary. They have all been affected by it. This danger to the Republic of the Philippines and the existence of a rebellion has been recognized even by our Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Lansang vs. Garcia, dated December 11, 1971.

Since the Supreme Court promulgated this decision, the danger has become graver and rebellion has worsened or escalated. It has paralyzed the functions of the national and local governments. The productive sectors of the economy have grounded to a halt. Many schools have closed down. The judiciary is unable to administer justice. Many of our businessmen, traders, industrialists, producers and manufacturers stopped their operations. In the Greater Manila Area alone, tension and anxiety have reached a point where the citizens are compelled to stay at home. Lawlessness and criminality like kidnaping, smuggling, extortion, blackmail, armed robbery, illegal traffic in drugs, gunrunning, hoarding and manipulation of prices, corruption in government, tax evasion perpetuated by

syndicated criminals, have increasingly escalated beyond the capability of the local police and civilian authorities.

The usually busy centers of the area such as cinema houses, supermarkets, restaurants, transportation terminals and even public markets are practically deserted. Battles are going on between the elements of the armed forces of the Philippines and the subversives in the island of Luzon at Isabela, Zambales, Tarlac, Camarines Sur, Quezon; and in the island of Mindanao, at Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur and Cotabato.

If this continues even at the present rate, the economy of the country will collapse in a short time.

In one province alone—Isabela—where the Communist Party and the New People's Army have sought to establish a rural sanctuary, they are now in control of 33 municipalities out of 37. Other towns are infiltrated severely by these armed elements. In this province alone, the supposed invisible government of the Communist Party has been organized through the Barrio Organizing Committees (BOCs), totalling 207 in twenty five (25) towns, compared to 161 in 12 towns in early 1971.

In addition to the Barrio Organizing Committees, they have also organized the Barrio Revolutionary Committees (BRCs).

In Angadanan and Cauayan, Isabela, the New People's Army has established communal farms and production bases.

The New People's Army has started to expand its operation to Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino as well as the Mountain Province of Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Bontoc and Benguet. Even the two Ilocos provinces and La Union have been infiltrated.

The New People's Army and the Communist Party have also sought to establish in a similar pattern, a rural sanctuary in the province of Camarines Sur and are attempting to expand into Albay, Sorsogon, and Camarines Norte as well as Quezon province.

The armed elmeents of the New People's Army under the Communist Party of the Philippines (Maoist Faction) have increased to about 10,000, which includes regulars as well as farmers in the

daytime and soldiers at night. This is an increase of 100% in a short period of six (6) months. It has increased its mass base to 100,000. Their front organizations operations have increased tremendously. Example of such a front organization is the *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM), the most militant organization of the Communist Party which has increased its chapters from 200 in 1970 to 317 up to the end of July 1972 and its membership from 10,000 in 1970 to 15,000 up to the end of July this year. The *Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan* (SDK), an outspoken front organization, had also increased its chapters from almost none in 1970 to 159 at the end of July this year and has now 1,495 highly indoctrinated and fanatical members.

The crucial point which indicates an increase in the capability, the area of operations as well as the manpower and fire power of the New People's Army is the M/V *Karagatan* or Palanan incident in Palanan, Isabela last July 4 and 5, 1972. This was a landing by an ocean-going ship of a reported 3,500 M-14 rifles of which only about 900 were recovered by the armed forces of the Philippines; about 30 rocket launchers of the M-40 variety of which only six (6) were recovered from the area. Also recovered by our forces were 160,000 rounds of ammunition, two (2) Browing automatic rifles which were originally looted by defector Victor Corpus from the arsenal of the Philippine Military Academy, five (5) Garand M-1 rifles, one (1) telephone switch board, seven (7) telephone sets, numerous M-14 magazines and many revealing subversive documents.

The landing of military armaments and equipment in the Palanan incident, indicated:

1) That the claim of the New People's Army that they are well-funded has basis in fact;

2) That they now have sources of funds and equipment not only inside the Philippines but also outside the country;

3) That the Communist Party and the New People's Army are capable of landing armaments, military equipment and even personnel in many points of the long sea coast of the

Philippines which is twice the sea coast of the United States.

The defense establishment has admitted that there have been attempts to infiltrate the military organizations as well as the Office of the Secretary of National Defense. There have been various incidents of attempts to sabotage not only the operations of the armed forces of the Philippines but the operations of the national government.

It has been reported that the communications system of the Philippine Constabulary is being utilized by the subversives.

The subversives have organized urban partisans in the Greater Manila Area. They have been and still are active. They have succeeded in some of their objectives.

The violent disorder in Mindanao and Sulu has to date resulted in the killing of over 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians, not to mention the more than five hundred thousands of injured, displaced and homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties among our government troops, and the paralyzation of the economy of Mindanao and Sulu.

I assure you that I am utilizing this power vested in me by the Constitution to save the Republic and reform our society. I wish to emphasize these two objectives. We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic. But at the same time we must now reform the social, economic and political institutions in our country. The plans and orders for reform to remove the inequities of that society, the clean-up of government of its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of the criminal syndicates, the systematic development of our economy — will be explained to you. But we must start out with the removal of anarchy and the maintenance of peace and order.

I have had to use the other two alternatives of calling out the troops to quell the rebellion and suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. But the rebellion has not been stopped. I repeat, it has worsened. Thus it was discovered that when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* was lifted

on January 11, 1972, the organization of the Communist Party had expanded their area of operation as well as increased their memberships.

All other recourses have been unavailing. You are all witnesses to these. So we have fallen on our last line of defense.

You are witnesses to the patience that we have shown in the face of provocation. In the face of abuse and license we have used persuasion. Now the limit has been reached. We are against the wall. We must now defend the Republic with the stronger powers of the Constitution.

To those guilty of treason, insurrection, rebellion, it may pose a grave danger. But to the citizenry whose primary concern is to be left alone to pursue their lawful activities, this is the guaranty of that freedom.

All that we do is for the Republic and for you. Rest assured we will continue to do so.

I have prayed to God for guidance. Let us all continue to do so. I am confident that with God's help we will attain our dream of a reformed society, a new and brighter world.

APPENDIX B

PROCLAMATION NO. 1081

PROCLAIMING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated and verified information, it is definitely established that lawless elements who are moved by a common or similar ideological conviction, design, strategy and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by, intensely devoted, well trained, determined and ruthless groups of men and seeking refuge under the protection of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their resources and forces together for the prime purpose of, and in fact they have been and are actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in order to forcibly seize political and state power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social, economic, legal and moral precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through seemingly innocent and harmless, although actually destructive, front organizations which have been infiltrated or deliberately formed by them, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their membership through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in spreading and expanding their control and influence over almost every segment and level of our society throughout the land in their ceaseless effort to erode and weaken the political, social, economic, legal and moral founda-

tions of our existing government, and to influence, manipulate and move peasant, labor, student and terroristic organizations under their influence or control to commit, as in fact they have committed and still are committing, acts of violence, depredations, sabotage and injuries against our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;

WHEREAS, in the fanatical pursuit of their conspiracy and widespread acts of violence, depredations, sabotage and injuries against our people, and in order to provide the essential instrument to direct and carry out their criminal design and unlawful activities, and to achieve their ultimate sinister objectives, these lawless elements have in fact organized, established and are now maintaining a Central Committee, composed of young and dedicated radical students and intellectuals, which is charged with guiding and directing the armed struggle and propaganda assaults against our duly constituted government, and this Central Committee is now imposing its will and asserting its sham authority on certain segments of our population, especially in the rural areas, through varied means of subterfuge, deceit, coercion, threats, intimidations, machinations, treachery, violence and other modes of terror, and has been and is illegally exacting financial and other forms of tributes from our people to raise funds and material resources to support its insurrectionary and propaganda activities against our duly constituted government and against our peace-loving people;

WHEREAS, in order to carry out, as in fact they have carried out, their premeditated plan to stage, undertake and wage a full scale armed insurrection and rebellion in this country, these lawless elements have organized, established and are now maintaining a well trained, well armed and highly indoctrinated and greatly expanded insurrectionary force, popularly known as the "New People's Army", which has since vigorously pursued and still is vigorously pursuing a relentless and ruthless armed struggle against our duly constituted government and whose unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults and reign of terror and acts of lawlessness in the rural areas and in our urban centers brought about the

treacherous and cold-blooded assassination of innocent civilians, military personnel of the government and local public officials in many parts of the country, notably in the Cagayan Valley, in Central Luzon, in the Southern Tagalog Region, in the Bicol Area, in the Visayas and in Mindanao, and whose daring and wanton guerrilla activities have generated and sown fear and panic among our people, have created a climate of chaos and disorder, produced a state of political, social, psychological and economic instability in our land, and have inflicted great suffering and irreparable injury to persons and property in our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, their cadres, fellow-travellers, friends, sympathizers and supporters have for many years up to the present time been mounting sustained, massive and destructive propaganda assaults against our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies and officials, and also against our social, political, economic and religious institutions, through the publications, broadcasts and disseminations of deliberately slanted and overly exaggerated news stories and news commentaries as well as false, vile, foul and scurrilous statements, utterances, writings and pictures through the press-radio-television media and through leaflets, college campus newspapers and some newspapers published and still being published by these lawless elements, notably the "Ang Bayan", "Pulang Bandila" and the "Ang Komunista", all of which are clearly well-conceived, intended and calculated to malign and discredit our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies and officials before our people, making it appear to the people that our government has become so weak and so impotent to perform and discharge its functions and responsibilities in our society and to our people, and thus undermine and destroy the faith and loyalty and allegiance of our people in and alienate their support for their duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies and officials, and thereby gradually erode and weaken as in fact they have so eroded and weakened the will of our people to sustain and defend our government and our democratic way of life,

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and security of the nation, and acting with cunning and manifest precision and deliberation and without regard to the health, safety and well-being of the people, are now implementing their plan to cause widespread, massive and systematic destruction and paralyzation of vital public utilities and services, particularly water systems, sources of electrical power, communication and transportation facilities, to the great detriment, suffering, injury and prejudice of our people and the nation and to generate a deep psychological fear and panic among our people;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in the cases brought before it, docketed as G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039, L-34265, and L-34339, as a consequence of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* by me as President of the Philippines in my Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, as amended, has found that in truth and in fact there exists an actual insurrection and rebellion in the country by a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government. Here is what the Supreme Court said in its decision promulgated on December 11, 1971:

> "x x x our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably, but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Phil-

ippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) after liberation — which clashed several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus,* the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castaneda. Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences.

"The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the grounds stated in the very preamble of said statute — that

"x x x the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

"x x x the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a *clear, present* and *grave* danger to the security of the Philippines; and

"x x x in the fact of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to

cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country x x x."

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —

> "The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng Mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals, the PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism."

Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the 'Protracted People's War' or 'War of National Liberation.' Its 'Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution' states, *inter alia*:

> "The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous . . .
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> xxx xxx xxx
>
> "The Central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The *Communist Party of the Philippines*

assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable to taking the road of armed revolution . . .

"In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National Defense — conducted rallies, resorted to kidnapings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 343 losses. In 1970, its record of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.

"At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is *per se* proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was *announced publicly* by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.

"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have to a considerable extent succeeded in impeding our duly constituted authorities from performing their functions and discharging their duties and responsibilities in accordance with our laws and our Constitution to the great damage, prejudice and detriment of the people and the nation;

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, by destroying our democratic way of life and our established secular and religious institutions and beliefs, and by supplanting our existing political, social, economic, legal and moral order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social. economic and moral precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in its said decision concluded that the unlawful activities of the aforesaid lawless elements actually pose a clear, present and grave danger to public safety and the security of the nation and in support of that conclusion found that:

> "x x x the Executive had information and reports — subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the above-mentioned Report of the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local officials; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila area in 1970; that the Constitutional Con-

vention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC Building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO sub-station at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.

"x x x the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration of student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molabe (SM), and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (MPK); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Areas, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu: that in 1970, the Party had

recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.

"Subsequent events x x x have also proven x x x the threat to public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequences of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2) others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command post of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) KM-SDK leaders, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed, that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza was reportedly killed on September

22, 1971, in an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.

"It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a 'Claymore' mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnapings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurrence would signal the beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharges other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and the Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area."

WHEREAS, in the unwavering prosecution of their revolutionary war against the Filipino people and their duly constituted government, the aforesaid lawless elements have, in the months of May, June and July, 1972, succeeded in bringing and introducing into the country at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela and at other undetermined points along the Pacific coastline of Luzon, a substantial quantity of war materiel consisting of M-14 rifles estimated to be some 3,500 pieces, several dozens of 40 mm rocket launchers which are said to be Chicom copies of a Russian prototype rocket launcher, large quantities of 80 mm rockets and ammunitions, and other combat paraphernalia, of which war materiel some had been discovered and captured by government military forces, and the bringing and introduction of such quantity

and type of war materiel into the country is a mute but eloquent proof of the sinister plan of the aforesaid lawless elements to hasten the escalation of their present revolutionary war against the Filipino people and their legitimate government;

WHEREAS, in the execution of their overall revolutionary plan, the aforesaid lawless elements have prepared and released to their various field commanders and Party workers a document captioned "REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972", a copy of which was captured by elements of the 116th and 119th Philippine Constabulary Companies on June 18, 1972 at Barrio Taringsing, Cordon, Isabela, the text of which reads as follows:

"REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972

"The following Regional Program of Action for 1972 is prepared to be carried out as part of the overall plan of the party to foment discontent and precipitate the tide of nationwide mass revolution. The fascist Marcos and his reactionary members of Congress is expected to prepare themselves for the 1973 hence:

"January — June:

"1. Intensify recruitment of new party members especially from the workers-farmers class. Cadres are being trained in order to organize the different regional bureaus. These bureaus must concentrate on mass action and organization to promote advancement of the mass revolutionary movement. Reference is made to the "Borador ng Programa sa Pagkilos at Ulat ng Panglipunang Pagsisiyasat" as approved by the Central Committee.

"2. Recruit and train armed city partisans and urban guerrillas and organize them into units under Party cadres and activists of mass organizations. These units must undergo specialized training on explosives and demolition and other forms of sabotage.

"3. Intensify recruitment and training of new members for the New People's Army in preparation for limited offensive in selected areas in the regions.

"4. Support a more aggressive program of agitation and propaganda against the reactionary armed forces and against the Con Con.

"July - August:

"During this period the party expects the puppet Marcos government to allow increase in bus rates thus aggravating further the plight of students, workers and the farmers.

"1. All Regional Party Committees must plan for a general strike movement. The Regional Operational Commands must plan for armed support if the fascist armed forces of Marcos will try to intimidate the oppressed Filipino masses.

"2. Conduct sabotage against schools, colleges and universities hiking tuition fees.

"3. Conduct sabotage and agitation against puppet judges and courts hearing cases against top party leaders.

"4. Create regional chaos and disorder to dramatize the inability of the fascist Marcos government to keep and maintain peace and order thru:

"a) Robbery and hold-up of banks controlled by American imperialists and those belonging to the enemies of the people.

"b) Attack military camps, US bases and towns.

"c) More violent strikes and demonstrations.

"September - October:

"Increase intensity of violence, disorder and confusion:

"1. Intensify sabotage and bombing of government buildings and embassies and other utilities:

"a) Congress
"b) Supreme Court
"c) Con Con
"d) City Hall
"e) US Embassy
"f) Facilities of US Bases
"g) Provincial Capitols
"h) Power Plants
"i) PLDT
"j) Radio Stations

"2. Sporadic attacks on camps, towns and cities.

"3. Assassinate high government officials of Congress, Judiciary, Con Con and private individuals sympathetic to puppet Marcos.

4. Establish provisional revolutionary government in towns and cities with the support of the masses.

"5. With the sympathetic support of our allies, establish provisional provincial revolutionary governments.

"CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
PHIILIPPINES"

WHEREAS, in line with their "REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972", the aforesaid lawless elements have of late been conducting intensified acts of violence and terrorisms during the current year in the greater Manila area such as the bombing of the Arca building at Taft Avenue, Pasay City, on March 15; of the Filipinas Orient Airways board room at Domestic Road, Pasay City on April 23; of the Vietnamese Embassy on May 30; of the Court of Industrial Relations on June 23; of the Philippine Trust Company branch office in Cubao, Quezon City on June 24; of the

Philamlife building at United Nations Avenue, Manila, on July 3; of the Tabacalera Cigar and Cigarette Factory Compound at Marquez de Comillas, Manila on July 27; of the PLDT exchange office at East Avenue, Quezon City, and of the Philippine Sugar Institute building at North Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, both on August 15; of the Department of Social Welfare building at San Rafael Street, Sampaloc, Manila, August 17; of a water main on Aurora Boulevard and Madison Avenue, Quezon City on August 19; of the Philamlife building again on August 30, this time causing severe destruction on the Far East Bank and Trust Company building nearby; of the armored car and building of the Philippine Banking Corporation as well as the buildings of the Investment Development Inc. and the Daily Star Publications when another explosion took place on Railroad Street, Port Area, Manila also on August 30; of Joe's Department Store on Carriedo Street, Quiapo, Manila, on September 5, causing death to one woman and injuries to some 38 individuals; and of the City Hall of Manila on September 8; of the water mains in San Juan, Rizal on Sept. 12; of the San Miguel building in Makati, Rizal on Sept. 14; and of the Quezon City Hall on September 18, 1972, as well as the attempted bombing of the Congress Building on July 18, when an unexploded bomb was found in the Senate Publication Division and the attempted bombing of the Department of Foreign Affairs on August 30;

WHEREAS, in line with the same "REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972", the aforesaid lawless elements have also fielded in Greater Manila area several of their "Sparrow Units" or "Simbad Units" to undertake liquidation missions against ranking government officials, military personnel and prominent citizens and to further heighten the destructions and depredations already inflicted by them upon our innocent people, all of which are being deliberately done to sow terror, fear and chaos amongst our population and to make the government look so helpless and incapable of protecting the lives and property of our people;

WHEREAS, in addition to the above-described social disorder, there is also the equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the unsettled conflict between certain elements of

the Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu, between the Christian "Ilagas" and the Muslim "Barracudas", and between our government troops, and certain lawless organizations such as the Mindanao Independence Movement;

WHEREAS, the Mindanao Independence Movement with the active material and financial assistance of foreign political and economic interests, is engaged in an open and unconcealed attempt to establish by violence and force a separate and independent political state out of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu which are historically, politically and by law parts of the territories and within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, because of the aforesaid disorder resulting from armed clashes, killings, massacres, arsons, rapes, pillages, destruction of whole villages and towns and the inevitable cessation of agricultural and industrial operations, all of which have been brought about by the violence inflicted by the Christians, the Muslims, the "Ilagas", the "Barracudas", and the Mindanao Independence Movement against each other and against our government troops, a great many parts of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu are virtually now in a state of actual war;

WHEREAS, the violent disorder in Mindanao and Sulu has to date resulted in the killing of over 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians, not to mention the more than five hundred thousand of injured, displaced and homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties among our government troops, and the paralyzation of the economy of Mindanao and Sulu;

WHEREAS, because of the foregoing acts of armed insurrection, wanton destruction of human lives and property, unabated and unrestrained propaganda attacks against the government and its institutions, instrumentalities, agencies and officials, and the rapidly expanding ranks of the aforesaid lawless elements, and because of the spreading lawlessness and anarchy throughout the land, all of which have prevented the government to exercise its authority, extend to its citizenry the protection of its laws and in general

exercise its sovereignty over all of its territories, caused serious demoralization among our people and have made the public apprehensive and fearful, and finally because public order and safety and the security of this nation demand that immediate, swift, decisive and effective action be taken to protect and insure the peace, order and security of the country and its population and to maintain the authority of the government;

WHEREAS, in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, I, as President of the Philippines, have, under the Constitution, three courses of action open to me, namely: (a) call out the armed forces to suppress the present lawless violence; (b) suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* to make the arrest and apprehension of these lawless elements easier and more effective; or (c) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law;

WHEREAS, I have already utilized the first two courses of action, first, by calling upon the armed forces to suppress the aforesaid lawless violence, committing to that specific job almost 50% of the entire armed forces of the country and creating several task forces for that purpose such as Task Force Saranay, Task Force Palanan, Task Force Isarog, Task Force Pagkakaisa and Task Force Lancaf, and, second, by suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* on August 21, 1971 up to January 11, 1972, but in spite of all that, both courses of action were found inadequate and ineffective to contain, much less solve, the present rebellion and lawlessness in the country as shown by the fact that:

1. The radical left has increased the number and area of operation of its front organizations and has intensified the recruitment and training of new adherents in the urban and rural areas especially from among the youth;

2. The Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the most militant and outspoken front organization of the radical left, has increased the number of its chapters from 200 as of the end of 1970 to 317 as of July 31, 1972 and its membership from 10,000 as of the end of 1970 to 15,000 as of the end of July,

1972, showing very clearly the rapid growth of the communist movement in this country;

3. The Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), another militant and outspoken front organization of the radical left, has also increased the number of its chapters from an insignificant number at the end of 1970 to 159 as of the end of July, 1972 and has now a membership of some 1,495 highly indoctrinated, intensely committed and almost fanatically devoted individuals;

4. The New People's Army, the most active and the most violent and ruthless military arm of the radical left, has increased its total strength from an estimated 6,500 (composed of 560 regulars, 1,500 combat support and 4,400 service support) as of January 1, 1972 to about 7,900 (composed of 1,028 regulars, 1,800 combat support and 5,025 service support) as of July 31, 1972, showing a marked increase in its regular troops of over 100% in such a short period of six months;

5. The establishment of sanctuaries for the insurgents in Isabela, in Zambales, in Camarines Sur, and in some parts of Mindanao, a development heretofore unknown in our campaign against subversion and insurgency in this country;

6. The disappearance and dropping out of school of some 3,000 high school and college students and who are reported to have joined with the insurgents for training in the handling of firearms and explosives;

7. The bringing and introduction into the country of substantial war materiel consisting of military hardware and supplies through the MV Karagatan at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela, and the fact that many of these military hardware and supplies are now in the hands of the insurgents and are being used against our government troops;

8. The infiltration and control of the media by persons who are sympathetic to the insurgents and the consequent inten-

sification of their propaganda assault against the government and the military establishment of the government;

9. The formation at the grass-roots level of "political power organs," heretofore unknown in the history of the Communist movement in this country, composed of Barrio Organizing Committees (BOCs) to mobilize the barrio people for active involvement in the revolution; the Barrio Revolutionary Committees (BRCs) to act as "local government" in barrios considered as CPP/NPA bailiwicks; the Workers Organizing Committees (WOCs) to organize workers from all sectors; the School Organizing Committees (SOCs) to conduct agitation and propaganda activities and help in the expansion of front groups among the studentry; and the Community Organizing Committees (COCs) which operate in the urban areas in the same manner as the BOCs.

WHEREAS, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines;

NOW, THEREFORE, I,FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses

committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy two.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) ROBERTO V. REYES
Acting Executive Secretary

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The author of *Marcos the Revolutionary,* the first full-length in-depth study of the Marcos theory of revolution, is a professor at the state Philippine College of Commerce, Manila, of which he is also the College and Board Secretary. Recognized as "one of the country's keenest and most perceptive minds," he has received honors for the "quality, range and depth" of his numerous essays on politics, history and society. His other books include *The Challenge of Leadership,* in which he foretold the reelection of President Marcos in the 1969 presidential election and intimated that from there Marcos would proceed to recast Philippine society; *The Lonely Room,* a collection of his "local color" short stories; and *Modern Advertising for Filipinos,* a widely used textbook on advertising and mass communications.